State v. Harrell
Decision Date | 28 February 2013 |
Docket Number | SC S059513,SC S059461).,CA A138184,(CC CR060548,CC C071438CR; CA A138740 |
Citation | 297 P.3d 461,353 Or. 247 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. James Anthony HARRELL, Petitioner on Review. State of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Samuel Allen Wilson, Petitioner on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Anna Fujita Munsey, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review James Anthony Harrell. With her on the briefs was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender. Joshua B. Crowther, Chief Deputy Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review Samuel Allen Wilson. With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
Jeremy C. Rice, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the briefs were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney General.
Jesse Wm. Barton, Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The Bunker Project.
Before BALMER, Chief Justice, and KISTLER, WALTERS, and LINDER, Justices, and DURHAM and DE MUNIZ, Senior Judges, Justices pro tempore. **
DE MUNIZ, Justice pro tempore.
In these two criminal cases, consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant attempted to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. 1 In both cases, the trial court refused to consent to the waiver, and juries subsequently convicted each defendant of the charges against him. In State v. Harrell, 241 Or.App. 139, 250 P.3d 1 (2011), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing defendant Harrell's requested jury waiver and affirmed the convictions. On review in Harrell, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision and remand to the trial court with instructions to reconsider defendant's jury waiver. In State v. Wilson, 240 Or.App. 708, 247 P.3d 1262 (2011), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's refusal to consent to defendant's requested jury waiver had been within the trial court's discretion and went on to affirm defendant's convictions. On review in Wilson, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court to reconsider defendant's jury waiver.
In September 2006, defendant was involved in an altercation outside a bar in which he stabbed one victim with a folding knife and injured a second in the ensuing commotion. Defendant was charged by indictment with multiple counts of assault, attempted assault, and unlawful use of a weapon.
Following a four-day trial, the jury began deliberations and, after three hours, submitted two written questions for the trial court. First, the jury asked, “If [defendant] is found guilty of first degree is he guilty of 2nd automatically?” The trial court answered, “No. Second degree assault requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the injury ‘recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifferent to the value of human life.’ ” The jury then asked, “Can (is it allowed that a persons [ sic ] ) a persons [ sic ] demeanor from ‘self defense’ to ‘intent to cause injury’ be done instantaneously?” The trial court replied, The jury did not submit any further queries.
Shortly after the trial court had been given the jury's questions, defendant indicated that he wished to waive his jury trial right and permit the trial court to rule on the charges against him. The record shows that defendant's counsel submitted a document to the trial court captioned “Waiver of Jury Trial” and had it marked and placed in the record. The document was signed by defendant Harrell and recited that, although he was fully aware of his right to a jury determination regarding the charges against him, he nevertheless wished to waive that right in favor of a determination made by the trial court judge sitting alone. The document further stated that defendant had executed the waiver “voluntarily with full understanding of my rights and without any threat or promise.”
The trial court—after opining that it probably had the authority to grant the waiver if the prosecutor agreed—nevertheless stated that, “absent an agreement[,] I don't think the court has the authority to grant the motion.” The prosecutor responded by arguing that it “would be dangerous precedent” to allow defendants to waive jury trials whenever they disliked a question that the jury had submitted to the trial court. After the prosecutor indicated that her preference was to have the jury decide the case, the trial court denied defendant's requested jury waiver, stating:
Several hours later, the trial court judge submitted his own sealed verdict, which the parties agreed to accept to avoid a retrial if the trial court had erred in refusing to allow defendant's requested jury waiver. Ultimately, the jury convicted defendant on two counts of second-degree assault and acquitted him on the remaining charges. After the jury had been released, the trial court judge stated that he would have acquitted defendant on all eight counts. As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions, and we allowed defendant's petition for review.
In April 2007, defendant was driving his vehicle one night after consuming a significant quantity of alcohol. His driver license was suspended at the time as a result of an earlier conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants. Eventually, defendant ran a stop sign and collided with another car, killing its driver. Defendant subsequently was charged with first-degree manslaughter, second-degree assault, driving under the influence of intoxicants, and driving while suspended.
Before his scheduled trial, defendant sought to waive his right to a jury. We are unable to find anything in the record showing that a written waiver was ever tendered to the trial court or that the need for such a writing was even discussed.2 The record does show that, following an in-chambers discussion with the parties, the trial court declined to accept defendant's requested waiver. When trial began the next day, the trial court allowed the parties to recite, for the record, the previous day's discussions regarding defendant's attempted jury trial waiver:
The trial court then explained the rationale for its decision:
(Emphasis added.) Defendant's case was then tried to a jury, and he was found guilty on all counts. Defendant appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, and, as already noted, we allowed defendant's petition for review.
Under the Oregon Constitution, criminal defendants possess both the right to be tried by a jury and the concomitant right—albeit bounded by judicial consent-to waive that jury trial guarantee in favor of a bench trial. To that end, Article I, section 11 provides, in part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; * * * provided, however, that any accused person, in other than capital cases, and with the consent of the trial judge, may elect to waive trial by jury and consent to be tried by the judge of the court alone, such election to be in writing[.]”
As we discuss later in this opinion, the people adopted that wording as a constitutional amendment in 1932.
In State v. Baker, 328 Or. 355, 976 P.2d 1132 (1999), this court interpreted the jury waiver portion of that constitutional provision following an amendment to ORS 136.001 that granted the state its own separate statutory right to pursue jury trials in criminal prosecutions. The court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because it authorized the state to insist on a jury trial despite a defendant's unequivocal request to waive such proceedings under Article I, section 11. See328 Or. at 360, 976 P.2d 1132 (). In doing so, the court identified the trial court as the only entity...
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