State v. Haney
| Citation | 184 S.E.2d 344,257 S.C. 89 |
| Decision Date | 22 October 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 19300,19300 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Michael HANEY, Appellant. |
Eddie R. Harbin, Greenville, for appellant.
County Sol. C. Victor Pyle, Sr., Greenville, for respondent.
The appellant appeals from his conviction for housebreaking, charging the trial court with error in failing to quash the indictment, failing to direct a verdict of acquittal, and declining a requested charge to the jury.
At about 10:30 on the night of August 19, 1970, police officers of the City of Greer converged on an elementary schoolhouse in response to the activation of its silent alarm system. The appellant and a non-appealing codefendant were apprehended as they ran out of a rear door and tried to flee. In a written statement, admitted in evidence by consent, appellant's companion stated that they entered the building through a door found partly open, but the school's janitor testified that he had locked the door upon closing the building earlier. The window to the principal's office, accessible from a ledge adjacent to the rear steps, was found by an investigating officer to be raised. Inside the building the door to the library and visual aids storage area was found open, although it, like the window, had been closed when the janitor left.
The breaking and entry condemned by Section 16--332, Code of 1962, upon which the conviction is based, must be carried out 'with intent to commit a felony or other crime of a lesser grade.' The indictment alleges that the defendant intended to steal 'the goods and chattles' inside the schoolhouse. He contends that the indictment is fatally uncertain in failing to specify what particular items he contemplated stealing. In State v. Langford, 55 S.C. 322, 327, 33 S.E. 370, 372 (1899), it was decided that in 'indictments for burglary with intent to commit larceny, it is not necessary to specify the particular goods and chattels the defendant intended to steal.' No reason has been suggested for applying a different rule when housebreaking is the charge. This contention must be rejected.
Claiming a total lack of evidence of intent to commit larceny, the defendant charges error in the refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal. The testimony adduced at trial fully supports a conclusion that the defendant gained access to the building through an unlocked window and entered the room where movie projectors and other visual aids were kept, whereupon the arrival of the police frightened him and his cohort into flight.
Absent an admission by the defendant, proof of...
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State v. Nathari
...evidence, while not containing the precise language requested by Nathari, is still a correct statement of the law. See State v. Haney, 257 S.C. 89, 184 S.E.2d 344 (1971) (refusal to give requested charge on circumstantial evidence not error where requested charge merely rephrases and repeat......
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State v. Lambert, 20214
...of intent to enter and steal was present as '(p)roof of intent necessarily rests on inference from conduct.' State v. Haney, 257 S.C. 89, 91, 184 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1971); 13 Am.Jur.2d, Burglary, Section 50. The trial judge was not required to seek out a series of potential explanations compa......
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State v. Hiott
...to describe the property accused intended to take, or to allege the value of the property." 17 C.J.S. Robbery § 68. See State v. Haney, 257 S.C. 89, 184 S.E.2d 344 (1971). There was no apparent confusion as to what judgment could be pronounced. The trial judge correctly instructed the jury ......
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McMillian v. State
...of events and find that he had the intent to commit a crime based on his conduct at the time of this offense. In State v. Haney, 257 S.C. 89, 91, 184 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1971), this Court observed that "proof of intent necessarily rests on inference from conduct." We noted the unexplained brea......