State v. Harrell

• Decision Date: 31 August 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-553-CR,77-553-CR
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Walter J. HARRELL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 428

270 N.W.2d 428

85 Wis.2d 331

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Walter J. HARRELL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 77-553-CR.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 8, 1978.

Opinion Released Aug. 31, 1978.

Opinion Filed Aug. 31, 1978.

John J. Carter, Carter & Finn S. C., Milwaukee, submitted briefs for defendant-appellant.

Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., and David J. Becker, Asst. Atty. Gen., submitted brief for plaintiff-respondent.

Before DECKER, C. J., CANNON, P. J., and MOSER, J.

DECKER, Chief Judge.

This is a double jeopardy case. It involves that narrow segment of former jeopardy principles applicable to retrial of a criminal case in which the first trial was terminated by an order granting defendant's motion for a mistrial.

The defendant was charged in a criminal complaint with having sexual intercourse with a girl fifteen years of age contrary to sec. 944.10(2), Stats. A jury trial of the charge was commenced September 26, 1977. On September 28, 1977, Judge Christ T. Seraphim granted the defendant's motion for a mistrial. The case was reassigned to Judge Landry who heard and denied defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The circuit judge found that the conduct of Judge Seraphim constituted judicial overreaching but that such conduct was not intended to provoke defendant's motion for a mistrial. For that reason, Judge Landry found that retrial of the charges was not barred by the former jeopardy provisions of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.

The defendant contends that judicial overreaching which invokes a double jeopardy bar to reprosecution need not be intended to provoke a defendant's mistrial request but rather need only be sufficient to justify a mistrial. Nevertheless, in elaboration of that argument, defendant compromises that contention by describing the circumstances of this case as judicial conduct Designed either to avoid an acquittal or to insure a conviction and presumably intended to prejudice the defendant's prospects for acquittal. We do not agree with the contentions of the defendant.

The fifth amendment double jeopardy clause is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). Because the former jeopardy provisions of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions ¹ are "identical in scope and purpose," ² the Wisconsin Supreme Court has accepted decisions of the United States Supreme Court, where applicable, as controlling the double jeopardy provisions of both constitutions. Day v. State, 76 Wis.2d 588, 591, 251 N.W.2d 811 (1977); State v. Calhoun, 67 Wis.2d 204, 220, 226 N.W.2d 504 (1975).

Relying upon Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977), the state has conceded that the order of the circuit court is appealable. The Fifth Amendment's prohibition against placing a defendant "twice in jeopardy" represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit in federal criminal proceedings. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).

Former jeopardy provisions represent the idea that the "heavy personal strain" of repeated attempts to convict an individual by the utilization of the power and resources of government, thereby subjecting him to the hazards of delay, embarrassment, expense, ordeal and anxiety should not be allowed. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).

Reprosecution, where the first trial is terminated by a mistrial order made without the defendant's consent, is permitted if "there is a manifest necessity for (it) or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). Circumstances which delay a trial or prevent a verdict are embraced within the manifest necessity standard. Mistrial and reprosecution serve the ends of public justice when the parties are not required to complete a trial which would result in an easily upset result. The standards of Perez are to be balanced by the defendant's right to completion of his trial before the particular tribunal at hand. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976). Great weight is given to the defendant's right to complete the trial and avoid delay and to preclude the postjeopardy opportunity to the prosecution to strengthen its case. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973).

The general rule is that when the defendant requests or consents to the mistrial he waives the right to completion of the trial and, ordinarily, the double jeopardy clause does not bar reprosecution. United States v. Dinitz, supra, 424 U.S. at 607, 96 S.Ct. 1075; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). When prosecutorial or judicial "overreaching" prompts the defendant's mistrial request an exception to the general rule is applicable. When overreaching occurs, the defendant's right to completion of the trial without delay is compromised by the prospect of conviction and lengthy postconviction review with the prospect of reprosecution. In United States v. Jorn, supra, a rule was announced that had been predicted in United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). The double jeopardy clause was held to bar reprosecution when a mistrial, although requested by the defendant, was justified by prosecutorial or judicial overreaching intended to prompt the request.

