State v. Hamilton

• Citation: 594 So.2d 1376
• Decision Date: 26 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 23422-KA,23422-KA
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. L.C. HAMILTON, Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)

Page 1376

594 So.2d 1376

STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. L.C. HAMILTON, Appellant.

No. 23422-KA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana,

Second Circuit.

Feb. 26, 1992.

Teat and Avery by Jimmy C. Teat, Jonesboro, for appellant.

Richard Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, Walter E. May, Jr., Dist. Atty., Jonesboro, John Michael Ruddick, Asst. Dist. Atty., Haynesville, for appellee.

Before SEXTON, NORRIS and HIGHTOWER, JJ.

SEXTON, Judge.

The defendant, L.C. Hamilton, was charged with and was subsequently convicted by jury of two counts of distribution of cocaine, in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967. The defendant was later sentenced to ten years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on each count, the sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal the defendant presents nine assignments of error. ¹ For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm defendant's convictions, but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

On August 3, 1990, law enforcement officials Terry Skinner and Saul Wilson, together with a confidential informant, were conducting an undercover narcotics investigation in Homer, Louisiana. Pursuant to this investigation, the officers were introduced to a man known as "Hamp," later identified as the defendant, who sold each of the officers one rock of cocaine for $20 apiece.

CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE

By his first assignment of error, the defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing to grant his challenge for cause of prospective juror James W. McClung. During voir dire, Mr. McClung stated that he knew law enforcement officer Donald Malray "rather well" and further advised that if Officer Malray's testimony conflicted with the testimony of another witness, Mr. McClung would "have to believe Officer Malray." The defendant challenged Mr. McClung for cause pursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 797(2), arguing that Mr. McClung was not impartial. The trial court denied the challenge for cause and the defendant was forced to expend one of his peremptory challenges to excuse Mr. McClung as a juror.

A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a challenge for cause, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, that is, unless it is arbitrary and capricious. State v. McIntyre, 381 So.2d 408 (La.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 209, 66 L.Ed.2d 90 (1980); State v. Honeyman, 565 So.2d 961 (La.App.2d Cir.1990).

We note that Mr. McClung did not evidence an inclination to be partial toward the testimony of all law enforcement officials, but only toward the testimony of Officer Malray. In all other respects, Mr. McClung clearly stated that he would not favor the state's witnesses and would otherwise fairly weigh the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence. The state noted that Officer Malray had only been involved in the arrest of the defendant and would therefore provide no testimony directly relative to the commission of the crime and defendant's guilt or innocence.

The situation is analogous to that considered in State v. Smith, 398 So.2d 1090 (La.1981). In that case the defendant had sought to have a prospective juror excused for cause because her husband was a state witness, although he would testify solely as to the circumstances of the discovery of the victim. The Louisiana Supreme Court found no error in the denial of the challenge for cause because the husband's testimony did not concern the commission of the crime and acceptance of his testimony would in no way refute either the state's or the defendant's version of the incident. His wife was therefore not precluded from serving as a juror.

We note further that, in the instant case, Officer Malray did not even testify at trial. Accordingly, any bias or reason for bias on the part of the prospective juror was removed and there was no error in the denial of the challenge for cause. See State v. Roux, 487 So.2d 1226 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1986), writ denied, 489 So.2d 244 (La.1986). This assignment of error is without merit.

BATSON CHALLENGE

By this assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for dismissal of the jury panel. That motion was based on the state's alleged use of its peremptory challenges to strike jurors based solely upon their race.

A determination of whether the exclusion of blacks from a jury is on the basis of race and therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause is guided by the principles enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court held that to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of a jury, the defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing necessary to allow an inference of purposeful discrimination, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances, including whether there has been a pattern of strikes against black jurors and whether the prosecutor's questions and statements made during voir dire support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. If the defendant makes such a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the state to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. The ultimate burden of persuasion in a claim of denial of equal protection through the purposeful discrimination in the selection of a jury remains on the defendant. State v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 349 (La.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988), rehearing denied, 488 U.S. 976, 109 S.Ct. 517 102 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981); State v. Young, 551 So.2d 695 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989).

In the instant case, the trial court found there had been no prima facie showing of discrimination and, accordingly, the state was not required to present its reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges. ² The issue is whether, considering all relevant circumstances, the defendant has made a prima facie showing sufficient to allow an inference of purposeful discrimination. The trial court's conclusion that a prima facie case had not been established is entitled to great deference. Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21. State v. Tucker, 591 So.2d 1208, (La.App.2d Cir.1991).

The defendant, a black man, was tried by a 12-member jury. Four of the twelve jurors, along with the only alternate, were black. Although each peremptory challenge exercised by the state was used to excuse a black prospective juror, we note that the state used only eight of its twelve allotted peremptory challenges. The state accepted two black jurors prior to exercising any of its peremptory challenges and accepted another black juror after the defendant had exercised all of his allotted peremptory challenges. ³

While we acknowledge that the mere presence of black jury members does not automatically defeat an inference of discrimination, State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815 (La.1989), we factually distinguish Collier and agree that a prima facie case of discrimination was not established in the instant case. Although the state used all of its exercised peremptory challenges to excuse black persons from the jury, as was the case in Collier, the ultimate makeup of the respective juries was significantly different. In Collier, although two blacks served on the jury, the Louisiana Supreme Court was careful to note that only ten jurors were needed to concur to obtain a conviction. Assuming, as might a prosecutor seeking to discriminate, that jurors would vote as a racial block, a conviction could be obtained solely through the votes of the ten white jurors.

The instant case differs from Collier in that the jury was comprised of eight white and four black jurors, but again ten jurors were needed for a conviction. The number of accepted black jurors would necessarily impact the verdict of the jury by precluding a verdict reached solely by the white block of a jury. Under such circumstances and especially where, as here, the state had peremptory challenges available to excuse the black jurors, the jurisprudence has consistently held that a prima facie case of discrimination has not been shown. See State v. Thompson, supra; State v. Jones, 588 So.2d 805 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991); State v. McDowell, 582 So.2d 364 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied, 586 So.2d 567 (La.1991); State v. Stewart, 530 So.2d 1263 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988). This assignment of error is without merit.

DEFENSE TABLE SEATING

By his next two assignments of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motions regarding the seating at defense table during trial. Specifically, defendant sought to have a friend seated at the defense table or, alternatively, that the trial court allow the defendant to sit in the spectator section of the courtroom. Defendant alleged that the purpose behind such motions was to ensure that the state's witnesses could accurately identify the defendant (and not merely the person seated at defense table) as the perpetrator of the crimes.

Just as a state may not resort to impermissibly suggestive procedures for in-court identification of a defendant during trial, neither may defense counsel avail himself of procedures designed to unduly confuse or handicap a state witness called upon to identify the accused. Accordingly, a trial court is not obligated to allow a defendant to sit in the spectator section of the courtroom rather than at the defense table with counsel. Neither is the trial court obligated to seat other persons alongside the defendant. State v. Riley, 261 La. 782, 260 So.2d 914 (1972); State v. Morris, 259 La. 1001, 254 So.2d 444 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 959, 92 S.Ct. 2066, 32 L.Ed.2d 346 (...