State v. Handy

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: CUFF, MINIMAN and WAUGH
• Citation: State v. Handy, 412 N.J. Super. 492, 991 A.2d 281 (N.J. Super. 2010)
• Decision Date: 12 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. A-1838-07T4,A-1838-07T4
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Germaine A. HANDY, Defendant-Appellant.

991 A.2d 281

412 N.J. Super. 492

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Germaine A. HANDY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1838-07T4

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued February 24, 2010.

Decided April 12, 2010.

Stephen P. Hunter, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Hunter, of counsel and on the brief).

Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued for respondent (Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney; Mr. Yomtov, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges CUFF, MINIMAN and WAUGH.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WAUGH, J.A.D.

Defendant Germaine A. Handy appeals his conviction, following a guilty plea, for possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). The appeal requires us to determine whether evidence found during the search incident to Handy's arrest should have been suppressed because the dispatcher who incorrectly informed the arresting officer that there was an outstanding arrest warrant acted unreasonably under the circumstances, even though the conduct of the arresting officer himself was reasonable. We conclude suppression is required and, consequently, reverse the conviction.

I.

The following facts are garnered primarily from the testimony of Millville Police Officer Carlo Drogo during the suppression hearing held on August 18, 2006.

On the evening of September 13, 2005, Drogo responded to a backup call from Special Officer Anthony Sills, who had stopped several individuals, including Handy, for city ordinance violations because they were riding their bicycles on the sidewalk. It appears that none of those individuals, including Handy, had drivers licenses or other forms of identification with them at the time. While Sills issued the appropriate summonses, Drogo collected the names and birth dates of the individuals and called the information into Millville Police dispatch to determine whether there were any outstanding warrants.

Handy told Drogo that his date of birth was "March 18, 1974" and that his name was "Germaine Handy," which he spelled for Drogo. He also informed Drogo of his address on Broad Street in Millville. Drogo provided Handy's name and date of birth, along with those of the other individuals, to the police dispatcher for the warrant check.¹

The dispatcher subsequently reported to Drogo that there was an outstanding warrant for Handy's arrest. Drogo informed Handy about the warrant, placed him under arrest, and conducted a search of his person. During the search incident to the arrest, Drogo discovered crack cocaine and marijuana.

Only after Handy had been arrested and placed in the back of the police car did the police dispatcher inform Drogo that there was a "discrepancy" with respect to the date of birth on the warrant. Drogo transported Handy to the police station and attempted to verify the warrant. In the process, Drogo also found that there was a difference in the spelling of Handy's first name and the first name on the warrant, a discrepancy that the police dispatcher had either not noticed or not reported to Drogo.

The arrest warrant, which had been issued on June 6, 1996, was for a "Jermaine O. Handy," whose date of birth was given as March 14, 1972, and whose address was listed as being in Los Angeles, California. The offense underlying the warrant was a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-38.1(b), now repealed, which makes it a disorderly persons offense to "exhibit to a police officer or judge in accordance with R.S. 39:3-29 any falsely made, altered, forged or counterfeited motor vehicle certificate of registration or driver's license, knowing the same to be falsely made, altered, forged or counterfeited."

According to the pre-sentence report, Handy's middle initial is "A" for "Antonio." Although Drogo discovered that the date of birth provided to him by Handy differed from the one on Handy's driver's license and dates of birth listed under Handy's "arrest jacket" in the Millville computer system, we note that it is the same as the date of birth listed on the pre-sentence report.

Drogo placed a call to the Chesterfield Township Municipal Court, which had issued the warrant. The call was answered by automated voicemail. Drogo left a message inquiring about the warrant, but he never received a return call. Unable to verify that the warrant was for the person he arrested, Drogo only processed Handy on the new charge. The State offered no evidence at the suppression hearing that defendant was the Handy for whom the warrant had been issued ten years earlier.

Handy was indicted on December 14, 2005. Indictment No. 05-12-1153 charged him with one count of third-degree possession of a CDS. Handy filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized incident to his arrest. The motion was heard and denied on August 18, 2006. The motion judge found that the police dispatcher's behavior was "unreasonable" because the dispatcher failed to immediately inform Drogo that there were discrepancies with respect to the date of birth and spelling of the first name. The judge nonetheless determined that, although it was a "close call on the facts that were presented," the arresting officer's actions in searching and arresting defendant were reasonable in light of the information provided by the dispatcher.

On November 2, 2006, Handy was indicted on additional, but unrelated charges. Indictment No. 06-11-1108 charged him with third-degree possession of a CDS, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count one), and fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (count two).

Handy had moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress. However, on December 20, 2006, he withdrew the motion and accepted a plea offer. He pled guilty to Indictment No. 05-12-1153, third-degree possession of a CDS, and to count two of Indictment No. 06-11-1108, fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend three years imprisonment for the CDS charge and a concurrent one year of imprisonment for the tampering with evidence charge. The remaining charge was dismissed.

On July 20, 2007, the judge sentenced Handy in accordance with the State's recommendation as contemplated in the plea agreement. This appeal followed.

II.

Handy raises the following argument on appeal:

THE JUDGE'S FINDING THAT "THE DISPATCHER WAS UNREASONABLE" SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN SUPPRESSION BECAUSE THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES WHEN A POLICE DISPATCHER'S ACTIONS RESULT IN AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH

OR SEIZURE. U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.

A.

The Supreme Court has explained the standard of review applicable to a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress as follows:

Our analysis must begin with an understanding of the standard of appellate review that applies to a motion judge's findings in a suppression hearing. As the Appellate Division in this case clearly recognized, an appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Elders, 386 N.J.Super. 208, 228, 899 A.2d 1037 (App.Div.2006) (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474, 724 A.2d 234 (1999)); see also State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1, 13, 397 A.2d 1050 (1979) (concluding that "there was substantial credible evidence to support the findings of the motion judge that the . . . investigatory search was not based on probable cause"); State v. Alvarez, 238 N.J.Super. 560, 562-64, 570 A.2d 459 (App.Div.1990) (stating that standard of review on appeal from motion to suppress is whether "the findings made by the judge could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record" (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 164, 199 A.2d 809 (1964))).

An appellate court "should give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the `feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 161, 199 A.2d 809. An appellate court should not disturb the trial court's findings merely because "it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal" or because "the trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side" in a close case. Id. at 162, 199 A.2d 809. A trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken "that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction." Ibid. In those circumstances solely should an appellate court "appraise the record as if it were deciding the matter at inception and make its own findings and conclusions." Ibid.

State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44, 927 A.2d 1250 (2007).

Our review of a judge's legal conclusions, however, is plenary. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995).

B.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey Constitution both prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule, which is one remedy for violations of those provisions, operates to preclude prosecutorial use of evidence obtained from unlawful searches and seizures. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-56, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691-92, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1089-90 (1961); State v. Reid, 194 N.J. 386, 405, 945 A.2d 26 (2008). Its primary purpose is to deter future police misconduct. Ibid.

The federal courts recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, pursuant to which evidence will not be suppressed if the police officers employed an objective standard of reasonableness and acted in good faith with respect to a warrant later found to be defective. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920, 104 S.Ct. 3405,...