State v. Hampton

Decision Date15 September 2009
Docket NumberNo. 17715.,17715.
Citation988 A.2d 167,293 Conn. 435
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Travis HAMPTON.

Raymond L. Durelli, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa L. Streeto, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Sandra Tullius, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The defendant, Travis Hampton, appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court rendered after a jury trial, convicting him of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49(a), 53a-8 and 53a-54a, conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48(a) and 53a-54a, kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 53a-92(a)(2)(A), conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 and 53a-92(a)(2)(A), assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 53a-59(a)(5), conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48(a) and 53a-59(a)(5), sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 53a-70(a)(1), conspiracy to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48(a) and 53a-70(a)(1), and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217(a)(1). The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court improperly: (1) denied his motion to suppress a written confession that he had made after waiving his Miranda rights;2 (2) failed to instruct the jurors that they had to agree unanimously on the factual basis underlying the sexual assault charges against the defendant; and (3) failed to instruct the jurors adequately on the specific intent necessary to convict the defendant as an accessory on the charges of attempt to commit murder, kidnapping in the first degree, assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the first degree. In addition, the defendant claims that his convictions for kidnapping in the first degree and conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree should be reversed in light of this court's construction of our kidnapping statute in State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 23, 2003 the defendant was with his friend, James Mitchell, when Mitchell received a telephone call from the victim,3 a young woman he knew, asking for a ride to her home in East Hartford. Mitchell drove his car to the location of the victim and picked her up. The three then drove to a nearby restaurant. After entering the restaurant and remaining there for a while, the defendant and the victim returned to the car, where Mitchell had remained. Mitchell told the victim that he would drive her home, but he did not. Instead, Mitchell began angrily questioning the victim as to the whereabouts of her brother, who, both Mitchell and the defendant suspected, was involved in a romantic relationship with Mitchell's former girlfriend. The victim informed Mitchell and the defendant that her brother was staying at her grandfather's house, but after driving there, Mitchell and the defendant realized that the victim had lied to them. Mitchell then drove first to his mother's house in Hartford, and then to an apartment complex. The victim repeatedly pleaded with Mitchell to take her home, but he did not comply. Mitchell drove his car from the apartment complex and brought the victim and the defendant to a closed gas station near Market Street in Hartford and parked behind the building, where it was dark. At this time, more than three hours had elapsed since Mitchell and the defendant had picked up the victim.

Mitchell then told the victim to get out of the car because he wanted to talk to her. Mitchell, the defendant and the victim exited the car. The victim, anticipating that "something bad" was about to happen, started to walk away, but stopped when the defendant took a shotgun out of the car and pointed it at her face. After the victim refused to tell Mitchell her brother's location Mitchell became angry and ordered the victim to take her clothes off. The victim removed her pants, and Mitchell sexually assaulted her by engaging in vaginal intercourse with her.

The defendant kept the shotgun pointed at the victim throughout the assault.4

Angry and scared, the victim pleaded with Mitchell and the defendant to let her go. Mitchell then gave the victim the choice to climb into a nearby dumpster or attempt to run away. As the victim started running, Mitchell fired the shotgun hitting her in the stomach. The victim continued to run toward the front of the gas station, and Mitchell followed her in the car while the defendant pursued her on foot, holding the shotgun. Despite the victim pleading with the defendant to stop, he shot and wounded her in the right side. The victim, bleeding profusely, ran across Market Street and tried to hide behind some trees on the side of the road. The defendant followed her and shot at her several more times, hitting her in the face and the upper thigh. The victim then dropped to the ground and pretended to be dead. The defendant walked over to the victim, who was lying on the ground, and shot her one final time in her left arm. Thinking that the victim was dead, the defendant got back into the car, which Mitchell was driving, and they drove away. They quickly returned, however, to verify that the victim was dead. The defendant got out of the car, walked over to the motionless victim, kicked her once, and said, "She's dead." The defendant and Mitchell then again drove away.

The victim subsequently was discovered by a passerby and ultimately was taken to the hospital, where, after receiving medical attention, she informed authorities that Mitchell and a person that she did not know, later identified as the defendant, had sexually assaulted and shot her. Late in the evening of August 27, 2003, Mitchell and the defendant were arrested. The defendant thereafter was charged with the multiple offenses previously set forth herein. At the police station, the defendant was informed of, and signed a waiver and acknowledgment of, his Miranda rights. He then told the police detectives his version of the incident, and also provided and signed a written statement of what had occurred.

Prior to trial, counsel for the defendant filed a motion to suppress all statements taken from the defendant by law enforcement authorities at the police station after the defendant had been arrested. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied it. Following a jury trial,5 the defendant was convicted of all of the charges against him except sexual assault in the first degree as a principal. See footnote 4 of this opinion. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the written confession he made following the waiver of his Miranda rights. Specifically, the defendant asserts that, when the interviewing detective incorrectly advised the defendant that it would be "in his best interest" to talk to the police, the detective impermissibly "altered" the Miranda rights previously read to and waived by the defendant and made the prior waiver "inadequate...." The defendant thus contends that his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution were violated. In addition, the defendant requests, to the extent that his claim is unpreserved, that we review the claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).6 In response, the state claims that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress his written confession because the defendant had knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his Miranda rights prior to speaking with the detectives. We conclude, first, that the defendant's "alteration" claim was not distinctly raised in the trial court, and, therefore, is unpreserved. We further conclude that the defendant's request for Golding review is unavailing as he has failed to provide an adequate record to review this claim.

It is well settled that "[o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit this court's review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial. See, e.g., Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514, 550, 911 A.2d 712 (2006) (declining to consider claim not raised before habeas court); State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 85-89, 905 A.2d 1101 (2006) (declining to review claim not preserved at trial) [cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S.Ct. 1491, 167 L.Ed.2d 236 (2007)]; Practice Book § 60-5 (court not bound to consider claim unless distinctly raised at trial)." State v. Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 579, 916 A.2d 767 (2007). In the present case, the defendant's motion to suppress alleged only that the defendant's statement was "taken in violation of rights guaranteed by both the Connecticut and [United States] constitutions." The motion did not refer in any way to the "best interest" statement allegedly made by the detective. During the hearing on the motion to suppress, counsel for the defendant did not at any time articulate the alteration claim. The hearing consisted solely of the state calling one of the interviewing detectives, Detective William Siemionko of the Hartford police department, to testify about the statement that he had made to the defendant. Siemionko testified that, after the defendant had signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights and after the defendant admitted that he had shot the victim, he told the defendant: "These are obviously very serious charges. It's in your best interest to talk to us. Give us your side of the...

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