State v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 29 July 1993
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Todd Lee HAMPTON, Petitioner on Review. CC C91-01-30249; CA A69310; SC S39900.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 621

855 P.2d 621

317 Or. 251

STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Todd Lee HAMPTON, Petitioner on Review.

CC C91-01-30249; CA A69310; SC S39900.

Supreme Court of Oregon In Banc.

Argued and Submitted May 7, 1993.

Decided July 29, 1993.

David E. Groom, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause on behalf of petitioner on review. On the petition were Sally L. Avera, Public Defender, and Ingrid A. MacFarlane, Deputy Public Defender, Salem.

Diane S. Lefkow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause on behalf of respondent on review. With her on the response to the petition were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.

UNIS, Justice.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence in defendant's trial for assault in the second degree, ORS 163.175, ¹ that defendant was on parole at the time of the alleged assault, that he was not in contact with his parole officer, and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for a parole violation (collectively referred to in this opinion as evidence of defendant's parole status). We hold that it did not.

Defendant was charged with assault in the second degree for hitting a police officer on the head with a bottle. The state contended that defendant did so in the midst of a struggle when the officer attempted to arrest defendant. ² At trial, defendant denied hitting the officer on the head with a bottle. Evidence of defendant's parole status was admitted to show that defendant had a motive to commit the assault. Defendant argued unsuccessfully that the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. From his conviction by a jury, defendant appealed, repeating the arguments that he made in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Hampton, 117 Or.App. 89, 843 P.2d 483 (1992). We allowed defendant's petition for review. We also affirm.

The general rule is that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by a defendant to suggest that, because the defendant is a person of criminal character, it is more probable that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she is on trial. OEC 404(3); ³ State v. Johnson, 313 Or. 189, 194, 832 P.2d 443 (1992). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted, however, if it is introduced to prove some other relevant purpose, such as to prove a defendant's motive for committing the crime. OEC 404(3); State v. Johnson, supra, 313 Or. at 194, 832 P.2d 443.

A three-part test, the first two parts of which are relevancy considerations and the third part of which involves the OEC 403 ⁴ balancing test, governs the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for "other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident" under OEC 404(3):

"(1) The evidence must be independently relevant for a noncharacter purpose [such as, in this case, proof of motive]; (2) the proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient proof that the uncharged misconduct was committed and that defendant committed it; and (3) the probative value of the uncharged misconduct evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403. Each of these requirements must be satisfied before uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible under OEC 404(3)." State v. Johnson, supra, 313 Or. at 195, 832 P.2d 443 (footnotes omitted).

To satisfy the first part of the test, evidence of defendant's parole status must be independently relevant for a noncharacter purpose. This is a "question of logical relevancy which the trial judge must decide under OEC 104(1)." ⁵ State v. Pinnell, 311 Or. 98, 109 n. 17, 806 P.2d 110 (1991). On review, we determine whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial judge's finding. Id. at 111, 806 P.2d 110.

Under OEC 401, ⁶ "[p]roffered evidence is relevant * * * if it has 'any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action [i.e., a consequential fact, a material fact ⁷] more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.' " Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg, 312 Or. 568, 575, 825 P.2d 641 (1992). "The proper inquiry [in determining logical relevance] is: 'Does the item of evidence even slightly increase or decrease the probability of the existence of any material fact in issue? If the item of evidence affects the balance of probabilities to any degree, it is logically relevant.' " State v. Gailey, 301 Or. 563, 567, 725 P.2d 328 (1986) (referring to Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence 45, § 2.17 (1984)). ⁸ The trial judge must decide, pursuant to OEC 104(1), whether the proffered evidence satisfies the minimum threshold of logical relevancy required by OEC 401. State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 692, 801 P.2d 789 (1990). The possibility that an inconsistent or contradictory inference may reasonably be drawn from the offered item of evidence does not destroy that item's relevancy so long as the inference desired by the proponent is also a reasonable one. Byrd v. Lord Brothers, 256 Or. 421, 424-25, 473 P.2d 1018 (1970). ⁹ Moreover, "a fact immaterial from the standpoint of the issues involved under the substantive law may still be relevant if it tends to establish a material fact in the case." Peterfreund, Relevancy and Its Limits in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts: Article IV, 25 The Record 80, 81 (1970) (emphasis in original). "In other words, evidence may still be relevant even though it's only an intermediate fact requiring another inference or two." Id. (emphasis in original).

