State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 November 1896
• Citation: 135 Mo. 618,37 S.W. 532
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HAYES, Revenue Collector v. HANNIBAL & ST. J. R. CO.

37 S.W. 532

135 Mo. 618

STATE ex rel. HAYES, Revenue Collector v. HANNIBAL & ST. J. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

November 17, 1896.

TAXATION — RAILROAD PROPERTY — LEVY BY COUNTY COURT — HOW REVIEWED — SCHOOL DISTRICTS — AVERAGE RATE — RAILROAD LANDS — SIDE TRACKS — LOCAL TAXATION.

1. In levying school taxes on a railroad company's distributable property, the county court and all other officers to whom power is given and who are charged with duties in making such levy proceed, not as judicial tribunals, but in invitum; and whether the taxes were levied in accordance with the statutory requirements is to be determined by an action in the circuit court as provided for in Rev. St. 1889, § 7682.

2. Under Rev. St. 1889, § 7717 et seq., which provides that the school tax upon local and distributable railroad property shall be levied by the county court, the clerk has no power, without an order of the county court, to extend such tax upon the tax books against the property of a railroad company, upon the certificate of the secretary of the board of directors of the school district reporting the amount of taxes to be levied for school purposes.

3. Under Rev. St. 1889, § 7732, which provides that "the roadbed, rolling stock, and movable property" of a railroad shall be taxed for school purposes at the average rate for the several districts of the county, where such property is erroneously made to include buildings on the right of way, the taxes are excessive to the amount of the average tax on the value of the buildings, and the county cannot recover for this excess.

4. That the average rate at which property of a railroad company should be assessed for the local school tax was fixed too low cannot be urged by the company as an objection against the tax.

5. That the rate for each fund of the school tax was not separately found and levied, as contemplated in Rev. St. 1889, § 7732, is an irregularity only, and does not invalidate the levy of the aggregate tax on railroad property at the average rate of the school districts of the county. Railway Co. v. Gracy (Mo. Sup.) 29 S. W. 579, followed.

6. Under Rev. St. § 8005, which provides that, "whenever it shall become necessary in the judgment of the board of directors of any school district * * * to increase the annual rate of taxation for school purposes, * * * such board shall determine the rate * * * [and] shall submit to the voters * * * whether the taxation shall be increased as proposed by said board," where the estimates returned by the several school districts show that the boards of directors fixed the respective rates, and that a majority of the voters voted in favor of an increase of the levy to those rates, the estimates sufficiently fixed the rates from which to deduce an average rate of the districts for the taxation of railroad property for school purposes.

7. Within the meaning of Rev. St. 1889, § 7728, which provides that the property of a railroad company subject to local assessment is "all property real, personal, or mixed, including lands, machine and work shops, round-houses, and other buildings, goods, chattels, and office furniture, not hereinbefore specified," the necessary lands upon which side tracks are laid in a yard, for the convenient and safe movement of cars, and for loading and unloading them, are not assessable by the local assessor. Brace, C. J., dissenting.

8. A portion of such yard, leased for private purposes, is subject to local taxation.

In banc. Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; Charles L. Dobson, Judge.

Action, on the relation of Elihu W. Hayes, collector of revenue, against the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company, for taxes alleged to be due from defendant. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Transferred to court in banc. Reversed.

The following are the opinions in division:

BRACE, P. J.

