State v. Harris
| Decision Date | 06 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 17834,17834 |
| Citation | 80 Ed.LawRep. 214,494 N.W.2d 619 |
| Parties | 80 Ed. Law Rep. 214 STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ryan Russell HARRIS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Scott Bogue, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.
Daniel E. Ashmore and Talbott J. Wieczorek of Gunderson, Palmer, Goodsell & Nelson, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.
Ryan Russell Harris (Harris) appeals to this court asserting that the trial court erred when it transferred his proceedings from juvenile court to adult court. Harris asserts that due to an alleged conflict in the juvenile statutes, the court improperly considered the interests of the public as well as the interest of the child at the transfer hearing. Harris also asserts that the court erred in ordering the transfer because the transfer is not substantially supported by evidence in the record. We affirm.
Sometime before September 11, 1991, Harris began talking to a friend about a plan to carry a gun into his math class and take the students hostage. On his seventeenth birthday, September 10, 1991, he mentioned this same plan to another friend and gave all of the money he had received for his birthday, as well as half of his paycheck, to various of his friends. He also wrote a will and a brief note of apology to his brother for his actions.
The next day, September 11, Harris arrived a few minutes late to his math class at Stevens Senior High School, Rapid City, South Dakota. Harris pulled out a sawed-off shotgun from under the long overcoat he was wearing, made the teacher leave the room and took the class hostage. When asked whether he was joking, Harris said he was not and fired a shot at one of the walls. Although Harris generally gave a warning before shooting, he was careless with the gun, waving it around the room causing the students to duck. During the next several hours, Harris fired shots into walls, overhead projectors (one of which exploded, stinging people with shards of glass) and the classroom intercom.
At one point, one of the students was sitting with her face toward her desk, her hands shaking. Harris walked up to her, pointed his shotgun at her, yelled "Boom" and walked away. When one of the students indicated that she needed to use the bathroom, Harris told her she could go. Part of his response to her question of whether he wanted her to come back was "No, I am going to shoot you in the back on the way out." She backed out of the room. A common student response to the hostage crisis was "I was scared out of my mind." Others said they thought "he would have shot an adult a lot more readily than a student." In a phone conversation with a police negotiator, Harris threatened to "blow heads off." At some point, Harris stepped into the hall and dared the police officers to shoot him.
Several hours after the students were taken hostage, cigarettes were delivered to the classroom. While students were crowded around the desk to have Harris light the cigarettes, one of the students, Chris Ericks, grabbed the shotgun from the desk. Ericks told the students to leave and they ran out of the room. Harris, begging Ericks to shoot and kill him, advanced toward Ericks and continued to advance until Ericks finally backed out the door with the shotgun. The police then apprehended Harris.
The next day, September 12, while at the detention center, Harris read the charges against him and commented: On September 13, the Pennington County State's Attorney's Office filed a forty-seven-count petition in the juvenile division of the Seventh Judicial Circuit alleging the delinquency of Harris. 1 Harris had previously come into contact with the juvenile system six months prior to this hostage situation as a result of a tire-slashing incident in March, 1991. Also, on September 12, State filed a motion to transfer the proceedings from juvenile court to adult court. Transfer hearings were held in November. On December 20, 1991, the circuit court judge granted State's motion to transfer the proceedings from juvenile court to adult court for adult criminal proceedings.
On January 6, 1992, the Pennington County State's Attorney signed a criminal complaint and information against Harris alleging commission of the same offenses contained in the earlier juvenile petition. An amended information was filed later that day which alleged only one count of kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault and one count of intentional damage to public property in the first degree. Also on January 6, the circuit court denied Harris' "Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Information." Harris pled guilty to the amended information counts. On January 24, 1992, the court ordered "that entry of judgment of guilt be withheld and imposition of sentence on this case be, and it is hereby suspended...." on each of the counts to which Harris had pled guilty. The order continued that Harris would be placed on probation for concurrent terms of from ten to forty years upon numerous conditions which included the payment of restitution for the property damage he caused, the counseling costs for the victims of his actions, successful completion of the in-patient treatment program at the Adolescent Care Unit of McKennan Hospital in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and attendance and successful completion of a residential treatment program at the Griffith Center in Colorado, at the completion of which further determinations will be made as to Harris' need for ongoing care or rehabilitation.
