State v. Halverson, 13–0446.

• Decision Date: 02 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–0446.,13–0446.
• Citation: State v. Halverson, 857 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 2015)
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Curtis Vance HALVERSON, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

857 N.W.2d 632

STATE of Iowa, Appellee

v.Curtis Vance HALVERSON, Appellant.

No. 13–0446.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 2, 2015.

Thomas A. Hurd of Glazebrook, Moe, Johnston & Hurd LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick C. Jackson, County Attorney, and Tyron Rogers, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Opinion

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we consider an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in which defense counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendant of possession of marijuana at a residential facility under Iowa Code section 719.7(3)(c ) (2011). In order to commit the charged offense, the defendant must be held in an “institution under the management of the [Iowa] department of corrections [ (IDOC) ]”. Id. In this case, the defendant was being held at the Burlington Residential Correctional Facility (residential facility) at the time of the events giving rise to the charge. After receipt of the State's testimony, defense counsel made a motion for directed verdict based on the State's failure to make a prima facie case,¹ but specifically failed to argue the evidence was insufficient to establish that the facility was an institution under the management of the department of corrections. The court denied the motion for directed verdict and the defendant was convicted of the underlying charge.

On appeal, the defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective for specifically failing to assert there was insufficient evidence to support the charge because the residential facility was not under the management of the department of corrections. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment. We granted further review. For the reasons stated below, we conclude the statutory argument was a claim “worth making” under our caselaw, that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert it, and that had the claim been timely asserted, the defendant would have been acquitted of the underlying charge. As a result, the decision of the court of appeals is vacated, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the charge.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

Curtis Halverson was in the custody of the residential facility—commonly referred to as a halfway house—when officials detected the smell of marijuana arising from a room to which he was assigned. Residential officers searched the room and discovered a partially smoked marijuana cigarette. After obtaining other incriminating evidence, Halverson was charged with knowingly possessing marijuana on the grounds of a facility “under the management of the department of corrections” in violation of Iowa Code sections 719.7(1)(a ), 719.7(3)(c ), and 719.7(4)(b ), a class “D” felony.²

Halverson pled not guilty and the matter proceeded to jury trial. At trial, the State called three witnesses. The State's witnesses testified that the residential facility was a halfway house in which Halverson was a resident, that the residential facility functioned “under the policies of the Department of Corrections,” and that staff received a two-week training course on their job duties “in association with or through the Department of Corrections.” After receipt of the testimony, defense counsel made a conclusory motion for a directed verdict, but failed to argue the evidence was insufficient to establish that the residential facility was an institution under the management of the department of corrections.

The court instructed the jury that in order to convict the defendant it must find that “The Burlington Residential Correctional Facility is a correctional institution or an institution under the management of the Department of Corrections.” The jury convicted Halverson. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, and we granted further review.

II. Standard of Review.

Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are reviewed de novo. State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1992). Although at trial Halverson's counsel moved to dismiss the State's case for insufficient evidence, he failed to specifically assert that the State failed to show the residential facility was under the management of the department of corrections. See Iowa Code § 719.7(3)(c ). As a result, the claim was not preserved; however, our ordinary preservation rules do not apply to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006). As a result, Halverson may raise his claim for the first time on appeal. Id.

In his brief on appeal, Halverson does not specify whether he is proceeding under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. Where there are parallel provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions and a party does not indicate the specific constitutional basis under which the party is proceeding, we regard both federal and state constitutional claims as preserved. See King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa 2011).

The United States Supreme Court has said that under the Sixth Amendment, in order to show ineffective assistance a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the attorney failed to perform an essential duty and to the extent it denied the defendant a fair trial, prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). Although some state courts have not utilized the Strickland test, the defendant does not suggest ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims should be reviewed under the Iowa Constitution in a fashion different from its federal counterpart. For purposes of this case, we therefore apply the Strickland standard. See King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 (applying Strickland test when counsel did not indicate whether case was being brought under the Iowa or Federal Constitution); State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838, 842 n. 1 (Iowa 2008) (interpreting Iowa and Federal Constitutions identically, and noting no argument was made that the Iowa Constitution should be interpreted differently than the Federal Constitution in search and seizure cases). Even in such cases, however, “we reserve the right to apply the principles differently under the state constitution compared to its federal counterpart.” King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 ; see, e.g., State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) ; Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 842 n. 1.

III. Discussion.

A. Introduction. In this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case, we begin by considering if the claim would have been meritorious had it been raised by trial counsel. Counsel, of course, does not provide ineffective assistance if the underlying claim is meritless. See State v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164, 171 (Iowa 2011). If, however, an underlying claim has merit, we must determine whether the failure to make the claim amounted to a breach of duty and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the breach. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.

B. Merits of the Underlying Claim. In order to answer the question of whether Halverson's trial counsel was ineffective, we first consider whether the unasserted grounds for dismissal would have been meritorious. In order to address this question, we review various provisions of Iowa Code chapters 904 and 905. Iowa Code chapter 904 outlines the powers and responsibilities of the IDOC, while Iowa Code chapter 905 structures the community-based correctional program. See Iowa Code chs. 904–05. We then examine other sections of the Code that shed light on the proper meaning of the phrase “under the management of the [IDOC].”

At the outset, Iowa Code section 904.102 lists the institutions in which the IDOC is “responsible for the control, treatment, and rehabilitation of offenders.” The list includes nine state institutions, “[r]ehabilitation camps,” and “[o]ther institutions related to an institution in subsections 1 through 10 but not attached to the campus of the main institution.” Id. The residential facility is not specifically named in the list, and there was no evidence offered at trial to suggest that it is an institution related to one of the listed facilities. As we have repeatedly stated, we do not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute under the guise of construction. See, e.g., State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 2007) ; Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) ; State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa 1973). Though the terms “management” and “control” are not identical, the lack of inclusion of community-based correctional programs like the residential facility in this Code section points in the direction of a conclusion that the residential facility is not managed by the IDOC.

The Iowa Code does, however, provide that the IDOC has certain powers related to community-based corrections programs. The IDOC “has primary responsibility” for the “development, funding, and monitoring of community-based corrections programs.” Iowa Code § 7E.5(1)(n ). The IDOC is also responsible for “[a]ccreditation and funding of community-based corrections programs....” Id. § 904.103(1); id. § 905.8 (The IDOC “shall provide for the allocation among judicial districts in the state of state funds appropriated for the establishment, operation, support, and evaluation of community-based correctional programs and services.”). The IDOC is directed to “provide assistance and support to the respective judicial districts” and to “establish [ ] guidelines” related to residential treatment centers and community-based correctional programs. Id. § 905.7. The director of the IDOC is required to “[e]stablish and maintain a program to oversee ... community corrections programs and to provide community support to ensure continuity and consistency of programs.” Id. § 904.108(1)(c ). These provisions suggest oversight, but not day-to-day management in any...