State v. Hancock

• Decision Date: 09 June 1892
• Citation: 24 A. 726,54 N.J.L. 393
• Parties: STATE v. HANCOCK.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

24 A. 726

54 N.J.L. 393

STATE

v. HANCOCK.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 9, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Case certified from circuit court, Mercer county, for advisory opinion.

Proceeding by the state against William Hancock, as surety, to recover on a forfeited recognizance.

Argued before Depue and Van Syckel, JJ.

Bayard Stockton, Pros. Atty., and W. Holt Apgar, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the State.

H. N. Barton, for defendant.

BEASLEY, C. J. This procedure has been placed before this court for its advisory opinion by the judge of the circuit court of the county of Mercer. The certificate of the circuit judge is as follows, viz.: "The Mercer county grand jury, at the term of October, A. D. 1890, of the court of oyer and terminer and general jail delivery of that county, indicted one Jacob Bush, under the act found on page 338, (P. L. 1888,) for having feloniously given, and having purported to give, information where, how, and of whom, and by what means, counterfeit coin, paper money, and tokens of value could be procured and had, and what purported to be counterfeit coin, etc., could be procured and had. Said indictment was taken down to the court of general quarter sessions of the peace of said county for trial. On November 11, 1890, said Bush appeared before said court of general quarter sessions, pleaded not guilty to the said indictment, and gave bail in the sum of $1,000, with William Hancock as surety, for his appearance to answer said indictment on November 18, 1890, and not to depart the court without leave. Before November 18, 1890, the said Bush's plea of not guilty was retracted, for the purpose of making a motion to quash said indictment. That such motion was made between entering said bail and the day fixed for trial, to wit, November 18, 1890, and after argument on behalf of the state and said Bush, the said indictment was quashed. The defendant's counsel then moved a discharge of Bush's said bail, and the motion was denied. The grand jury of the said county, at a subsequent term of said court, to wit, the term of January, A. D. 1891, indicted the said Bush, under the same act, for having feloniously aided, assisted, and abetted one J. E. Hollman in a certain felonious and fraudulent scheme and device, offering, and purporting to offer, for sale, loan, gift, exchange, and distribution, counterfeit coin, paper money, and other tokens of value, called 'bills,' 'green articles,' etc. After the return of the last mentioned indictment, Bush's surety was notified to produce the defendant, on a certain day thereafter, before the said court; and, the said Bush not appearing on the day so named in the notice to his surety, the recognizance given with said Hancock as surety, at the October term, A. D. 1890, of the said court, was forfeited, and said forfeiture was certified into the circuit court of the said county. That a scire facias against said William Hancock was issued out of the said circuit court, and pleas were filed thereto by said Hancock, raising the following questions, which are hereby certified to the supreme court for its advisory opinion: First. Is the act on page 14 (P. L. 1889) constitutional? Second. Was the quashing of the indictment found against Bush at the October term, A. D. 1890, such a final determination of the cause in which the said recognizance was entered at that term as will discharge the bail from the obligation of producing the defendant? Was the recognizor discharged from such obligation by the act found on page 852, Supp. Revision, § 1? E. W. Scuddek, Circuit Judge."

The first problem thus propounded for solution relates, as it will be perceived, to the jurisdiction of the circuit court over a proceeding of this character. It is admitted that the course in question is in accordance with the provisions of the statute approved February 12, 1889, which is in these words, to wit: "That hereafter it shall be lawful for the court of general quarter sessions of the peace, in which any recognizance has been or may be forfeited, to certify such forfeiture into the supreme court or the circuit court of the county in which such forfeiture hath been or may hereafter be made, to be therein prosecuted in the manner and with the costs provided in the second section of the act to which this is a supplement." In the instance now before us, this recognizance having been forfeited before the court of general quarter sessions of the peace, such forfeiture was thereupon certified to the circuit court of the county of Mercer, and the prosecution that thence resulted is the procedure now under consideration. Upon this point the only question raised respects the legality of the statute itself, the contention being that it conflicts with that provision of the constitution that declares "that no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the act revived, or the section or sections amended, shall be inserted at length;" and also to that other provision that ordains "that no act shall be passed which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of the act, or which shall enact that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be applicable, except by inserting it in such act." With respect to the first of the constitutional paragraphs just quoted, and the objection based upon it, we deem it sufficient to say that, in our opinion, such provision is entirely inapplicable to the present case. The act criticised does not, in the constitutional sense, amend the statute to which it is a supplement, and, of course, there can be no pretense that it, in any degree, revives it. The primary act makes provision for the transfer of forfeited recognizances from the oyer and terminer to the circuit court for prosecution, and this disposition remains intact. The supplementary law in no wise, and in no measure, modifies or affects it. The original act is complete and perfect as to its purposes. It needs no amendment, and none has been essayed. It arranges for the protection of recognizances forfeited in the oyer and terminer, the supplement for those forfeited in the sessions. These legal schemes are several and distinct. The court is of opinion that there is no force whatever in this objection.

Nor do we think that the second exception to this supplement has any greater solidity. Such contention is founded on the assumption that inasmuch as the last clause...