State v. Harris

Citation269 P.3d 820,293 Kan. 798
Decision Date03 February 2012
Docket NumberNo. 101,613.,101,613.
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Katreal M. HARRIS, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. When requested, a district court has a duty to instruct the jury on any lesser included offense established by the evidence, even if that evidence is weak or inconclusive.

2. There is no duty to instruct on a lesser included offense if the jury could not reasonably convict the defendant of that lesser included offense based on the evidence presented. The evidence in this case was insufficient to support an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense.

3. When a defendant fails to request a lesser included offense instruction, an appellate court reviews the argument that a lesser included offense instruction should have been given under a clearly erroneous standard.

4. An instruction is clearly erroneous only if the appellate court reaches a firm conviction that, had the instruction been given, there was a real possibility the jury would have returned a different verdict.

5. When reviewing a district court ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, appellate courts review the ruling's factual underpinnings under a substantial competent evidence standard. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. The appellate court does not reweigh evidence, assess witness credibility, or resolve conflicting evidence. Under the facts in this case, the district judge did not err in ruling that defendant's confession was voluntary and admissible.

6. K.S.A. 22–3423(1)(c) permits a trial court to declare a mistrial if there was prejudicial contact inside or outside the courtroom that makes it impossible to proceed without injustice to a defendant or the prosecution. To follow the statute, a district judge must engage in a two-step analysis: (a) decide whether there was some fundamental failure of the proceeding; and (b) if so, determine whether it is possible to continue without an injustice. This second step requires assessing whether the damaging effect of any prejudicial conduct can be removed or mitigated through jury admonition or instruction or other accommodation. If that is not possible and the degree of prejudice would result in an injustice, a mistrial is necessary.

7. An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision denying a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (a) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the viewed adopted by the trial court; (b) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (c) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.

Christina M. Waugh, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BILES, J.:

Katreal Harris directly appeals his convictions of first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and criminal possession of a firearm. He claims the district court erred by: (1) failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of imperfect self-defense; (2) denying his motion to suppress statements made to police; (3) admitting the victim's pretrial identification of him; (4) denying his motion for mistrial during jury selection; (5) imposing a hard 50 sentence without first submitting the aggravating factors to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and (6) including his prior juvenile adjudication in his criminal history without a jury determination. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Blake Overton and Christopher Sloan were shot at close range in a car at an apartment complex parking lot while attempting to buy cocaine. Sloan died at the scene. Overton was hospitalized with life-threatening injuries, but survived. Overton's injuries prevented him from being interviewed by police for more than a week.

Police initially investigated by interviewing residents at the apartment complex. After a few days, a community police officer received a phone call that the shooter was at the complex. Officers responded and found a disturbance outside an apartment building involving a number of people discussing the shootings. As an officer approached the crowd, he noticed Harris walking from around the side of the building and appearing nervous. Harris was identified by a person at the complex as a man possibly involved in the shootings. Officers arrested Harris after learning he had an outstanding warrant for an unrelated offense. They took him to the police station for questioning. Upon their arrival, officers placed Harris in a locked interview room. Harris claims he was handcuffed or shackled while in the room.

Harris was not immediately interviewed at the station because officers were questioning a woman from the apartment complex who claimed to have information about the shootings of Overton and Sloan. Officers left Harris alone for about 3 1/2 hours, checking on him from time to time, escorting him to the restroom if needed, and providing him with water and a blanket after he complained he was cold.

When his questioning began, the initial portion of Harris' interview was not recorded. We will describe the testimony regarding that in greater detail when relevant to one of the claimed errors on appeal. But once the recording began, Harris was advised of his Miranda rights, asked if he understood them, and acknowledged that he had been read those same rights at the beginning of the interview. Harris confirmed he had been treated fairly up to that point and was not under the influence of alcohol or narcotics.

Harris then told detectives he was the shooter. He explained that a black BMW pulled into the complex, and the two men inside told him to come to them. He said that once he approached the vehicle, the occupants asked for someone named Trey. Harris responded that he did not know anyone by that name, so he went and got Henry “Deon” Sullivan. Harris and Sullivan then returned to the BMW, where Sullivan and the driver soon exchanged angry words during an altercation. Harris recalled the driver saying, “You not Trey,” and Sullivan responding, “Fuck Trey.” Harris said at that point he saw the driver's hands go down between the seat consoles, so he reached into the car with a gun and fired twice into the driver's neck. Harris said he paused, thinking “Oh my God, I just killed somebody,” and fired again at the passenger's head because the passenger said “what the fuck,” and Harris “didn't know what else to do.” Harris said he used Sullivan's .40 caliber Smith & Wesson handgun to shoot the men, which Harris said he had gotten from Sullivan earlier in the evening.

A few minutes later, the detective again asked Harris whether he fired the shots, and Harris responded affirmatively, adding that he believed he saw the driver reaching for a gun. The detective asked whether Harris ever saw the gun he thought the driver was reaching for. Harris said he saw only a handle but not the entire gun, and that he thought the gun was black with a clip. Harris also said that prior to seeing the driver reach for what Harris thought was a gun, the driver had scratched Sullivan on the arm during a scuffle after what Harris believed was Sullivan's attempt to reach in and take the gun away. Harris described the events as a “domino effect” because they happened quickly.

About 9 days after the shootings, Overton was interviewed at the hospital. He told detectives that he and Sloan had driven to an apartment complex parking lot to buy cocaine from a man Sloan had referred to as “T” or Trey. Overton drove his family's black BMW. Upon arriving, Overton said they asked a person standing outside for Trey. That person offered to sell them drugs, but Overton declined because he and Sloan were waiting for Trey. The person left, but then returned with another person. Overton described the two men who approached the vehicle, but did not know either of them before the shooting.

To see if Overton could identify the men involved with the shootings, detectives provided him with two displays containing six photographs each. Overton was shown the first, which placed Harris' photo in the first position next to five others the detectives later described as being similar in appearance to Harris. Overton said he recognized Harris. A second display with Sullivan's photograph in the first position, along with five others, also was shown to Overton. Overton indicated he was drawn to Sullivan's picture, but could not positively identify anyone from that document.

Harris was subsequently charged with first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder with an alternative charge of aggravated battery, and criminal possession of a firearm. Sullivan was arrested a few days later.

At trial, Harris took the witness stand in his own defense and recanted his recorded statements to police. He testified he drank alcohol, smoked marijuana, and did a “couple lines” of coke the day he was arrested, but acknowledged he told police during his interview that he had not taken drugs that day. Harris also testified that he changed his story during the police interview because he was tired of sitting there and being told the detectives did not believe him, and that he was afraid of a man named “G” or “George,” and what “G” would do to him if he told the truth about the shootings. Harris said he lied during the interview because he wanted to “preserve [his] life.” He...

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