State v. Harden
| Decision Date | 23 January 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 45788,45788 |
| Citation | 206 Kan. 365,480 P.2d 53 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Roy HARDEN, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The defendant in a criminal action was charged with murder in the first degree, convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to the Kansas State Industrial Reformatory for a period of twenty years. On appeal the record is examined and it is held: The trial court did not err in (a) allowing the appellant's confession to police officers to be put in evidence before the jury; (b) refusing to give an instruction on insanity; and (c) permitting certain rebuttal testimony on redirect examination tending to impeach the credibility of the rebuttal witness to be admitted in evidence.
2. Whether a confession was freely or voluntarily given is based upon a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, and where there is a genuine conflict in the evidence great reliance must be placed upon the finder of fact.
3. In determining the voluntariness of a confession made by the defendant in a criminal action, the trial court in a Jackson v. Denno type hearing is not bound to adopt the opinion of a medical doctor qualified in psychiatry to the exclusion of nonexpert testimony on the issue of the defendant's mental condition and his degree of intoxication at the time the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and interrogated.
4. Where the trial court conducts a hearing in the absence of the jury to determine the admissibility of a defendant's confession, the determination that the statement was freely and voluntarily made is entitled to the weight commonly accorded findings of trial courts, and if supported by competent evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.
5. The instructions in a criminal case are to be confined to the issues in the case as determined by the charge in the information and the evidence adduced at the trial.
6. Mental incapacity produced by voluntary intoxication, existing only temporarily at the time of the criminal offense, is no excuse for the offense, or defense to a prosecution for the offense. The test of insanity as affecting criminal responsibility, that the accused must have labored under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature or quality of the act, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing wrong, does not apply to drunkenness. 7. Temporary insanity immediately produced by intoxication does not destroy responsibility for crime where the accused, when sane and responsible, voluntarily made himself drunk.
8. In a criminal case the state may rest upon the presumption of sanity in establishing a primia facie case. It is then incumbent upon a defendant to overcome that presumption by competent evidence and to reasonably substantiate his plea of insanity. Such evidence must reasonably tend to show that at the time of the commission of the crime the defendant was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong to excuse him from the legal consequences of his acts.
9. Under K.S.A. 60-420 any party including the party calling the witness may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility.
Ray Hodge, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
James W. Wilson, Asst. County Atty., argued the cause, and Kent Frizzell, Atty. Gen., Keith Sanborn, County Atty., and James Z. Hernandez, Deputy County Atty., were with him on the brief for appellee.
This is a criminal action wherein the defendant was charged with the first degree murder of his wife pursuant to K.S.A. 21-401. He was convicted by a jury of second degree murder pursuant to K.S.A. 21-402 and was sentenced in accordance with K.S.A. 21-403 and K.S.A. 76-2406 to the Kansas State Industrial Reformatory for a term of twenty years. Appeal has been duly erfected.
The appellant contends the trial court erred in three particulars: (1) In allowing the appellant's confession to police officers to go to the jury; (2) in failing to give an instruction on insanity; and (3) in permitting certain rebuttal testimony to go to the jury.
The facts disclosed from the evidence are that in the early morning hours of December 1, 1968, Roy Harden (defendant-appellant) called the Wichita police officers to his residence at 3544 Munger Lane in Wichita, Kansas. Officer Hampton was the first to arrive and as he approached the appellant, who was standing at the north front door of the duplex, he asked, 'Roy, did you call the police?' The appellant replied, 'I shot my wife.'
Officer Hampton placed the appellant in a police vehicle and then went into the house to ascertain the condition of Katie J. Harden, the appellant's wife. Katie was found lying face up in the back yard approximately six feet from the back porch. She had a gunshot wound to her left eye bordering near the bridge of the nose directly between the eyes. The projectile entered her brain.
Shortly thereafter the appellant was taken by police officers to the Wichita police department. At approximately 1:25 a. m. on Decemer 1, 1968, Detectives Gerald Skelton and Karl Triplett interviewed the appellant at the police department. The interview was commenced by advising the appellant of his constitutional rights in accordance with Miranda. The appellant acknowledged that he understood his rights and would speak to the detectives. He thereupon related to the detectives his activities from Thanksgiving Day, 1968, up to and including the time of the shooting of his wife. His recollection of such activities was specific and clear.
