State v. Hardy

• Decision Date: 25 February 1918
• Docket Number: 22928
• Citation: State v. Hardy, 142 La. 1061, 78 So. 116 (La. 1918)
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. HARDY

78 So. 116

142 La. 1061

STATE v. HARDY

No. 22928

Supreme Court of Louisiana

February 25, 1918

SYLLABUS

(Syllabus by the Court.)

The matter of the separation of witnesses in a criminal case is largely within the discretion of the trial court, which will not be controlled by this court, save when plainly abused, to the prejudice of the defendant.

The trial judge may restrict the cross-examination of a witness in a criminal case within reasonable limits.

The credibility of a defendant in a criminal case may be impeached, upon laying the proper foundation, by evidence of statements made by him which conflict with his testimony and, though a statement so made, in the form of an answer to a question propounded by the sheriff, while holding such defendant in custody, may involve a confession, it is, nevertheless, admissible in evidence if shown to have been made voluntarily, and without inducement, promise, threat, or intimidation.

A trial judge does not err in refusing to allow a state witness to be recalled, after the closing of a criminal case, in order that he may be cross-examined concerning threats said to have been made by him against the counsel for the defendant, and which could not have affected the interest of the defendant during the trial.

Where the general charge of the trial judge, in a criminal case, fully covers the law applicable to the facts so far as disclosed to this court,

Where the general charge of the trial judge, be reversed.

In conferring jurisdiction on the juvenile courts, the Constitution makes an exception with respect to capital crimes.

J. R. Kitchell and John Nugier, both of Abbeville, for appellant.

A. V. Coco, Atty. Gen., and Preston J. Greene, Dist. Atty., of Abbeville (Vernon A. Coco, of New Orleans, of counsel), for the State.

OPINION

MONROE, C. J.

Defendant, having been convicted of manslaughter under an indictment for murder, and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five, nor more than six, years, prosecutes this appeal. It appears that he and his sister, the wife of the deceased, were jointly indicted, and that she was acquitted. He has put in no appearance in this court, either in person or by counsel.

1. We find in the record a bill of exception to the ruling of the trial court in granting the request of the state that George Lege, a witness called by the state, be excepted from an order, granted on motion of defendant, that all the witnesses be sequestered. It appears from the statement per curiam that Lege was the father of two minors, a boy aged 10, and a girl aged 14, who were the only eyewitnesses of the difficulty between the defendant and the deceased, and that the judge considered the request a reasonable one. The bill suggests no prejudice to the defendant; the matter was largely within the discretion of the judge, and, as we find no reason to believe that such discretion was abused, we shall not disturb the ruling. Marr's Cr. Jur. of La. p. 713, § 423.

2. George Lege, called by the state in rebuttal, was asked, in chief, where he lived and how many children he had, and, having answered, was asked, on cross-examination, where he had lived during the life of his father, to which the state objected, and, the objection having been sustained, a bill was reserved. It appears from the statement of the judge that defendant announced that the purpose of the question was to show the character of the witness in the estimation of his father; that the witness was over 40 years of age, had a large family of his own, that he had been cross-examined for two or three hours, 'along those lines,' and that the court thought it proper to put an end to it. Also, that he was not an eyewitness to the killing, but testified merely to certain physical facts which affected the charge against defendant's sister and did not concern the case against the defendant.

The judge is vested with a sound discretion in the matter of controlling the examination of witnesses within proper limits, and defendant shows no ground for complaint of the exercise of that discretion in the instance disclosed by the bill. State v. Jackson, 111 La. 343, 35 So. 593; State v. Haab, 105 La. 230, 29 So. 725.

3. From the recitals of another bill, the statement of the judge, and the testimony of the sheriff annexed thereto, it appears that the two children heretofore mentioned called by the state (being the only witnesses, other than the defendant now before the court and his sister and codefendant who actually saw the difficulty which resulted in the killing), testified that they heard defendant say to decedent, 'Come out here, you half nigger, and I will cut your ribs out;' that thereupon decedent walked up to defendant and gave him 'one slap, a pushing slap that pushed him down'; that defendant's sister then stepped between them, laying her hands on the arms of decedent who apparently offered no resistance, and was pushing him backward; that while she was so doing defendant was standing behind her, watching decedent over her right shoulder, and a short time afterwards reached over and stabbed decedent in the neck with what appeared to be a pocketknife; that decedent then pursued defendant for some distance, and, returning, asked that the sheriff be sent for, and that he died soon afterwards.

The two defendants, as witnesses in their own behalf, testified that decedent was a grown man, something over five feet in height, 21 years old, married and the father of two children; that he first assaulted the defendant now before the court and knocked him down three times with his clenched fist; that defendant then escaped and ran; that decedent pursued and overtook him and again knocked him down, and that, upon his arising, seized him by the throat and was choking him when defendant, then a boy not yet 16 years of age, who had an open knife in his hand, in defending himself against the attack of the decedent, must have stabbed him in the neck, from which wound he bled to death. The trial judge makes the further statement that defendant's testimony, if believed, established the plea of self-defense, and that he also testified to circumstances tending to show that the stabbing was accidental, in fact, that he so stated on cross-examination; that he denied having made any statements in conflict with his testimony; denied that he had spoken to the sheriff or Mr. Kibbe about the killing; denied that he had told the sheriff, the day after the killing, on the train, on their way to the prison at New Iberia, that he had stabbed the deceased because the latter had given him a slap; that he was warned that the district attorney proposed to contradict him by the testimony of the sheriff as to his...