State v. Hallock., 83.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1945
• Docket Number: No. 83.,83.
• Citation: 44 A.2d 326
• Parties: STATE v. HALLOCK.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

44 A.2d 326

STATE

v.HALLOCK.

No. 83.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Oct. 2, 1945.

Exceptions from Addison County Court; Orrin B. Hughes, Presiding Judge.

Carlie H. Hallock was prosecuted for operating a motor vehicle on a public highway after revocation of his operator's license, and the State brings an exception to the county court's last fact finding before final judgment.

Exception sustained, judgment of respondent's guilt rendered, and cause remanded for sentence.

Wayne C. Bosworth, State's Atty., of Middlebury, for plaintiff.

Ezra S. Dike, of Bristol, and Louis Lisman, of Burlington, for defendant.

Before MOULTON, C.J., and SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT, and JEFFORDS, JJ.

BUTTLES, Justice.

The respondent was prosecuted in county court for the offense of operating a motor vehicle upon the public highway after his operator's license had been revoked. Trial by jury resulted in a disagreement and the jury was discharged. It was then stipulated and agreed by the parties, through their respective attorneys, that the case should be tried by the court without a jury; that the transcript of the jury trial should constitute the evidence to be considered by the court in making findings of fact; and that the judges of the county court, present at the trial by jury, should treat the evidence introduced thereat as if the same had been presented before them acting as a court in a trial without a jury. It is not questioned that there was a sufficient waiver of the respondent's right under Chap. 1, Art. 10 of the Constitution of Vermont to a trial by jury. Pursuant to this agreement findings of fact were made and filed and the State has brought the case to this Court before final judgment, under the provisions of P.L. 2425, upon its exception to the last finding so made.

The respondent has challenged the jurisdiction of the courts of Vermont in this case and we first give attention to the jurisdictional question. It is contended that the offense charged lies within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts and that the jurisdiction of the state courts is thereby excluded. It is not questioned that Lake Champlain is a part of the navigable waters of the United States, and that the maritime jurisdiction granted to the federal government and its courts by the Constitution and statutes of the United States applies to it. See St. John v. Thompson, 108 Vt. 66, 68, 182 A. 196.

From the findings it appears that the respondent's license to operate motor vehicles in Vermont was revoked for cause by the commissioner on September 26, 1944; that on January 5, 1945, the respondent rode in an automobile driven by a licensed operator on the ice of Lake Champlain to a point about 70 feet straight out from the shore in the town of Shoreham; that the respondent then took the car himself and drove it to a certain fishing shanty 400 or 500 feet from the shore, thence across the lake to the New York shore and thence back to the place from which he started driving the car; that the respondent's license to operate motor vehicles had not then been restored or reinstated.

The Federal District Courts have been vested by Congress with jurisdiction of crimes punishable by Federal law committed on the navigable waters of the United States; but in taking cognizance in such cases, they act as courts of common law, not as admiralty courts, the reason being that the constitution guarantees a jury trial in criminal prosecutions and juries are unknown to general admiralty jurisprudence. 1 Am.Jur., Admiralty, § 62; 14 Id., Crim.Law, § 222 p. 923. The United States Criminal Code provides for the punishment of crimes: ‘First. When committed upon the high seas, or any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, or when committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State on board any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created’ etc. U.S.Crim.Code, § 272, 18 U.S.C.A. § 451. The limitation of the federal jurisdiction in criminal cases to ‘waters * * * out of the jurisdiction of any particular State’ occurs in prior enactments as early as the Act of April 30, 1790, which provided for the punishment of certain crimes committed ‘upon the high seas, or in any river, harbor, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.’ 18 U.S.C.A. § 481, note. That this limitation excludes the federal courts from jurisdiction of offenses committed upon waters which are within the jurisdiction of one of the states of the Union is entirely clear and appears never to have been questioned. See United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 4 L.Ed. 404; United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 265, 14 S.Ct. 109, 115, 37 L.Ed. 1071; Wynne v. United States, 217 U.S. 234, 30 S.Ct. 447, 54 L.Ed. 748.

Generally speaking a state possesses jurisdiction and sovereignty coextensive with its boundaries. 49 Am.Jur. States § 24; State v. Young, 46 Vt. 565, 569. It is found that the boundary line between the states of Vermont and New York follows the...