In the context of the double jeopardy clause we define judicial overreaching as conduct that is egregious rather than merely error. Conduct that is intended to prompt a mistrial request by the defendant or is intended to harass or prejudice the defendant characterizes judicial overreaching. The kinds of judicial misconduct which lead to defendant's mistrial request and bars reprosecution are seeded in a state of mind of the judge which intends to frustrate the defendant's valued right to but one trial and the avoidance of the delay, expense, anxiety, embarrassment and order of retrial. Allowing mere error, prosecutorial or judicial to bar retrial "would fail to adequately take into account the public interest in prosecuting and punishing individuals guilty of crime." Muller v. State, 478 P.2d 822, 827 (Alaska 1971). An intentional act of prosecutorial misconduct has characterized prosecutorial overreaching. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 6 L.Ed.2d 901 (1961); United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129, 94 S.Ct. 866, 38 L.Ed.2d 753 (1973); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 557 (3rd Cir. 1969), Cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912, 90 S.Ct. 2206, 26 L.Ed.2d 566 (1970); State v. Ballinger, 19 Ariz.App. 32, 504 P.2d 955, 959 (1973); People v. Hathcock, 8 Cal.3d 599, 105 Cal.Rptr. 540, 547, 504 P.2d 476, 483 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Montgomery v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 220 A.2d 859, 865 (1966); Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177, 180 (1967); City of Tucson v. Valencia, 21 Ariz.App. 148, 517 P.2d 106, 110 (1973); United Sates v. Mandel, 431 F.Supp. 90, 97 (D.C.Md.1977); United States v. Buzzard, 540 F.2d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Harvey, 377 A.2d 411, 416 (D.C.App.1977); Piesik v. State, 572 P.2d 94, 97 (Alaska 1977); White v. State 523 P.2d 428, 530 (Alaska 1974); State v. Marquez, 113 Ariz. 540, 558 P.2d 692, 695 (1976); State v. Ware, 27 Ariz.App. 645, 557 P.2d 1077, 1088 (1976); State v. Pulawa, 569 P.2d 900, 903-4 (Hawaii 1977); State v. Jackson, 33 Or.App. 139, 575 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1978); State v. Shuler, 293 N.C. 34, 235 S.E.2d 226, 233 (1977); State v. Wesley, 347 So.2d 217, 219 (La.1977).

A minority of other courts have held that gross negligence of a prosecutor or a failure to satisfy professional standards constitutes prosecutorial overreaching. United States v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1977); Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977); People v. Baca, 562 P.2d 411 (Colo.1977); People v. Collins, 48 Ill.App.3d 643, 6 Ill.Dec. 296, 362 N.E.2d 1118 (1977); Thompson v. Maryland, 38 Md.App. 499, 381 A.2d 704 (1978).

The burden is on the defendant to establish that prosecutorial or judicial conduct constitutes overreaching and that such conduct is intentional. United States v. Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1973), Cert. denied 414 U.S. 924, 94 S.Ct. 252, 38 L.Ed.2d 158 (1973).

As in the case of prosecutorial misconduct, judicial misconduct intended to prompt a defendant's mistrial request or intended to harass or prejudice him is required if the double jeopardy clause is to bar reprosecution. United States v. Dinitz, supra, 424 U.S. at 611, 96 S.Ct. 1075. In Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33-4, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 2148, 53 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977), the United States Supreme Court concluded:

It follows under Dinitz that there was no double jeopardy barrier to petitioner's retrial unless the judicial or prosecutorial error that prompted petitioner's motion was "intended to provoke" the motion or was otherwise "motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice" petitioner.

The key words are "intended" and "motivated" in the first two instances and "undertaken to harass or prejudice" in the third instance. All of the situations are characterized by intentional conduct.

Defendant relies upon decisions of federal courts of appeal to sustain his contention that intentional judicial misconduct is not required to constitute judicial overreaching. In United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246, 1256 (5th Cir. 1976), the court cited United States v. Beasley, supra, as authority for the assertion that prosecutorial misconduct resulting from gross...