State v. Harman

Citation198 Conn. 124,502 A.2d 381
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Hyde A. HARMAN.
Decision Date17 December 1985
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut

Hyde A. Harman, pro se.

Temmey Ann Pieszak, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on brief, was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

C. Robert Satti, Sr., State's Atty., with whom was Michael L. Regan, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN and ASPELL, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue on this appeal is whether the trial court denied the defendant his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel by failing to appoint new counsel for him for eleven weeks after the withdrawal of the defendant's previous attorney. The defendant, Hyde A. Harman, was convicted, after a jury trial, of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 1 and 53a-54a. 2 He appeals from this judgment.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts concerning the underlying crime. The defendant and his wife separated in June, 1979. On October 28, 1979, the defendant drove to his wife's house, after having called her to say that he was going away and wanted to give her their dog. As he pulled into the driveway, his wife left the house and approached the car. Emerging from the car with a rifle in hand, the defendant told his wife that he was going to kill her, and then shot her in the stomach. As she turned to run away, he shot her three more times in the back. After she fell, he shot himself in the stomach.

The defense, at trial, centered on a claim of mental disease or defect, a defense that the jury rejected. On appeal, the defendant's chief claims of error are that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial in: (1) allowing him to remain unrepresented by counsel for eleven weeks; (2) erroneously instructing the jury on the insanity defense; and (3) improperly admitting the testimony of a psychiatrist. We find no error.

I

The defendant first argues that the original trial court, Hendel, J., unconstitutionally left him unrepresented for eleven weeks. On September 17, 1980, the defendant's attorney, special public defender Chester Fairlie, successfully moved to withdraw from the case. The trial court did not appoint new counsel to represent the defendant until December 3, 1980. The defendant claims that the trial court, by failing to replace Fairlie in a timely manner, violated his right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the federal constitution and by article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. In light of the unusual circumstances present in this case, we disagree. 3

The record reveals an undisputed history of stormy relationships between the defendant and the attorneys appointed to represent him in this case. After the defendant's arrest, the court named assistant public defender Richard Singer to serve as defense counsel. The defendant soon began to complain that he did not want Singer and, on January 22, 1980, the trial court replaced Singer with public defender Edward Lavallee. By May, 1980, the defendant had ceased cooperating with Lavallee and had written a number of letters to the court demanding new counsel. On May 19, 1980, Lavallee withdrew and the court appointed a special public defender, Fairlie, to represent the defendant. The defendant repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with Fairlie and refused to cooperate with him, prompting Fairlie twice to move to withdraw. The court denied both motions. To force the trial court to appoint new counsel, the defendant brought suit in federal court against Fairlie, as well as against Lavallee and Singer. On September 17, 1980, having received notice of the federal suit, the trial court allowed Fairlie to withdraw.

Immediately thereafter, the trial court began its attempt to appoint new counsel. The defendant refused to waive his right to counsel, but warned the court that he would strongly object to the appointment of a public defender and threatened to cause further problems if the attorney he received did not satisfy him. The trial court told the defendant that it would not appoint counsel whom the defendant found objectionable and ordered that a public defender from another county be located. On September 24, the defendant returned to court and reiterated his objection to the appointment of a public defender. In light of the defendant's stance, the court did not appoint counsel. The defendant next appeared before the court on October 14. During that session, the state recommended an attorney to represent the defendant. The defendant objected. The court then offered to permit the defendant to interview another attorney. It gave the defendant the option of either accepting the attorney without objection after the interview or proceeding pro se. On October 21, after having met with the attorney, the defendant informed the court that he would accept him but that he would also object. The court declined to appoint the attorney. Rather than compel the defendant to represent himself, however, the court transferred the case to Hartford where it hoped that the defendant would obtain counsel satisfactory to him. Due to the heavy caseload in Hartford, the defendant's case was returned to the original trial court. During proceedings held on November 25, 1980, attorney Leo Flaherty offered to represent the defendant if the court transferred the case to Tolland. The defendant agreed to accept Flaherty without objection and the court transferred the case to Tolland. On December 3, 1980, the court in Tolland, Spada, J., formally appointed Flaherty, who then served as the defendant's counsel for the remainder of the trial.

