State v. Hamilton, 95-172

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Citation: 75 Ohio St.3d 636,665 N.E.2d 669
• Docket Number: No. 95-172,95-172
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HAMILTON, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 26 June 1996

Page 636

75 Ohio St.3d 636 665 N.E.2d 669 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,
v.
HAMILTON, Appellant. No. 95-172. Supreme Court of Ohio. Submitted March 5, 1996.
Decided June 26, 1996. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

A prosecutor's participation in a hearing on an application to seal the record of a conviction is not limited to issues specified by the prosecutor in a written objection filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(B).

In February 1990, a Montgomery County jury convicted David Hamilton of theft. The court sentenced Hamilton to a one-year prison[665 N.E.2d 670] term, which was suspended, and placed him on probation with the requirement that he make restitution and perform community service. Hamilton received a termination of his probation upon fulfilling each of its conditions.

After waiting the required three years from his discharge, Hamilton applied to the sentencing court to have the record of his conviction sealed pursuant to R.C. 2953.32.

Without filing an objection to Hamilton's application as permitted by R.C. 2953.32(B), an assistant prosecuting attorney appeared at the expungement hearing and cross-examined Hamilton regarding his employment and his qualifications

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and licensure in law and accounting. The prosecutor urged the court to deny Hamilton's application based on Hamilton's possibility of obtaining a position with fiduciary responsibilities.

The court denied Hamilton's application, finding that the legitimate needs of the government outweigh Hamilton's need to have the record sealed. Specifically, the court noted that "should the defendant re-apply to practice law and or become an accountant, the public's need to know about his criminal record is a relevant, legitimate governmental need under the statute."

Hamilton appealed and the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court concluded that R.C. 2953.32(B) does not require the prosecutor to file objections to a defendant's application for expungement of a conviction prior to the hearing as a prerequisite to participating in the expungement hearing. Instead, the court interpreted R.C. 2953.32(B) to permit the prosecuting attorney to file written objections prior to trial either in lieu of or in addition to participating at the hearing.

The court of appeals certified a conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District in State v. Stiff (June 21, 1990), Scioto App. No. 1804, unreported, 1990 WL 84843, regarding the following issue:

"Whether a trial court errs in denying a defendant's motion to seal the records of his conviction on the basis of objections made by the prosecutor at the hearing on the motion which were not specified by the prosecutor prior to the hearing, because the prosecutor is limited by R.C. 2953.32(B) to objections specified prior to the hearing on the motion." ¹

The cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists.

Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and M. Catherine Koontz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Thomas P. Randolph, Dayton, for appellant.

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COOK, Justice.

The narrow question properly certified to this court involves the statutory interpretation of R.C. 2953.32(B). In the present case, because there was no written objection filed by the prosecutor with the court prior to the hearing, Hamilton argues that it was error for the trial court to consider the facts elicited and arguments presented by the prosecutor at the hearing. To the contrary, we adjudge that R.C. 2953.32(B) does not require the filing of a written objection as a prerequisite to a prosecutor's participation in the expungement hearing. Rather, as an alternative to appearing at the expungement hearing, the statute permits a prosecutor to contest an expungement by written objection. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.

I

R.C. 2953.32(B) states in pertinent part:

[665 N.E.2d 671] "Upon the filing of an application under this section, the court shall set a date for a hearing and shall notify the prosecutor for the case of the hearing on the application. The prosecutor may object to the granting of the application by filing an objection with the court prior to the date set for the hearing. The prosecutor shall specify in the objection the reasons he believes justify a denial of the application."

Hamilton's reading of R.C. 2953.32(B), and the interpretation of that provision advanced by the Fourth District Court of Appeals in Stiff, supra, would limit the prosecutor's participation at an expungement hearing to those facts and arguments set forth in a written objection, filed prior to the date of the hearing.

At the outset of this discussion, we note that R.C. 2953.32 does not contain language expressly forbidding participation by the prosecuting attorney at the expungement hearing in the absence of a filed written objection. Instead, Hamilton suggests that such a result should be implied from that portion of R.C. 2953.32(B) allowing the prosecutor to object to an expungement by filing a written objection, prior to the date of the expungement hearing, and R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(d), which requires a court to consider the reasons against granting the application specified in the prosecutor's objection. The primary rationale advanced by Hamilton and the Stiff court to support their interpretation is that the filing of such a written objection is intended to give the applicant notice of the state's basis for opposing the application and the opportunity to prepare a response thereto.

Given, however, that the language of...