Harris asserts on appeal that the court erred when it transferred his proceedings from juvenile court to adult court. Harris first asserts that there is a conflict in the juvenile statutes as to which standard the court is to use at the transfer hearing and that the court erred when it considered the interests of the child and the public during a transfer hearing held pursuant to SDCL 26-11-4, rather than conducting the transfer hearing pursuant to SDCL 26-7A-5, which does not mention the interests of the public. Harris next asserts that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the transfer of his proceedings to adult court. Additional facts will be related where appropriate.
WHETHER A COURT HOLDING A TRANSFER HEARING PURSUANT TO SDCL
OR ONLY THE INTERESTS OF THE CHILD.
We apply the clearly erroneous standard of review as to the trial court's factual determinations. State v. Brings Plenty, 459 N.W.2d 390, 399 (S.D.1990). We will not overturn the trial court unless the findings are against the weight of the evidence. Id. "The construction of a statute is a question of law." Vellinga v. Vellinga, 442 N.W.2d 472, 473 (S.D.1989). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Rusch v. Kauker, 479 N.W.2d 496, 499 (S.D.1991).
We look to the rules of statutory construction for guidance as to a statute's interpretation.
Each statute must be construed according to its manifest intent as derived from the statute as a whole, as well as other enactments relating to the same subject. Words used by the legislature are presumed to convey their ordinary, popular meaning, unless the context or the legislature's apparent intention justifies departure. Where conflicting statutes appear, it is the responsibility of the court to give reasonable construction to both, and to give effect, if possible, to all provisions under consideration, construing them together to make them harmonious and workable. However, terms of a statute relating to a particular subject will prevail over general terms of another statute. Finally, we must assume that the legislature, in enacting a provision, had in mind previously enacted statues (sic) relating to the same subject.
Meyerink v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 391 N.W.2d 180, 183-84 (S.D.1986) (citations omitted). If this court determines that the statutes do conflict, "the more recent enactment is controlling." In re Estate of Smith, 401 N.W.2d 736, 740 (S.D.1987); Kneip v. Herseth, 87 S.D. 642, 214 N.W.2d 93 (1974). We determine that there is no conflict in these juvenile statutes.
A forty-seven felony count petition was initially filed in the juvenile division of the Seventh Judicial Circuit alleging the delinquency of Harris. 2 State moved to have the proceedings transferred to adult court pursuant to SDCL 26-11-4 which states in part:
At the transfer hearing, the court shall consider only whether it would be contrary to the best interest of the child OR of the public to retain jurisdiction over the child. (Emphasis added.)
Harris contends that at the transfer hearing the court should have followed SDCL 26-7A-5. Contrary to Harris' assertion, by the plain language, this section does not apply to chapter 26-11:
Proceedings under this chapter [26-7A] and chapters 26-8A, 26-8B and 26-8C shall be in the interests of the child.
The juvenile laws were rewritten by the legislature in 1991. Harris finds great significance in the fact that the prior SDCL 26-7-11, which had called for a consideration of the interests of the child and of the state, as well as parents and others directly interested, as now codified at SDCL 26-7A-5, no longer mentions the interests of the state or other parties. As we do not consider this statute in isolation, Meyerink, 391 N.W.2d at 184; Border States Paving, Inc. v. South Dakota Dep't of Rev., 437 N.W.2d 872 (S.D.1989), we point out that juvenile proceedings have never been conducted in a vacuum, free from the interests of the state. The prior SDCL 26-8-2, which also called for the consideration of the interests of many parties including the state, now follows section 5 at SDCL 26-7A-6 and still calls for consideration of the interests of the state and others. That section reads:
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