State v. Hamilton, WD

Decision Date15 October 1991
Docket NumberNo. WD,WD
Citation817 S.W.2d 8
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Michael HAMILTON, Appellant. 42686.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Raymond L. Legg, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Geoffrey W. Preckshot, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before FENNER, P.J., LOWENSTEIN, C.J., and ULRICH, J FENNER, Presiding Judge.

Appellant, Michael Hamilton, appeals his convictions of second degree murder, first degree assault, and two counts of armed criminal action. Appellant also appeals the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief.

Taking the evidence and its inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and disregarding any contrary evidence and inferences, the evidence was as stated hereafter.

On September 14, 1988, at approximately 1:00 a.m., a blue van with four men in it turned off 35th Street onto Wabash and drove past the park at that location. LeRoy Hudson was driving the van, with Terrence Jackson, Michael Sanders, and appellant in the rear of the van with the sliding door open. The men in the rear of the van opened fire on the twenty to thirty people in the park and continued to fire out of the van until the van had passed the park and traveled two houses further down Wabash. Following behind the van was a gold LTD owned by Fletcher Wiley. The two people in the LTD, Fletcher Wiley and Edward Buford, also fired on the people in the park.

Arvelt Bruster saw the van turn the corner from 35th onto Wabash from where he was standing on the sidewalk in the park. Bruster knew all four men in the van and recognized them as the van turned the corner. When the gunfire began, Bruster hid behind a nearby building. When the first round of gunfire stopped, Bruster came out and saw Fletcher Wiley's car drive past, with Wiley and Buford firing into the park.

Eric Dunlop was also at the scene when the shooting began. Dunlop recognized the driver, Leroy Hudson, and also Terrence Jackson who was inside the van. Dunlop saw another man, large in stature like appellant, inside the van, but Dunlop couldn't positively identify appellant as having been in the van. Dunlop also saw shots fired from the gold LTD. Robert Wright, who was with Eric Dunlop in the park, was struck in the face by a bullet and died from his wound.

Carl Washington was walking home from the park when the shooting began. Washington made it about two houses away from the park when he was shot in the hip. Washington recovered from his wound.

The van used in the shooting, which had been stolen, was discovered about thirty minutes after the shooting. The van had been abandoned at a location some seven to ten minutes away from the scene of the shooting. There were powder burns on the rear carpet area. Spent shell casings as well as unfired cartridges were found in the van. The shell casings were from five separate weapons.

LeRoy Hudson's fingerprints were found on both the outside and inside of the sliding door of the van. A hair recovered from a ball cap in the van matched the hair of Fletcher Wiley.

A police officer spoke with appellant approximately one hour before the shooting at a car wash at 59th and Prospect. Appellant was in the company of LeRoy Hudson and Terrence Jackson at that time.

When appellant was questioned about the shooting, he stated that he had been with his girlfriend from 7:30 p.m. on the night of the shooting to 8:00 a.m. the next morning. Appellant's girlfriend denied being with appellant during that time.

Arvelt Bruster testified that the reason for the shooting was an ongoing feud stemming from a high school rivalry. Bruster and Eric Dunlop were in one group, while appellant and the others in the van and LTD were in another group. In the course of their feud, the two groups had been involved in shoot outs on several prior occasions.

In his first point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his Motion for Acquittal at the Close of All the Evidence because the evidence was insufficient for him to have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, appellant argues that Arvelt Bruster's eyewitness identification of him was so incredible that it did not constitute substantial evidence. Without Bruster's identification, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient.

An appellate court must consider the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. State v. Sumowski, 794 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Mo. banc 1990). Appellate courts do not weigh the evidence, but limit their review to a determination of whether the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. State v. Murphy, 753 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Mo.App.1988). The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to make a submissible case. State v. Sumowski, 794 S.W.2d at 645. Furthermore, the reliability and credibility of a witness is for the jury to decide. Id.

Appellant argues that since it was 1:00 a.m., and Arvelt Bruster identified him as being in the back of a "darkened" van, that Bruster's identification was unreliable. However, there was also evidence that although it was night time, there were street lights in the area and the police were able to distinguish faces and take notes at the scene without the aid of additional light.

Arvelt Bruster's reliability and credibility were for the jury to decide. Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is denied.

In his second point, appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing Arvelt Bruster and Eric Dunlop to testify that they had been involved in previous shoot-outs with the men in the van and LTD.

Evidence of the commission by defendant of crimes separate and distinct from the crime for which he is charged is generally inadmissible. State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 19...

To continue reading

Request your trial
28 cases
  • State v. Middleton, Nos. WD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 6 Abril 1993
    ...835 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Mo. banc 1992), nor will it determine the reliability or credibility of the witnesses, State v. Hamilton, 817 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo.App.1991); but will limit its review to a determination of whether there existed substantial evidence from which the jury might have found the ......
  • State v. Neal, Nos. WD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 9 Marzo 1993
    ...310 (Mo. banc 1992). We neither weigh the evidence nor determine its reliability or the witnesses' credibility. Id.; State v. Hamilton, 817 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo.App.1991). Our review is limited to determining whether the jury had substantial evidence from which to find the defendant guilty beyo......
  • State v. Hope
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 24 Septiembre 1997
    ...of law assert that "conclusory speculations" are not substantial evidence that a trial counsel was ineffective. State v. Hamilton, 817 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Mo.App.1991). We find no clear error by the motion The record reveals that the state adduced no evidence regarding fingerprint evidence at tri......
  • State v. Martin
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 25 Agosto 1992
    ...501 U.S. 1262, 111 S.Ct. 2918, 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1991). Appellate courts do not determine the credibility of witnesses. State v. Hamilton, 817 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo.App.1991). The jury determines the credibility of witnesses and may believe all, some or none of a witness's testimony in arriving ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT