State v. Hanlon
| Decision Date | 11 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-584,94-584 |
| Citation | 164 Vt. 125,665 A.2d 603 |
| Parties | STATE of Vermont v. John R. HANLON. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert Appel, Defender General and Judith A. Ianelli, Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee.
Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.
The State appeals the trial court's decision to continue the prosecution of defendant on charges of sexual assault upon two boys pending the outcome of the appeal of convictions on similar charges in Massachusetts. We affirm.
In 1993, defendant, a 66-year-old Catholic priest, was charged with sexually assaulting two boys, Christopher W. and Christopher M., on separate occasions during ski trips to Vermont in 1987. In April 1994, defendant was sentenced by a Massachusetts court to three consecutive life terms followed by a suspended life sentence after he was convicted of two counts of the forcible rape of William W., the brother of Christopher W. Defendant appealed the Massachusetts convictions, and then sought to have the Vermont charges dismissed in the interest of justice under V.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(2).
On October 6, 1994, the trial court continued further proceedings of the Vermont case "until an Order disposing of the Defendant's appeal in Massachusetts is entered." The court ordered that if the Massachusetts convictions are reversed, a status conference would be convened to conclude pretrial preparation in the Vermont case. On the other hand, if the Massachusetts convictions are affirmed, the State would be afforded thirty days to file its objections "to the grant of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss these prosecutions with prejudice."
The trial court's opinion suggests that it is inclined toward granting defendant's motion to dismiss. The court acknowledged that the Vermont charges involve different victims assaulted in a different place approximately six years after the Massachusetts assaults, and that the testimony of the two Vermont victims at the Massachusetts trial did not immunize defendant from prosecution for the Vermont assaults. Nevertheless, the court stated that it would be difficult to justify trial on the Vermont charges considering that (1) defendant would be eighty-one years old at his earliest possible release date in Massachusetts if the sentences there are upheld; (2) the two Vermont victims contributed to defendant's Massachusetts convictions through their testimony; and (3) there is a significant backlog of criminal cases in Windham District Court.
On October 17, 1994, the State sought permission to appeal the October 6 order under both 13 V.S.A. § 7403(c) and V. R.A.P. 5(b). On November 4, 1994, the trial court ruled that the motion to appeal under Rule 5(b) was timely, but that the request and notice of appeal under § 7403 were untimely because they were filed beyond the seven-day period allowed by statute. See § 7403(e). At a later hearing, the court granted the State's motion for permission to appeal from both the October 6 and November 4 rulings.
Regarding the procedural issue, we agree with the State that the trial court erred in concluding that the State's appeal under § 7403(c) was untimely filed. Rule 26(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that V.R.C.P. 6 "applies to the computation of any period of time prescribed by these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable statute." (Emphasis added.) Under Rule 6(a), when the period of time prescribed by the rule, court order, or applicable statute is less than eleven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and state or federal legal holidays are excluded from the computation of the time period. In this case, discounting weekend days and holidays, the State's motion and notice of appeal under § 7403 were filed within seven days, and therefore were timely. Section 7403(e) is plainly an "applicable statute" for purposes of the computation of the time period in which an appeal may be filed. Further, applying V.R.A.P. 26(a) and V.R.C.P. 6(a) to § 7403 does not enlarge or modify any substantive rights provided by law. See 12 V.S.A. § 1 ().
Regarding the merits of this appeal, the State contends that the trial court's October 6 order exceeds the scope of its authority under Rule 48(b)(2) and violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by infringing on the executive branch's power to charge crimes and to grant pardons. These arguments are premature at this point because the trial court has not dismissed the prosecution; indeed, in the event defendant's Massachusetts convictions are affirmed, the State will have a further opportunity to contest defendant's motion to dismiss.
If and when that day arrives, the trial court will be guided by another opinion issued by this Court today, State v. Sauve, 164 Vt. 134,...
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...case, we will not interfere with the trial court's decision if there is a reasonable basis to support it. State v. Hanlon, 164 Vt. 125, 128, 665 A.2d 603, 605 (1995). We will reverse a trial court's decision on such a motion only if that decision constituted an abuse of discretion. State v.......
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...the trial court's decision to deny the motion to continue was a clear abuse of discretion requiring reversal. See State v. Hanlon, 164 Vt. 125, 128, 665 A.2d 603, 605 (1995) (Supreme Court will not interfere with trial court's ruling on motion to continue if there is any reasonable basis to......
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