State v. Harding
| Decision Date | 22 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 20080772-CA.,20080772-CA. |
| Citation | 2010 UT App 8,223 P.3d 1148 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Tina HARDING, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Margaret Lindsay, Spanish Fork, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen. and Marian Decker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and GREENWOOD.1
¶ 1 Defendant Tina Harding appeals her convictions for illegal possession or use of a controlled substance and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. These charges stem from the search of a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. Specifically, she appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the search of her bags, which were inside the rear storage compartment of the vehicle, was a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm.
¶ 2 Defendant was a passenger in her friend's vehicle when Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic stop for an equipment violation because the vehicle's plate lamp was inoperable. Officer Westerman ran a routine check on the driver and learned that she did not have a valid driver license. He then requested the names and birth dates of each of the three passengers and discovered that none of them had a valid driver license.2 Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a citation for an inoperable plate lamp and driving without a license. He then told her she was free to leave, but advised her to contact someone to come drive the vehicle because none of the passengers had a valid driver license. The driver began to walk toward her vehicle but returned to ask Officer Westerman a question. At that point, Officer Westerman asked her if he could look in the vehicle and she consented. Officer Westerman asked the passengers to exit the vehicle and told them they could wait with the backup officer "if they wanted." This second officer arrived before Officer Westerman completed his investigation and prior to the driver consenting to a search. The emergency lights on both of the officers' vehicles were off before the driver exited her vehicle.
¶ 3 During Officer Westerman's search of the vehicle he found a brown bag and a blue bag3 in the cargo space behind the back seat of the vehicle. Before searching the bags, Officer Westerman did not ask to whom they belonged, and none of the passengers claimed ownership of them. There were no visible indications on the bags that they belonged to anyone other than the driver. The bags contained drugs and drug paraphernalia and other items indicating the bags belonged to Defendant. Officer Westerman then searched Defendant and found a lock blade knife with a three-inch blade. Officer Westerman arrested Defendant and gave her Miranda warnings.
¶ 4 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. Defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, see State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (), and now appeals.
¶ 5 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence because the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. We afford little discretion to the district court's determination in cases involving the legality of a search and seizure "because there must be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 26, 63 P.3d 650 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 6 Unreasonable searches are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection extends to automobile stops, although reasonable traffic stops are allowed if the "purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). When a traffic stop occurs, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). That seizure continues "[f]or the duration of a traffic stop." Arizona v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 781, 782, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). Generally speaking, a traffic stop for a traffic violation observed by an officer is justified. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 30, 63 P.3d 650. Recognizing this principle, the parties in this case stipulated that the initial traffic stop was a legally valid investigatory detention.
¶ 7 "Once the purpose of the initial stop is concluded ... the person must be allowed to depart." Id. ¶ 31. Further, "[a] traffic stop that begins as a seizure may de-escalate to a mere consensual encounter." Id. ¶ 33. Thus, we consider whether the vehicle occupants' encounter with Officer Westerman had de-escalated from an investigatory detention to a consensual encounter before Officer Westerman asked the driver if he could look in her vehicle. Any investigatory traffic stop may properly be determined to have "de-escalate[d] to a consensual encounter when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she is free to end the encounter and depart." Id. ¶ 39.
¶ 8 In State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, the Utah Supreme Court addressed de-escalations to consensual encounters. By definition, "`an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual unless the driver's documents have been returned to [her].'" Id. ¶ 40 (quoting United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir.1996)). If the driver's documents have been returned, we consider "factors tending to show de-escalation," including "informing a person [s]he is free to leave, or that [s]he does not have to answer additional questions." Id ¶ 41. By contrast, factors that weigh against de-escalation include "failure to issue a warning or citation before engaging in additional questioning" and "a coercive show of authority, such as the presence of more than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer, or [the officer's] use of a commanding tone of voice indicating that compliance might be compelled." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 9 In Hansen, the supreme court reversed this court's decision that a traffic stop had de-escalated to a consensual encounter, determining that there was no noticeable break between the initial traffic stop and the further questioning unrelated to the purpose for the traffic stop. See id. ¶ 68. In addition, the officer did not address the traffic violations before questioning the defendant about possible contraband and did not tell the defendant he was free to leave. See id. ¶ 45. Because the supreme court "question[ed] whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave before being issued a warning or citation, or at least being told he or she could leave," id., it concluded that the "detention had not de-escalated to a consensual encounter at the time of the additional questioning; and thus, [the defendant] was illegally seized," id. ¶ 46.
¶ 10 In this case, however, the driver's documents had been returned to her and she was cited for the equipment violation and lack of a driver license. Further, there was a distinct break in the encounter when Officer Westerman told the driver she was free to leave. At that point, the purpose of the traffic stop had clearly been concluded. However, the driver then approached Officer Westerman to ask a question. While it is true that there was a backup officer present, the facts do not suggest coercion. For example, the officers' vehicles' emergency lights were off, and there is no indication that the officers' weapons were displayed, that the officers touched the driver or the passengers, or that the officer used a commanding tone of voice. See id. ¶ 41 ().
¶ 11 We conclude that, under these circumstances, the driver would have reasonably felt free to leave and, therefore, the encounter had de-escalated to a consensual encounter. See id. ¶¶ 33-34. Thereafter, the driver consented to a search of the vehicle. Although Defendant lacked standing to object to the search because she did not own or exercise authority over the vehicle, the State stipulated that she had standing to challenge the search of her bags because she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bags and did not abandon them. Thus, we turn to the legality of the search of Defendant's bags.4
¶ 12 Our analysis of the legality of the search of Defendant's bags begins with the question of whether it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to conclude that the driver's consent extended to Defendant's personal belongings. As noted above, the State concedes that Defendant has standing to challenge whether the officer had a reasonable belief that the driver's consent to search the vehicle extended to Defendant's bags.
¶ 13 In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of `objective' reasonableness— what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Id. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). In Jimeno, the car driver consented to a search and the officer searched a folded, brown paper bag...
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State v. Harding
...the driver had authority to consent to the search of her backpacks. A majority of the panel of the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Harding, 2010 UT App 8, ¶ 1, 223 P.3d 1148. The majority concluded that Officer Westerman could have reasonably believed the driver had authority to consent......
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Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Third Edition
...cases in favor of non-deferential review"); State v. Lowe, 2010 UT App 156, ¶ 5, 234 P.3d 160; State v. Harding, 2010 UT App 8, ¶ 5, 223 P.3d 1148 ("We afford little discretion to the district court's determination in cases involving the legality of search and seizure."); State v. Hogue, 20......