State v. Hammett-Marette
| Decision Date | 08 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 28157 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellant v. KHADIJA HAMMETT-MARETTE Defendant-Appellee |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
OPINIONMATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by HEATHER N. JANS, Atty. Reg. No. 0084470, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
KYLE J. LENNEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0085726, 120 West Second Street, Suite 612, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
{¶ 1} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) and Crim.R. 12(K), plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from an order of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granting defendant-appellee Khadija Hammett-Marzette's motion to suppress.1 For the reasons outlined below, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and the matter will be remanded for further proceedings.
{¶ 2} On July 3, 2018, the Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted Hammett-Marzette for one count of having weapons while under disability, one count of carrying a concealed weapon, one count of assault, and one count of resisting arrest. Following her indictment, Hammett-Marzette pled not guilty to the charges and filed a motion to suppress statements she made during a police interview. In the motion to suppress, Hammett-Marzette argued for the suppression of her statements on grounds that the interviewing detective continued to interrogate her after she had clearly and unambiguously invoked her right to counsel.
{¶ 3} On September 7, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. At the hearing, the parties agreed that the trial court would base its ruling on its review of two exhibits: an audio recording of the detective's interview of Hammett-Marzette and a waiver of rights form. Those exhibits established the following facts.
{¶ 4} At 11:44 a.m. on June 6, 2018, Detective Shiverdecker of the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office2 spoke with Hammett-Marzette in an interview room. The detective began by completing the header area of a pre-interview waiver of rights form. He filled in the date, time, and location of the interview, and he asked Hammett-Marzette for her name, birthdate, and Social Security number, which she provided. The detective told her that she was being interviewed regarding the offenses of carrying a concealed weapon and having weapons while under disability. The detective then read to Hammett-Marzette five enumerated paragraphs detailing her Miranda rights, and he instructed her to initial next to each sentence if she understood them. Hammett-Marzette initialed each paragraph.
{¶ 5} Detective Shiverdecker asked Hammett-Marzette how many years of schooling she had, to which she responded 11 years. He then asked her to read aloud the "waiver of rights" paragraph that followed. The paragraph read:
The above statement of rights has been read to me. I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.
State's Exhibit 1.
{¶ 6} When Hammett-Marzette reached the sentence regarding her not wanting a lawyer, the following exchange occurred:
State's Exhibit 2.
{¶ 7} After the foregoing discussion, Hammett-Marzette finished reading the "waiver of rights" paragraph aloud. Detective Shiverdecker then reread the last sentence and made sure that Hammett-Marzette understood the meaning of "coercion." Hammett-Marzette subsequently signed the form and proceeded to make statements to Shiverdecker.
{¶ 8} After reviewing the evidence submitted by the parties, the trial court granted Hammett-Marzette's motion to suppress. In granting the motion, the trial court stated the following:
Decision, Entry and Order Sustaining Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Oct. 1, 2018), Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 2018-CR-2197/1, Docket No. 30, p. 1-2.
{¶ 9} The State now appeals from the trial court's order granting Hammett-Marzette's motion to suppress, raising a single assignment of error for review.
{¶ 10} Under its sole assignment of error, the State challenges the trial court's order sustaining Hammett-Marzette's motion to suppress. Specifically, the State claims the trial court erroneously determined that Hammett-Marzette clearly and unambiguously invoked her right to counsel during the interview with Detective Shiverdecker. We agree.
{¶ 11} As a preliminary matter, we note that in ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court "assumes the role of the trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994); State v. Knisley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22897, 2010-Ohio-116, ¶ 30. Accordingly, when we review suppression decisions, we must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Retherford at 592. "Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard." Id.
{¶ 12} Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself. To counteract the coercive pressure of custodial interrogations, police officers must warn a suspect, prior to questioning, that he or she has a right to remain silent and a right to the presence of an attorney. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103-104, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
{¶ 13} "The opportunity to exercise these rights exists throughout the interrogation, and thus, the interrogation must cease when the defendant exercises his 'right to cut off questioning,' which must be scrupulously honored." State v. Miller, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 12, 2014-Ohio-2936, ¶ 41, quoting Miranda at 473-474; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (). See also Shatzer at 104 ( ).
{¶ 14} In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the United States Supreme Court explained that:
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. * * * [A]n accused, * * * having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
(Footnote omitted.) Id. at 484-485. Accord...
To continue reading
Request your trial