State v. Harper
| Decision Date | 05 June 2017 |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Dasean HARPER, Defendant–Respondent. |
229 N.J. 228
160 A.3d 1281
STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Dasean HARPER, Defendant–Respondent.
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Argued January 30, 2017
Decided June 5, 2017
Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
Joshua D. Sanders, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney).
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Legislature passed an amnesty bill in 2013 that, "for a period of not more than 180 days from the effective date of [the]
act," L. 2013, c. 117, enabled people to dispose of guns they possessed illegally. During that time, the law allowed individuals to transfer or voluntarily surrender firearms. We now consider whether the law effectively created a nearly six-month grace period from prosecution for the illegal possession of firearms.
In this case, a jury convicted defendant Dasean Harper of unlawful possession of a weapon—a .357 Magnum revolver loaded with hollow-point bullets. One year later, defendant argued for the first time on appeal that, in light of the amnesty provision, his possession of the handgun was lawful. On remand, the trial court vacated
the conviction based on the language of the amnesty law. The Appellate Division denied the State's motion for leave to appeal.
We find that the amnesty law did not afford defendants blanket immunity for the entire amnesty period. Reading the law in that way would lead to absurd results that the Legislature did not intend. It would permit violent criminals to carry weapons in public with impunity, for almost 180 days, and remain free from prosecution so long as they transferred or voluntarily surrendered their firearms just before the end of the amnesty period.
Instead, the law created a period of no more than six months during which people could dispose of weapons they illegally possessed without being prosecuted. The provision affords a defense to those who attempted to comply with its terms. As with other affirmative defenses, a defendant must raise the defense at trial or it is waived.
Here, defendant did not argue at trial that the amnesty law provided a defense to the charge. He did not offer proof that he attempted to transfer or surrender his handgun. In short, he waived the affirmative defense. We therefore reverse and reinstate his conviction.
I.
We draw the following facts from the trial record. On November 29, 2013, a police officer on patrol in Pennsville saw a box truck
parked in the wrong direction on a street. He also observed that its tires were over the fog line, partially in the roadway. The officer approached the driver and passenger, who explained that they were looking for the right address to make a delivery. The officer asked for identification, and each man provided a Pennsylvania driver's license. Defendant was the driver.
The officer checked the identifications through dispatch and learned that defendant had two outstanding arrest warrants. The officer then asked defendant to step out of the truck, told him that he was being placed under arrest, and directed him to put his hands up.
Defendant complied and told the officer, "I want to let you know, I have a gun on me, a handgun on me." The officer called for backup, handcuffed defendant, and retrieved a gun from defendant's waistband—a Smith & Wesson .357 Magnum revolver loaded with four hollow-point bullets and two slug rounds. During a search, the officer also recovered a concealed-carry permit that the State of Florida had issued to defendant. Defendant said that, because of the permit, he thought he had not done anything wrong.
On February 20, 2014, a grand jury in Salem County returned an indictment that charged defendant with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b) (Count One), and fourth-degree possession of hollow-point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–3(f) (Count Two).
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment before trial. He relied, in part, on the Florida permit to claim an exemption from prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:39–6. At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel represented that defendant lived and worked in Pennsylvania and passed through New Jersey to make a delivery for his job. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and also held that defendant was properly denied entry into the pretrial intervention program (PTI).
A jury convicted defendant on both counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to five years' imprisonment, with forty-two months of parole ineligibility, on Count One. The court imposed a 364–day concurrent term of imprisonment on Count Two.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. He also filed two motions before the Appellate Division: one for a limited remand to reconsider his application for PTI, which is not relevant to this appeal, and another for bail pending appeal. In support of his request, defendant argued for the first time that his handgun conviction was illegal because of the amnesty provision. In a two-page order dated August 5, 2015, the Appellate Division remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a bail hearing and consider the amnesty law.
The following week, the trial court granted defendant bail pending appeal. The court later heard oral argument on the meaning of the amnesty provision. According to defense counsel, the law allowed an individual to "retain possession" of a weapon during the six-month amnesty period provided he otherwise complied with the statute by "Day 180." After that, defendant argued, the police could return, ask the individual if he had disposed of the gun, and seek to prosecute him if he had not.
Based on the plain language of the law, the trial court concluded that an individual who unlawfully possessed a handgun on the effective date of the law could keep the firearm and decide how to proceed for the next 179 days. To the extent the law might "create[ ] some interest[ing] fact scenarios" in which criminal conduct "becomes not criminal because of the statute," the court concluded that the words of the law reflected the Legislature's intent.
In an order dated February 8, 2016, the court vacated defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm "because the issue of amnesty was never presented to the finder of fact." The Appellate Division denied the State's motions for leave to appeal and for a stay of the trial court's order.
We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. 226 N.J. 205, 141 A .3d 292 (2016).
II.
The State, represented by the Attorney General, argues that the trial court erred when it vacated defendant's conviction for unlawful possession. The State submits that the amnesty provision did not confer "blanket immunity for six months to all illegal firearms possessors, regardless of whether they were even attempting to comply with the law." Instead, the State contends that the Legislature intended to encourage people to comply with the law expeditiously. The State relies on the law's plain language and legislative history for support, and claims that its reading of the statute is consistent with the law's purpose to promote public safety.
According to the State, the law requires "the unlawful possessor to take affirmative steps to dispose of the illegal weapon." In any event, because defendant failed to raise the provision as an affirmative defense at trial, the State argues that he waived the issue.
Defendant asserts that the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed. As he did before the trial judge, defendant argues that the amnesty provision is "unambiguous on its face" and allows for only one interpretation: that defendant "still had time to comply with the Amnesty Provision at the time he was charged." Defendant maintains that only "those who ... failed to comply with the Amnesty Provision prior to the sunset date" could be prosecuted for unlawfully possessing firearms. Here, defendant contends, "the State's own actions in charging" him prevented him from complying.
Defendant contends that the Legislature acted to reduce the number of illegal firearms in the community and encourage individuals
to transfer them. He disputes that the law was meant to operate as an affirmative defense. He argues in the alternative
that, if the law is not clear, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed against the State.
III.
A.
At the heart of this appeal is the meaning of L. 2013, c. 117, which we refer to as the amnesty provision. Governor Christie signed the law on August 8, 2013 as part of a series...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
L.R. ex rel. J.R. v. Camden City Pub. Sch. Dist
...reading gives rise to an absurd result, do we consider legislative history or other extrinsic information. See State v. Harper, 229 N.J. 228, 237, 160 A.3d 1281 (2017). "When interpreting multiple statutes governing the same subject, the Court should attempt to harmonize their provisions." ......
-
Maison v. NJ Transit Corp.
...legislative history. We also look to extrinsic aids if a literal reading of the law would lead to absurd results.[ State v. Harper, 229 N.J. 228, 237, 160 A.3d 1281 (2017) (citations omitted).]"The Comparative Negligence Act [ (CNA) ] and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law [ (JTCL), N.J......
-
Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp.
...is over." Richardson v. Bd. of Trs. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195, 927 A.2d 543 (2007). See also State v. Harper, 229 N.J. 228, 237, 160 A.3d 1281 (2017). "However, if a statute's plain language is ambiguous or subject to multiple interpretations," then courts look to extr......
-
State v. Pimentel
...the statute are clear on their face, and there is no reason to consult extrinsic sources to divine their meaning. State v. Harper, 229 N.J. 228, 237-38, 160 A.3d 1281 (2017). Further, defendant's claims about the non-discretionary nature of the 180-day minimum penalty are dispelled by the C......