On the evening of November 30, 1968, Floyd Meade and his wife, Lois, came to the home of the appellant at about 8:00. Floyd Meade was a staff sergeant at the McConnell Air Force Base employed with the appellant who also worked at the air base. They were friends and spent the evening visiting and drinking from a half gallon bottle of Jim Beam liquor until approximately 11:30 p. m., at which time the Meades left and went to their home. The Meades testified on direct examination for the defense at the trial that the appellant was drunk when they left his home on the night of November 30, and was in a condition incapable of reporting for work or driving a car. On cross-examination, however, they admitted having made a statement to the police officers which was tape-recorded on December 1, 1968. Lois Meade in the tape-recorded statement said, Sgt. Meade in the tape-recorded statement said, 'I wouldn't say he appeared drunk, no.' These tape recordings were introduced in evidence and heard by the jury.
The appellant in his statement at 1:25 a. m. on December 1, 1968, informed the detectives that after the Meades had left at approximately 11:30 p. m. on November 30, 1968, he started to argue with his wife, the decedent, as to her treatment of his friends; that he then went to the night stand in the bedroom and removed a loaded revolver and went back in the kitchen where his wife was standing, and while holding the gun beside his leg he cocked it by pulling back the hammer. When asked why he did this, he replied that in the past when his wife started getting upset the sight of the gun would calm her down.
The appellant further informed the detectives that his wife went running out the back door and he gave pursuit. When he caught up with her the argument resumed. The appellant stated he started waiving the pistol and while he was waiving it the pistol discharged. He said he saw blood on her face and he ran into the house and called the police. He then sat in a chair and waited until the officers arrived.
Testimony from a ballistics expert of the Wichita police department indicated the absence of nitrates on the person of the decedent. In his opinion, based on this fact, the shot when fired at the decedent was fired from a distance exceeding three feet.
The police detectives took another statement from the appellant at 11:50 a. m. December 1, which confirmed almost word for word the appellant's previous statement. Twice, however, the appellant refused to permit his statement to be taperecorded. But according to the officers the appellant at no time requested an attorney.
The appellant's evidence centered on the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. C. J. Kurth. In Dr. Kurth's opinion, because of the enormous consumption of alcoholic beverage by the appellant and its effect on his mental condition, the appellant could not formulate the necessary criminal intent at the time of the shooting of his wife.
The appellant testified at the trial and his testimony virtually confirmed most of the statements he had previously made to the detectives at 1:25 a. m. on December 1, 1968, and later at 11:50 a. m. the same day. By his testimony and that of his friends, the Meades, the appellant sought to establish that he had consumed an enormous amount of alcoholic liquor on the night of November 30, 1968, and that he was not aware of his surroundings.
Was the appellant's statement given to the police detectives in the early morning hours of December 1, 1968, properly admitted in evidence?
Counsel for the appellant contends the appellant could not have consumed liquor all evening, shot his wife, coupled with the existing mental condition, and then knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his constitutional rights and confess.
It is argued the appellant's testimony at the trial discloses that he can only remember certain things during his pruported interrogation.
Relying upon the testimony of Dr. Kurth it is argued:
'Only a competent and qualified Doctor of Psychiatry can look into the mind of the appellant, only then after a battery of tests and examinations and be able to say if the appellant was or...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Young
...and voluntarily given. (State v. McVeigh, 213 Kan. 432, 435, 516 P.2d 918; and Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 384 (1960).) (See also, State v. Harden, 206 Kan. 365, 480 P.2d 53 (alcohol intoxication alleged); State v. Kimmel, 202 Kan. 303, 448 P.2d 19 (alcohol intoxication alleged); State v. Hansen, 1......
-
State v. Anderson
...would justify a jury finding in accordance with the defendant's theory. State v. Hamrick, 206 Kan. 543, 479 P.2d 854; State v. Harden, 206 Kan. 365, 480 P.2d 53, Syl. ¶ 5." (Emphasis Similarly, our decision 10 years before Kessler in State v. Gonzales, 253 Kan. 22, 23, 853 P.2d 644 (1993), ......
-
State v. Jacques
...where the testimony showed defendant's mental faculties were sufficient to make a voluntary confession); State v. Harden, 206 Kan. 365, 368-72, 480 P.2d 53 (1971) (affirming second-degree murder conviction and holding that defendant's use of alcohol did not require suppression of statement ......
-
State v. Smith
...Barry, 216 Kan. 609, 533 P.2d 1308; State v. Randol, 212 Kan. 461, 513 P.2d 248; State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 497 P.2d 275; State v. Harden, 206 Kan. 365, 480 P.2d 53; Van Dusen v. State, 197 Kan. 718, 421 P.2d 197; State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868, 8......