This is an action by the collector of the revenue of Jackson county for the recovery of taxes alleged to be due by the defendant for the year 1891. The taxes sued for are upon both the local and distributable property of the defendant. Before the taxes became delinquent the aggregate sum which the defendant admitted to be properly leviable of its property was tendered to the collector, and after suit brought was deposited in court. The question at issue is upon the taxes which it refused to pay, for reasons stated as follows: "(1) The defendant refused to pay the local school tax of Kansas City district on its local property described in the petition as `Tracts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8,' for the reason that no order of the county court was made levying the tax. (2) The defendant also refused to pay school taxes at the average rate of 55 cents on the $100, claiming that it was in excess of the true average rate, and that the levy of the average rate was illegal. (3) Defendant refused to pay the school tax at the average rate of 55 cents on its buildings, valued at $12,550, and it contends that said buildings should only be taxed at the local district rate. (4) It refused to pay all taxes on tracts 9 and 10, described in appellant's petition, for the reason that said tracts were in fact a part of the distributable property of the defendant, were reported by it to the state auditor and the same were assessed by the state board of equalization. Defendant claims that they were not subject to assessment by the local assessor of Jackson county." The trial court refused all the declarations of law asked for by both the plaintiff and the defendant, gave judgment for the defendant, adjudged the costs against the relator, and the plaintiff appeals.

1. Plaintiff contends that the action of the county court in ascertaining the average rate of taxation for school purposes upon defendant's distributable property, and of said court and of the assessor in the assessment of defendant's local property, is conclusive, and not subject to attack in this action, and that the court committed error in refusing to so declare, as asked in the instructions of the plaintiff, and in admitting evidence in support of such attack. If this contention can be maintained, we are relieved of the necessity of inquiring into most of the objections urged against the validity of the proceedings by which the contested taxes were attempted to be levied. The argument to support this contention proceeds upon the idea that the county court, in ascertaining the average rate of taxation for school purposes, and in levying these taxes, acts judicially as a court of record, and its determination therein is a judgment, which is final and conclusive unless appealed from, and that the assessment of the local property by the assessor is also in some manner a judgment of a competent tribunal in a matter within its jurisdiction, which is also final and conclusive under the same circumstances, and upon the assumption that the defense in this action brought to enforce the collection of the taxes levied and assessed by these tribunals upon the property of the defendant is a collateral attack upon their final judgments. This, we take it, is an entire misconception of the character of this action. It is admitted that the defendant is the owner of the property, and that its valuation by the assessing authorities is correct. But the complaint is that the taxes sued for were not levied upon that valuation, against the property of the defendant, in the manner required by law. We think there can be no doubt that, in levying the taxes in question, the county court and all other officers to whom power is given and who are charged with duties in making such levy proceed, not as judicial tribunals, but in invitum, as the representatives of the taxing power of the government, the force and effect of whose action is declared by statute to be only prima facie correct in an action brought for the collection of such taxes. Rev. St. 1889, § 7682. These taxes, to be valid charges against the property of the defendant, must have been levied in accordance with the requirements of the statute. The tribunal provided by the statute for determining whether they were so levied is the circuit court, in an action such as this, in which the question to be tried is whether they were so levied. Jones v. Driskill, 94 Mo. 190, 7 S. W. 111; Boyd v. Ellis, 107 Mo. 400, 18 S. W. 29; Smith v. Nelson, 110 Mo. 552, 19 S. W. 734; State v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 117 Mo. 1, 22 S. W. 910. The circuit court committed no error in making such inquiry, and we are not relieved of the necessity of determining whether that court decided correctly in sustaining the several objections, hereinbefore stated, made by the defendant to these taxes. These objections will be ruled upon in their order.

2. It seems to be conceded that the Kansas City school district is organized under the provisions of article 2 of chapter 143 of the Revised Statutes. It is provided by section 8000 of that chapter that "the school board of each district shall on or before the 15th of May of each year, forward to the county clerk an estimate of the amount of funds necessary to sustain the schools of their district for the time required by law, or when a longer time has been ordered by the annual meeting, for the time thus decided upon, together with such other amount for purchasing site, erecting buildings, or meeting bonded indebtedness and interest on same as may have been legally ordered, in such estimate, stating clearly the amount deemed necessary for each fund, and the rate required to raise said amount." And by section 8067 it is provided that, "on the receipt of the estimates of the various districts, the county clerk shall proceed to assess the amount so returned on all taxable property real and personal in said district as shown by the last annual assessment for state and county purposes. * * *" In compliance with the requirements of this statute there was forwarded to the clerk of the county court the...