It is against this factual background that we must decide whether the trial court violated the defendant's constitutional rights by failing to appoint new counsel for him for eleven weeks. Trial courts have an unquestioned obligation, under both the state and the federal constitutions, to provide indigent defendants with legal representation. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); see State v. Gethers, 193 Conn. 526, 533, 480 A.2d 435 (1984). If appointed counsel withdraws from the case for good cause, the trial court must furnish a new attorney for the defendant. McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.1981); United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2d Cir.1972); State v. Beaulieu, 164 Conn. 620, 628-29, 325 A.2d 263 (1973). The emergence of a conflict of interest between the defendant and his attorney establishes good cause for withdrawal of counsel. McKee v. Harris, supra; United States v. Calabro, supra. When a trial court is called upon to provide substitute counsel, it must do so expeditiously.

The defendant claims that the trial court's eleven week delay in appointing new counsel was an unconstitutional denial of his right to the assistance of counsel. The defendant does not challenge the trial court's apparent finding that, by suing Fairlie, he had himself created the conflict of interest that entitled him to a new attorney. He maintains, however, that the length of this delay, during an allegedly critical stage of the prosecution, necessarily gave rise to an irrebuttable presumption that he had been denied a fair trial. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).

Even if we were to agree with the defendant that, in the ordinary case, an eleven week delay in the appointment of substitute counsel is constitutionally impermissible, this is not the ordinary case. When the defendant's obstreperous behavior has materially contributed to the delay, we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the propriety of the trial court's action. Cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970); United States v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1216, 103 S.Ct. 1218, 75 L.Ed.2d 455 (1983). In this case, the defendant's conduct justified the trial court's delay in naming a new attorney. The trial court could have immediately assigned a lawyer to whom the defendant objected and then insisted that the defendant either accept the appointed counsel or proceed pro se. See State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 380, 497 A.2d 408 (1985); McKee v. Harris, supra, 931; United States v. Calabro, supra, 986; State v. Beaulieu, supra, 164 Conn. 629-31, 325 A.2d 263; State v. Hudson, 154 Conn. 631, 637, 228 A.2d 132 (1967); State v. Nash, 149 Conn. 655, 183 A.2d 275, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 868, 83 S.Ct. 130, 9 L.Ed.2d 104 (1962). Instead, the trial court, aware of the defendant's previous problems with his attorneys, sought to accommodate the defendant's objections and thereby prevent future disruptions of the trial that might prejudice the defendant. Indeed, the trial court took considerable pains to provide the defendant with a satisfactory attorney, transferring the case twice and repeatedly asking the defendant, to no avail, to name an attorney that he desired.

On this record, we are unpersuaded that the defendant was harmed in any way by the eleven week hiatus in his representation by counsel. The trial court did not compel the defendant to represent himself. Court proceedings during this period focused almost exclusively upon the search for new counsel. When the defendant insisted on immediate judicial disposition of his pro se motions for discovery, the court initially decided the motions but then refused to allow the defendant to argue pro se, ruling that the defendant had not waived his right to counsel and was merely awaiting the appointment of a new attorney. In effect, the court virtually suspended the case until satisfactory counsel could be found. The defendant claims that, because he had no lawyer for eleven weeks, he...

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28 cases
  • State v. Mitchell
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 1 juillet 1986
    ...198 Conn. 255, 258-63, 502 A.2d 886 (1986) (illegal arrest does not void subsequent prosecution and conviction); State v. Harman, 198 Conn. 124, 131, 502 A.2d 381 (1985) (delay in appointment of new counsel to represent defendant). Not every constitutional violation requires automatic rever......
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    ...on any of [the essential] elements warrants reversal regardless of whether the defendant objected at trial." State v. Harman, 198 Conn. 124, 134, 502 A.2d 381 (1985). The only possible fundamental constitutional right that the defendant appears to be asserting is that the elements of rape a......
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    ...the constitutional ambit of State v. Evans, supra, [this challenge is] unreviewable. See Practice Book § 3063." State v. Harman, 198 Conn. 124, 137, 502 A.2d 381 (1985). Furthermore, it is well settled that a claim of error based on an instruction that the jury should consider the defendant......
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1 books & journal articles
  • State v. Golding: a Standardless Standard?
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 65, 1990
    • Invalid date
    ...buWen of proof); State v. Vitale, 190 Conn. 219, 460 A.2d 961 (1983~ ~comment on defendant's interest in outcome); State v. Harman, 198 Conn. 124, 502 A.2d 381 (1985) (claimed denial of right to counsel). 27. Turcio v. Manson, 186 Conn. 1, 4, 439 A.2d 437 (1982); Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn.......

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