State v. Harris
Citation | 181 N.J. 391,859 A.2d 364 |
Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ambrose A. HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Decision Date | 19 October 2004 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
Robert Francis Gold and Michael A. Priarone, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Gold, Mr. Priarone and James N. Barletti, of counsel and on the briefs).
Nancy A. Hulett, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
In 1996, a jury convicted Ambrose Harris of capital murder and sentenced him to death. We affirmed the conviction and sentence, State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 716 A.2d 458 (1998) (Harris I), and in a subsequent proceeding, found defendant's capital sentence not disproportionate when compared to sentences imposed in similar cases. State v. Harris, 165 N.J. 303, 757 A.2d 221 (2000) (Harris II). Now, four years later, we review defendant's multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and assorted other challenges to the validity of his conviction and sentence.
Review of an application for post-conviction relief in a capital case, eight years after the defendant's trial and sentencing, is a daunting task under any set of circumstances. It is made more difficult in this instance due to the conduct of the PCR trial court. That conduct requires us to determine initially whether we can place any confidence in the PCR court's findings and conclusions.
We explain. Ordinarily our review would be based on the findings and conclusions of the PCR trial court. R. 3:22-11; R. 2:2-1(a)(3). However, certain written and in-court statements of that court complicate our review. We will not recount those statements in detail here, except to note their thrust. The PCR court expressed a belief that defendant would not ever face the death penalty, no matter what the court did:
[(Footnotes omitted)(emphasis added).]
The balance of the court's statements contain what only can be described as outrageous, sarcastic, and pejorative comments about this State's death penalty system and this Court's capital jurisprudence, including gratuitous personal attacks against current and former members of the Court.1 The court's statements reveal a disdain for defendant and a preordained view that its role in our capital-sentencing system is meaningless. The nature of its comments raise a Caldwell-like issue, namely whether we can affirm a post-conviction relief determination upholding a capital sentence "when [a PCR court seems] to believe that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with [it] but with the appellate court which later reviews the case." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2636, 86 L.Ed.2d 231, 235-36 (1985).
In Caldwell, supra, the capital defendant's attorney asked the jury to "confront both the gravity and the responsibility of calling for another's death." 472 U.S. at 324, 105 S.Ct. at 2637, 86 L.Ed.2d at 236. In response, the prosecutor urged the jurors not to see themselves as the determiners of the defendant's sentence because a death sentence would be reviewed for appropriateness by the state supreme court. Id. at 325-26, 105 S.Ct. at 2637-38, 86 L.Ed.2d at 237. The United States Supreme Court "conclude[d] that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death sentence rests elsewhere." Id. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639, 86 L.Ed.2d at 239. Acknowledging "the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments [as] require[ing] a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination," the Supreme Court observed that "many of the limits that [it] ha[d] placed on the imposition of capital punishment are rooted in a concern that the sentencing process should facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing discretion." Id. at 329, 105 S.Ct. at 2639, 86 L.Ed.2d at 239.
The Supreme Court continued:
The Supreme Court vacated the defendant's death sentence, because "the State sought to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death." Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 2646,86 L.Ed.2d at 247.
We have applied Caldwell on several occasions in circumstances where, for example, a prosecutor or court makes an inappropriate statement to a jury, or where a misleading verdict sheet weakens or subverts the requirement of enhanced "reliability in the [sentencer's] determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Id. at 330, 105 S.Ct. at 2640, 86 L.Ed.2d at 240. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 457-60, 803 A.2d 1 (2002) (Nelson II)
( ); State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 107, 803 A.2d 1074 (2002) ( ); State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 536, 776 A.2d 144 (2001) ( ); State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 247, 586 A.2d 85 (1991) ( ); State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 511, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988) (same); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 162, 548 A.2d 887 (1988) ( ). See also Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ind.2002) ( ).
Caldwell states that the Eighth Amendment's demand for heightened reliability in capital sentencing forbids the State from trying to diminish the sentencer's sense of its "awesome responsibility." The decision does not directly or explicitly place Eighth Amendment duties on a state trial court adjudicating a capital defendant's post-conviction petition. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that members of the judiciary, charged with the function of ensuring the fairness and integrity of the capital-sentencing process, also must view their responsibility as "awesome." Courts evaluating direct review appeals, proportionality review claims, and post-conviction petitions do not determine a capital defendant's sentence, but nonetheless play an indispensable role in "determining [the] appropriateness of [a] death [sentence]," ibid., in light of a defendant's legal rights.
Thus, although we do not rely directly on Caldwell in addressing the PCR court's transgressions, we find that Caldwell provides support for our decision to nullify the PCR court's findings and conclusions. That said, we ground our nullification of the PCR court's determinations in this matter in our State Constitution's protection against cruel and unusual punishment, N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 12, and specifically, on the role that the post-conviction review proceeding is expected to play in assuring meaningful appellate review in our capital-sentencing scheme.
We have stated that a meaningful post-conviction review proceeding is essential to the state constitutionality of our capital sentencing process....
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