State v. Harris
Decision Date | 07 February 1928 |
Docket Number | (No. 6116.) |
Citation | 141 S.E. 637 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE . v. HARRIS. |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error to Circuit Court, Marshall County.
Marvin Harris was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor child under age of 16 years, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Hugo F. Chestosky, of Steubenville, Ohio, and D. B. Evans and Martin Brown, both of Moundsville, for plaintiff in error.
Howard B. Lee, Atty. Gen., and W. Elliott Nefflen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
MILLER, P. [1] The defendant was tried and convicted on an indictment charging that he "on the——— day of March in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-seven, in the county aforesaid, and at divers other times within one year next preceding the finding of this indictment, did unlawfully cause, encourage and contribute to the delinquency of Gertie Smith, an infant child of John Smith of said county, as such term with reference to children is defined in the statutes of the State of West Virginia, she, the said Gertie Smith, being then and there a child under the age of eighteen years, to wit, of the age of fifteen years, by enticing and encouraging the said Gertie Smith to absent herself from her home without just cause and without the consent of her parents, by enticing and encouraging the said Gertie Smith to knowingly associate with immoral persons, and by enticing and encouraging the said Gertie Smith to wander about the streets in the nighttime without being on any lawful business or lawful occupation, against the wish and over the objection of the said John Smith her father, in violation of the statutes of the State of West Virginia in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State."
This indictment is predicated on section 26 of chapter 46A of the Code (Acts 1915, c. 70; Acts 1919, c. 111, § 26), providing that:
"Any person who shall by any act cause, encourage or contribute to the delinquency of a child, as this term with reference to children is defined by the statutes of this state, or who shall for any cause be responsible therefor, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, " etc.
The act referred to, by section 1 thereof, provides that the words "delinquent child'' used therein, shall mean any male or female child who, while under the age of eighteen years, among the other acts named therein "knowingly associates with thieves, vicious, or immoral persons, " or "without just cause and without the consent of its parents guardian or custodian absents itself from its home or place of abode, " or "wanders about the streets in the nighttime without being on any lawful business or lawful occupation."
The defendant complains of the action of the trial court in refusing to require the State to file a bill of particulars. By his affidavit in support of his motion for a bill of particulars, the defendant alleges that:
"He cannot safely go to trial upon said indictment without notice of the time or times the state will claim, and offer evidence to prove, any such alleged unlawful acts to have been committed by him."
We think the defendant was not prejudiced by the action of the trial court. The statute clearly defines the offense created thereby; and the indictment is framed in the words of the statute. The Legislature could not possibly anticipate and set out in words every particular act that might constitute the offense. Defendant was charged with knowledge of every act committed by him in his relations with the child, and must know whether or not and when he was encouraging or enticing her to do the things which, under the statute, constitute delinquency. The State in a prosecution for contributing to the delinquency of a child is not confined to a single act on the part of the accused, but may prove any act tending to contribute to. such delinquency. 16 C. J. 596. It is not the act itself, but causing, encouraging or contributing to the delinquency, that constitutes the crime. Here defendant did not ask the State to designate the particular acts relied on, but only the time or times it would claim they were committed. How the defendant could have been benefited by such information does not appear. By the indictment he was "fully and plainly informed of the character and cause of the accusation, " and of the time within which the offense alleged was committed.
The defendant contends that section 34 of chapter 46A of the Code, which the court presented to the jury by State's instruction number 2 is unconstitutional and void. This section reads as follows:
"In order to find any person guilty of violating this act it shall not be necessary to prove that the child has actually become...
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...... We will first consider the constitutional issue raised by the second certified question. . This Court construed the predecessor statute to Code, 49--7--7, in State v. Harris, 105 W.Va. 165, 141 S.E. 637. The earlier statute contained the language, 'Any person who shall by any act cause, encourage, or contribute to the delinquency of a child * * * shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.' We held in Harris that the State was not required to provide the defendant with a bill ......
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