State v. Harlin, s. 75234

Citation925 P.2d 1149,260 Kan. 881
Decision Date25 October 1996
Docket NumberNos. 75234,75487,75235,75491,s. 75234
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. William W. HARLIN, et al. Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the facts are uncontroverted, a trial court decision that double jeopardy applies is subject to de novo review on appeal.

2. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides three different types of protection for a person charged with a crime. Double jeopardy protection shields an accused from: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.

3. The double jeopardy protection guaranteed in Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is equivalent to the protection guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

4. Kansas has long held that prison disciplinary proceedings brought against an inmate do not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct on grounds of double jeopardy. Significant United States Supreme Court decisions claimed to have altered existing case law in this area are examined and held not to bar the prosecution at issue, all as set forth more fully herein.

Joe Shepack, County Attorney, argued the cause, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, was with him on the brief, for appellant.

Lisa Nathanson, Assistant Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, was with her on the briefs, for appellees William W. Harlin and Curtis Cox.

Thomas B. Frost, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee Gregory Chaney.

McFARLAND, Chief Justice.

William W. Harlin, Curtis Cox, and Gregory Chaney, inmates of Ellsworth Correctional Facility, violated prison rules and discipline was imposed in the form of disciplinary segregation, restriction of privileges, loss of good time, fines, or a combination thereof. Criminal charges were subsequently filed in the Ellsworth County District Court against the three individuals based upon the same incidents from which the disciplinary proceedings had arisen. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the criminal cases based upon claims they were violative of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Kansas Constitutions. The district court granted the motions, and the State appeals therefrom.

The underlying facts may be summarized as follows.

William W. Harlin

On November 28, 1994, and March 17, 1995, Harlin struck a correctional officer on duty at the institution. In disciplinary proceedings, he was found guilty of battery (K.A.R. 44-12-324) and sentenced to the aggregate of 82 days' segregation, 111 days' restriction of privileges, and fined $50. Based upon these same incidents, two separate complaints were later filed in the district court, each charging Harlin with battery against a law enforcement officer, a violation of K.S.A. 21-3413(a)(2), a level 7 person felony. In one case, 94-CR-149, Judge Rohleder denied the motion to dismiss; in the other case, 95-CR-64, Judge Bennington granted the motion. Upon rehearing the motion to dismiss in No. 94-CR-149, Judge Bennington reversed Judge Rohleder's earlier order and dismissed the case on grounds of double jeopardy.

Curtis Cox

On October 16, 1994, six balloons containing marijuana were taken from Cox's wife, who was in the prison to visit Cox. Correspondence indicating Cox and his wife had developed a plan to deliver the marijuana to Cox had been previously intercepted. In disciplinary proceedings, Cox was found guilty of conspiring to introduce contraband into a penal institution, a violation of K.A.R. 44-12-1101 and K.A.R. 44-2-103. Cox was sentenced to 21 days' segregation, 21 days' restriction of privileges, and fined $10. He was later charged in the Ellsworth County District Court with one count of solicitation to introduce contraband into a penal facility, a violation of K.S.A. 21-3826 and K.S.A. 21-3303, a level 9 nonperson felony, and one count of delivery of marijuana, a violation of K.S.A.1995 Supp. 65-4163, a level 3 drug felony. The charges were dismissed on grounds of double jeopardy.

Gregory Chaney

On June 9, 1995, Gregory Chaney struck a correctional officer on duty in the Ellsworth Correctional Facility. In a disciplinary proceeding, Chaney was found guilty of battery, a violation of K.A.R. 44-12-324, and was sentenced to 28 days' segregation, 21 days' restriction of privileges, and the loss of 60 days of good-time credits. He was later charged in the Ellsworth County District Court with battery against a law enforcement officer, a violation of K.S.A. 21-3413, a level 7 person felony. The district court dismissed the charge on grounds of double jeopardy.

Standard of Review

The facts upon which the district court based its decision are uncontroverted. Where the facts are uncontroverted, a trial court decision that double jeopardy applies is subject to de novo review on appeal. In re C.M.J., 259 Kan. 854, 857, 915 P.2d 62 (1996).

Double Jeopardy Defined

We recently discussed double jeopardy in In re C.M.J., 259 Kan. at 857, 915 P.2d 62, stating:

" 'The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution states: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The double jeopardy guaranty is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Kansas also enforces an analogous double jeopardy clause in Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. It states: "No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." The double jeopardy protection guaranteed in the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is equivalent to the protection guaranteed in the United States Constitution. See State v. Cady, 254 Kan. 393, 396-97, 867 P.2d 270 (1994).' [State v. Mertz, 258 Kan. 745, 749, 907 P.2d 847 (1995) ].

"In Mertz, we summarized the scope of the double jeopardy protections:

'The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides three different types of protection for a person charged with a crime. Double jeopardy protection shields an accused from: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.' 258 Kan. 745, Syl. p 3, 907 P.2d 847."

Issue

The issue is broadly stated to be whether the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the State from prosecuting an inmate who has previously been disciplined by prison authorities for the same conduct. The district court answered the question affirmatively and dismissed the charges. The actual issue is narrower. It is long-established law in Kansas that prison discipline imposed for violation of prison regulations does not bar subsequent prosecution under criminal laws for the same conduct. See Collins v. State, 215 Kan. 489, 524 P.2d 715 (1974), and State v. Williams, 208 Kan. 480, 493 P.2d 258 (1972). The issue before us may be more accurately stated as being whether two cases of the United States Supreme Court require the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar the prosecution herein as held by the district court. These two cases are United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), and Montana Dept. of Rev. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994).

Discussion

This court has addressed the double jeopardy question in a variety of contexts since Kurth Ranch and Halper were decided. See In re C.M.J., 259 Kan. 854, 915 P.2d 62 (expelling a juvenile from school and adjudicating him as a juvenile offender for the same conduct do not constitute double jeopardy); State v. Jensen, 259 Kan. 781, 915 P.2d 109 (1996) (assessment and partial or complete satisfaction of tax and penalty under the Kansas Drug Tax Act do not bar subsequent criminal prosecution for drug possession); Mertz, 258 Kan. 745, 907 P.2d 847 (an administrative proceeding suspending a driver's license does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol); State v. Gulledge, 257 Kan. 915, 896 P.2d 378 (1995) (assessment and payment of amounts owed under the Kansas Drug Tax Act do not constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes).

In this case, there is no question that the criminal prosecution and conviction would constitute "punishment" for the illegal acts allegedly committed within the correctional institution. Thus, the determinative issue is whether the preceding administrative disciplinary penalties constituted "punishment" under post-Halper-Kurth Ranch double jeopardy jurisprudence. If so, a criminal prosecution which occurs after the administrative disciplinary procedures would be "multiple punishment" for the same offense. See Mertz, 258 Kan. at 751-52, 907 P.2d 847.

In our recent treatment of the issue in Mertz, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. While criminal charges were pending, defendant's driver's license was administratively suspended based on the same incident. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in the criminal case alleging a violation of his rights under the double jeopardy clause. He contended that he had already been punished by the administrative suspension of his driver's license. 258 Kan. at 747, 907 P.2d 847. Our analysis of Halper is helpful and will be quoted at some length as follows:

"The crux of the defendant's argument is based on the definition of punishment in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 . In Halper, the defendant was convicted of collecting 65 false Medicare reimbursement claims. For this offense, the defendant was fined $5,000 and sentenced to prison. Later, the Government brought a civil action against the...

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