State v. Hanson

• Decision Date: 06 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 241-74,241-74
• Citation: State v. Hanson, 356 A.2d 517, 134 Vt. 227 (Vt. 1976)
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Kent Auburn HANSON.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 517

356 A.2d 517

134 Vt. 227

STATE of Vermont v.Kent Auburn HANSON.

No. 241-74.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

April 6, 1976.

John A. Rocray, Windham County State's Atty., Brattleboro, for plaintiff.

Weber, Fisher, Perra & Gibson, Brattleboro, for defendant.

Before BARNEY, C. J., and SMITH, DALEY, LARROW and BILLINGS, JJ.SMITH, Justice.

This case comes to us as an appeal from a judgment of guilty granted August 30, 1974, in the District Court of Vermont, UnitNo. 6, Windham Circuit, after a trial by jury for violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2501.

On April 1, 1974, appellantKent Hanson, then an unsupervised patient at Vermont State Hospital at Waterbury, left the hospital in an automobile with a vague purpose of traveling to Brattleboro.While driving on Interstate 89 in the Barre-Montpelier area, appellant picked up two male teenaged hitchhikers.The vehicle driven by Hanson eventually broke down and was abandoned by its occupants, who received a ride into Randolph, Vermont, from a service wrecker.In Randolph, Hanson and the two young men engaged in various frivolous activities until late in the afternoon when it was decided that all three would go to Brattleboro together.At that point, Hanson got into a 1973 Toyota Corolla owned by Robert Smith of Randolph, the key to which had been left in the ignition, and proceeded to drive himself and his two companions to Brattleboro.The trio arrived at their destination sometime in the evening.There they visited various bars in which the appellant consumed a substantial amount of alcohol.The three subsequently drove the Toyota to the Signal Hill area of Brattleboro.At that site, the two hitchhikers set out on their own, leaving the appellant asleep in the car.Shortly thereafter the two were apprehended by Brattleboro police and taken into custody.After questioning the young men the police proceeded to the Signal Hill locale where they discovered Hanson asleep in the Toyota.Hanson was immediately arrested for possession of stolen property and incarcerated.

On April 2, the State's Attorney for Windham County filed an information charging Hanson with violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2561.Subsequently this was amended to read 13 V.S.A. § 2501.

At trial, which commenced August 28, 1974, Hanson pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.The latter plea was predicated on the fact that Hanson, in 1963, suffered a ruptured aneurysm of an artery supplying blood to the brain which resulted in substantial organic damage to his brain.Appellant contended at trial, as he does here, that this 'mental disease' relieved him from criminal responsibility for his conduct on April 1, 1974, under the language of 13 V.S.A. § 4801.To rebut this defense, the State introduced the testimony of Dr. Bardwell Flower, a qualified expert in forensic psychiatry, who had been appointed to examine Hanson.In his testimony, and under cross-examination, Dr. Flower stated that it was his opinion that 'Kent Hanson was mentally ill at the time of the offense with which he is presently charged but not to the extent that he was legally insane.'

At the termination of the evidence, the State requested a charge, delivered by the court, that,

mental disease or defect do not include an abnormality manifested by repeated criminal or other anti-social conduct.Thus if you determine that the only evidence of Mr. Hanson's mental disease is a pattern of anti-social behavior, you cannot return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Appellant made timely objection to this charge.

The jury, on August 30, 1974, determined that Hanson was guilty as charged.Appellant, on September 3, filed a motion for a new trial alleging that: (1)the court erred in its instructions to the jury in that it should not have included the above quoted request of the State relating to mental disease and 'psychopathic' behavior; and (2) that because of his inability to understand or accept the statutory definition of insanity, coupled with his incomplete knowledge of the facts, the testimony of Dr. Flower should have been excluded.This motion was denied and appellant was sentenced to 0-5 years imprisonment.

Hanson now appeals the judgment entered below on the following grounds: (1) that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a new trial; and (2) that the court below committed error in its charge to the jury.

I.

The standard to be followed in passing upon appellant's contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial is whether there is evidence in the case such that the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant-appellant was sane at the time of the commission of the offense.State v. Bishop, 128 Vt. 221, 227, 228, 260 A.2d 393(1969);State v. Blair, 118 Vt. 81, 100, 101, 99 A.2d 677(1953);State v. Wilson, 113 Vt. 524, 529, 37 A.2d 400(1944).

The motion for a new trial, under V.R.Cr.P. 33, is directed to the discretion of the trial court.Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal§ 551, (1969).Therefore, this Court will defer to the view of the court below and will affirm unless there has been error as a matter of law or a clear abuse of discretion.Id. at § 559.

Review of the transcript reveals ample evidentiary support, primarily the testimony of Dr. Flower, for the jury's verdict.Appellant alleges, however, that the testimony was insufficient as a matter of law since Flower had not been fully informed as to the appellant's behavior on the relevant dates and had expressed doubts concerning the validity and meaning of the Vermont statute.The record demonstrates, however, that when apprised of this behavior, the witness stated that such information would not alter his final opinion.In addition, Dr. Flower testified fully to the extent of his examination of the appellant and investigation into his background.This question raised by appellant was dealt with by the Court in State v. Bishop, supra, where it ruled:

Though it is for the court to judge, in the first instance, whether witnesses introduced as experts possess sufficient skill to entitle them to give an opinion, it is for the jury to determine from the testimony whether such experts have sufficient skill to render their opinion of any importance.

State v. Bishop, supra, 128 Vt. at 228, 260 A.2d at 398.Appellant's contention directed at the legal sufficiency of Flower's testimony is more properly concerned with the weight to be accorded it.

Clearly, then, there was produced at trial sufficient evidence indicative of appellant's sanity at the time of the commission of the offense.It was...