In order to satisfy the first part of the three-part test that governs the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, therefore, the evidence of defendant's parole status must have a tendency to prove a relevant, noncharacter purpose. The Court of Appeals summarized the challenged evidence:

"The state's case opened with testimony from a parole and probation office intake person, who testified that defendant had come in to make an appointment and that, after giving him an appointment slip, she asked if there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. She said that defendant said no, and she asked him to stay until she 'clarified it and resolved the matter.' He then asked if he could go to the restroom. 'I said sure but would he please come back, and that was the last we saw of him.' She testified that she later confirmed that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

"Defendant's parole officer testified that she had never met defendant and that he did not keep his appointment with her and never submitted a monthly report form. She testified that, when a client fails to keep an appointment, she typically reports the violation to the releasing authority and an arrest warrant is issued." State v. Hampton, supra, 117 Or.App. at 93, 843 P.2d 483.

The state argues that there is evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that the evidence of defendant's parole status is independently relevant to explain defendant's motive for his assaultive behavior, i.e., that he resisted and assaulted the officer to avoid apprehension and revocation of his parole, and that that motive is relevant to prove that defendant committed the assault charged ¹⁰ and that he committed it with the requisite mental state (i.e., knowingly ¹¹). We agree.

Under the standard of relevance in OEC 401, the evidence of defendant's parole status tended to prove a relevant, noncharacter purpose that defendant had a motive ¹² to assault the officer. As the state argues and the Court of Appeals agreed, "the evidence was relevant, because a rational juror could reasonably infer that defendant sought to get away from the officer because he knew outstanding charges were pending against him and that his parole * * * status--ergo his freedom--was in jeopardy and that that was his motive, the reason that he vigorously fought to try to get away." State v. Hampton, supra, 117 Or.App. at 94, 843 P.2d 483. (internal quotation marks omitted). From the evidence of defendant's parole status, the jury might reasonably infer that defendant had a special reason (motive) for engaging in the assaultive conduct charged and for engaging in it with the requisite mental state (knowingly), i.e., to avoid apprehension and revocation of his parole. From that motive, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant knowingly broke the bottle on the officer's head to avoid apprehension and revocation of his parole status.

Although the motive for committing a crime generally need not be established by the prosecution to prove guilt, ¹³ State v. Rose, 311 Or. 274, 283, 810 P.2d 839 (1991), it is a relevant circumstantial fact, because it makes more probable the fact that defendant committed the crime than if such a motive were not established. Peterfreund, supra, 25 The Record at 81.

"[D]efendant's possession of a motive * * * strengthens the inference that the social loss was caused by an actus reus [the physical aspect of the crime] rather than a natural accident. Moreover, evidence of the defendant's motive is logically relevant to show that when the defendant performed the actus reus, the defendant did so with mens rea [a guilty mind]." Imwinkelried, supra, at 72, § 5.32 (footnotes omitted). Circumstantial evidence is always necessary to prove the state of mind of a person. Evidence as to a person's state of mind may be inferentially relevant to the fact in issue. When evidence of motive is admitted, it is to be considered with other evidence surrounding the commission of the crime and given only such weight as the jury deems proper. State v. Rose, supra, 311 Or. at 283 n. 7, 810 P.2d 839 (citing State v. Walker, 244 Or. 404, 411-12, 417 P.2d 1004 (1966)).

There was sufficient...