State v. Hardyway, 74415
Decision Date | 17 April 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 74415,74415 |
Citation | 264 Kan. 451,958 P.2d 618 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Terry W. HARDYWAY, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The record in this Fourth Amendment traffic stop search and seizure case is examined, and it is held: The district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress illegal drugs seized from the defendant's person.
2. An appellate court reviews a decision on the suppression of evidence with great deference to the factual findings of the district court. The initial question for review is whether the district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. If so, the appellate court should not reweigh the evidence. The ultimate determination of the suppression of evidence is a legal question requiring independent appellate review.
3. The existence and voluntariness of a consent to search and seizure is a question of fact to be decided in light of the attendant circumstances by the trier of fact. The question of voluntariness will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
4. The quantum of evidence necessary to prove voluntariness is by a preponderance. Debra S. Peterson, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Thomas J.
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision filed February 7, 1997. Appeal from Sedgwick district court; PAUL W. CLARK, judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Elizabeth Seale Cateforis, Assistant Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, was with her on the brief for appellant.
Schultz, Assistant District Attorney, and Nola Foulston, District Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, were on the brief for appellee.
This is a Fourth Amendment traffic stop search and seizure case. Defendant Terry W. Hardyway appeals his conviction on one count of possession of cocaine, K.S.A.1994 Supp. 65-4160(a), and one count of seat belt violation, K.S.A. 8-2503. Before trial, Hardyway filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The motion was denied. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The State petitioned for review, asserting error in reversal of the district court's finding that Hardyway's consent was voluntary.
We granted the petition for review. Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 20-3018. A majority finds the consent to search voluntary, reverses the Court of Appeals, and affirms the district court.
The police received complaints that three of four residences in a four-plex in Wichita were involved with gang activity and "mostly narcotic sales." Detective Terry Fettke, Officer Shaun Price, and other officers of the Special Community Action Team (SCAT) conducted surveillance of the residences. SCAT is a unit that focuses on street level gangs and drugs. The purpose of the surveillance was to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant for a search of the residences.
The officers received information from another SCAT unit that a passenger in a brown Cadillac had entered one of the residences under surveillance. The passenger had only been there a brief period of time and returned to the car. Believing the passenger, Hardyway, might have purchased narcotics, the officers located and followed the brown Cadillac. They observed the driver change lanes without signaling, stopped the Cadillac for traffic infractions, and observed seat belt violations by both occupants. Detective Fettke testified that he immediately advised the occupants of the traffic violations. The driver consented to a search of his person. Fettke asked Hardyway if he would mind getting out of the car and going to the rear to speak with him. Hardyway complied. Fettke testified that he did not order Hardyway out of the car. Fettke informed Hardyway of his suspicions that Hardyway had just purchased drugs on Indiana Street. Fettke then asked Hardyway if he would mind being searched for narcotics or weapons. According to Fettke, Hardyway consented to the search, responding that he did not mind being searched. Fettke found crack cocaine in Hardyway's left shirt pocket.
After seizing the cocaine, arresting Hardyway, and informing him of his Miranda rights, Fettke questioned Hardyway. Hardyway admitted going to the residence and purchasing the cocaine.
Hardyway's motion to suppress addressed the seized cocaine and his statements to the detective. Fettke testified about the surveillance and the traffic stop. Fettke said that he followed Hardyway's car because he thought the occupants may have been involved in a drug deal. Fettke pointed out that his suspicion was based upon hours of surveillance, "having direct knowledge of the persons involved in the narcotics distribution from 429 Indiana and realizing that the distribution was going on at that location before that vehicle [sic ] even pulling up."
The district court ruled that Hardyway's statements to Fettke were inadmissible but admitted the cocaine and the lab reports. The district judge said:
In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals said:
The Court of Appeals found that Hardyway's...
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State v. Mell, No. 98,725.
...do not include situations where only a mere possibility exists that evidence could be destroyed or concealed. State v. Hardyway, 264 Kan. 451, 465, 958 P.2d 618 (1998). Whether exigent circumstances exist to justify the warrantless search of a home is dependent upon the particular facts and......
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...as must the district court, with "common sense" considering "ordinary human experience."' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Hardyway, 264 Kan. 451, 459, 958 P.2d 618 (1998). "'"This approach is intended to avoid unrealistic second-guessing of police officers' decisions and to accord appropriat......
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State v. Hubbard
...circumstances, that the evidence will be destroyed or concealed before a search warrant can be obtained. State v. Hardyway , 264 Kan. 451, 464-65, 958 P.2d 618 (1998). But this does not stretch to situations when only a mere possibility of that danger exists. State v. Fewell , 286 Kan. 370,......
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...v. Robinson, 322 Ill.App.3d 169, 255 Ill.Dec. 35, 748 N.E.2d 739 (2001); State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1993); State v. Hardyway, 264 Kan. 451, 958 P.2d 618 (1998); Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329 (Ky.1992); State v. Kelly, 376 A.2d 840 (Me.1977); State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189, 3......
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...(2008); State v. White, 44 Kan. App. 2d 960, 968-69, 241 P.3d 591 (2010). [66]Thompson, supra note 8,, generally. [67]State v. Hardyway, 264 Kan. 451, 465, 958 P.2d 618 (1998); State v. Parker, 282 Kan. 584, 596, 147 P.3d 115 (2006); State v. Wendler, 47 Kan. App. 2d 182, 200-03, 274 P.3d 3......
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Pardon Me, May I ...? Consent Searches in Kansas
...(2008); State v. White, 44 Kan.App.2d 960, 968-69, 241 P.3d 591 (2010). [66] Thompson, supra note 8, generally. [67] State v. Hardyway, 264 Kan. 451, 465, 958 P.2d 618 (1998); State v. Parker, 282 Kan. 584, 596, 147 P.3d 115 (2006); State v. Wendler, 47 Kan.App.2d 182, 200-03, 274 P.3d 30 (......