State v. Harris

Decision Date14 November 1994
Docket NumberNo. 66984,66984
Citation98 Ohio App.3d 543,649 N.E.2d 7
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HARRIS, Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Pros. Atty., and Paul J. Daley, Asst. Pros. Atty., Cleveland, for appellee.

James A. Draper, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Robert R. Clarico, Asst. Public Defender, Cleveland, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-appellant, William Harris, appeals the judgment of conviction for drug abuse in violation of R.C. 2925.11.

Appellant raises the following sole assignment of error for our review:

"The trial court erred in denying Mr. Harris' motion to suppress when the evidence seized was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution."

At the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress evidence, Patrolman Darrell Garner, a Regional Transit Authority ("RTA") police officer with eighteen years' experience in law enforcement, was called upon to testify first on behalf of the state. Officer Garner testified that on September 22, 1993, at approximately 3:30 a.m. to 4:00 a.m., he and his partner, Officer Vincent Ventura, were patrolling the East 55th Street rapid transit station when they noticed a pickup truck with plastic liners covering its shattered windows. Officer Garner stated that they had patrolled the same area an hour earlier and had not observed the truck.

Considering the shattered windows and unkempt condition of the vehicle, Officer Garner suspected it to be either stolen or abandoned and decided to investigate further. Additionally, Officer Garner stated that RTA parking lots are not open to the public this late at night when the trains were not running. As Officers Garner and Ventura approached the vehicle on foot, Officer Garner observed someone stir in the front seat. Officer Garner woke up the person, later identified as appellant, and requested him to step out of the vehicle.

As appellant exited the vehicle, Officer Ventura illuminated the inside of the truck, and both officers observed some pills on a tray on top of the glove compartment. Officer Ventura then illuminated the inside of an open glove compartment and observed a clear plastic tube, commonly known as a "straight shooter."

After discovery of the pills on the dashboard and the straight shooter inside the open glove compartment, these items were retrieved from the vehicle and appellant was subsequently placed under arrest. The vehicle was then inventoried and towed per RTA policy. Additionally, neither officer was able to identify the pills on the scene as being over-the-counter or prescription drugs, and no other evidence was found to indicate that a valid prescription for the pills existed. Officer Ventura stated that he believed they were not over-the-counter drugs since a brand name did not appear on any of the pills.

The officers later determined that the vehicle was not reported stolen and was registered to appellant's father.

After Officers Garner and Ventura testified, appellant testified on his own behalf. Appellant stated that at approximately 3:30 a.m., he was awakened by the RTA policemen and told to place his hands out the driver's window, open the door and exit the vehicle. After appellant complied, he claimed he was put on the ground, where he stayed for approximately forty-five minutes. Appellant told the officers it was his truck and gave them his driver's license.

Appellant further claimed that he told the officers the pills were over-the-counter Bufferin extra-strength pain relievers. Appellant also claimed that the officers took his keys, without permission, and went through the locked glove compartment where the glass pipe was found. After the search of appellant's truck, he was placed under arrest by the officers.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court overruled appellant's motion to suppress evidence, finding that the contraband was located in plain view when found by the officers. Appellant subsequently pleaded no contest, as indicated, to drug abuse in violation of R.C. 2925.11. The trial court sentenced appellant to a term of one year. Appellant timely appeals the trial court's decision to overrule his motion to suppress evidence.

It is axiomatic that the evaluation of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses at a suppression hearing are issues for the trial court as factfinder. State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972, 981-982; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 1 OBR 57, 57-58, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584-585. Appellate courts will defer to the factual findings of the trial court when such findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 488, 597 N.E.2d 1141, 1142-1143; State v. Claytor (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627, 620 N.E.2d 906, 908. Accepting the findings of fact of the trial court as true, an appellate court must then independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the trial court erred in applying the substantive law to the facts of the case. Klein, supra; State v. McCulley (Apr. 28, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 64470, unreported, 1994 WL 164013.

In its ruling pursuant to Crim.R. 12(E), the trial court determined that the evidence seized was found in plain view, and therefore such evidence would not be suppressed. Citing State v. Claytor, supra, 85 Ohio App.3d at 632-634, 620 N.E.2d at 911-913 (Harsha, P.J., concurring), the state argues such evidence was actually discovered in open view and was therefore not required to be suppressed.

We agree that a distinction should be made between evidence discovered in plain view, invoking Fourth Amendment analysis, and evidence discovered in open view, which does not invoke Fourth Amendment analysis. The distinction is most aptly described as follows:

" ' * * * The fact that there is a plain view in the Coolidge [v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564] sense does not mean that there has been no search; indeed, the situations described by Justice Stewart are in the main search situations--search pursuant to a warrant naming other objects, search during hot pursuit, search incident to arrest, and a search for purposes other than finding evidence. Rather, the effort in Coolidge is to describe when items so found may be seized even though they were not the items which were legitimate objectives of that search. The Coolidge plurality identifies three requirements: (1) there must be a prior valid intrusion; (2) the discovery of the seized items must be inadvertent; and (3) it must be immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them. The significance of these requirements in terms of justifying a warrantless seizure of evidence is discussed at several points in this Treatise.

" 'By comparison, the concern here is with plain view in a quite different sense, namely, as descriptive of a situation in which there has been no search at all in the Fourth Amendment sense. This situation, which perhaps is deserving of a different label so as to avoid confusion of it with that discussed in Coolidge, encompasses those circumstances in which an observation is made by a police officer without a prior physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. This includes the case in which an officer discovers an object which has been left in an "open field" or similar nonprotected area, and also those cases in which an officer--again, without making a prior physical...

To continue reading

Request your trial
175 cases
  • Tolliver v. Sheets
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • 18 d5 Janeiro d5 2008
    ...the factual determinations of a trial court so long as they are supported by competent and credible evidence. State v. Harris (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 543, 546, 649 N.E.2d 7. The application of the law to those facts, however, is then subject to de novo review. Id. In Miranda, the United Stat......
  • State v. Adam Ennedy, 99-LW-4172
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 30 d4 Setembro d4 1999
    ...1991), Ross App. No. 1633, unreported. The application of the law to those facts, however, is then subject to de novo review. Harris, supra at 546, 649 N.E.2d at 9; State Anderson (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 688, 691, 654 N.E.2d 1034, 1036; also see Lewis, supra 1332; Wilson, supra at 1254. Wit......
  • State v. Abernathy, 2008 Ohio 2949 (Ohio App. 6/6/2008), 07CA3160.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 6 d5 Junho d5 2008
    ...evidence supports those findings. See, e.g., State v. Metcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 145, 675 N.E.2d 1268; State v. Harris (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 543, 546, 649 N.E.2d 7. Appellate courts then independently review whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts. See, e.g.......
  • State v. Norman, 2-99-25.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 20 d1 Dezembro d1 1999
    ...(1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 41, 619 N.E.2d 1141, 1143; United States v. Lewis (C.A.1, 1994), 40 F.3d 1325, 1332; State v. Harris (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 543, 546, 649 N.E.2d 7, 9; State v. Claytor (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627, 620 N.E.2d 906, 908. Accepting those facts as true, we must ind......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT