State v. Harrison

Decision Date03 April 2013
Docket NumberNo. 27228.,27228.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Andrew Lee HARRISON, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2010–178686.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Janna A. Nelson of Greenwood, and Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia and Solicitor Jerry W. Peace, of Greenwood, for respondent.

Chief Justice TOAL.

Andrew Lee Harrison (Appellant) contends that the trial court erred in refusing to find that the penalty portion of section 56–5–1210 of the South Carolina Code offends the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the morning of September 27, 2009, Appellant picked up a 2003 Ford F–350 truck from Wilson's Auto Sales for detailing. Appellant drove the truck a short distance in Greenwood County on U.S. Route 25 (Highway 25), a highway comprised of two northbound and southbound lanes. Appellant travelled to Parson's Used Cars to perform the detailing work. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Appellant completed the detailing work and exited Parson's by making a right turn onto the southbound lane of Highway 25.

Gary Tims (the Victim) and Daniel Gantt were travelling on Highway 25 in the same direction as Appellant, and in the left lane. The Victim and Gantt were both riding motorcycles. Gantt rode approximately one “bike length” behind the Victim. Appellant entered Highway 25, but instead of utilizing the right lane, pulled his vehicle into the left lane. The Victim lost temporary control of his motorcycle and shifted to the right lane to avoid Appellant's vehicle. However, Appellant simultaneouslyswitched to the right lane and the Victim struck the rear of Appellant's truck. The Victim's motorcycle “ flipped over,” and the Victim landed in the highway. Appellant did not stop, but continued driving on Highway 25. Gantt followed Appellant until Appellant pulled over approximately one-half mile from the accident. Gantt informed Appellant that the Victim was “laying [sic] down in the highway,” and that Gantt did not know whether the Victim was “dead or alive.” Appellant inspected the damage to the truck and stated that he did not possess a valid driver's license, because his driver's license had been suspended. Appellant agreed to return to the scene of the accident. However, once Gantt departed to return to the scene, Appellant travelled in the opposite direction. It is undisputed that Appellant never returned to the scene of the accident. Law enforcement officers later located Appellant hiding in the closet of a vacant house and placed him in custody.

The Greenwood County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for driving under suspension, in violation of section 56–1–0460 of the South Carolina Code and leaving the scene with death, in violation of section 56–5–1210 of the South Carolina Code. A jury convicted Appellant of both charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years' imprisonment for leaving the scene with death, and a concurrent sentence of six months' imprisonment for driving under suspension. Appellant argues that section 56–5–1210 is unconstitutional, and appealed his conviction pursuant to Rule 203(d), SCACR.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the penalty portion of section 565–1210 of the South Carolina Code does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has a very limited scope of review in cases involving a constitutional challenge to a statute. Joytime Distrib. & Amusement Co. v. State, 338 S.C. 634, 640, 528 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1999). All statutes are presumed constitutional and will, if possible, be construed so as to render them valid. Davis v. Cnty. of Greenville, 322 S.C. 73, 77, 470 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1996). A legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. Westvaco Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 321 S.C. 59, 62, 467 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1995).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to find that the penalty provision of section 56–5–1210 of the South Carolina Code, and his sentence pursuant to that provision, violates the Eighth Amendment. We disagree.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).

A. The Proportionality Principle

The United States Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional principle of proportionality in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). In that case the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to fifteen years of “cadena temporal,” a type of imprisonment including hard labor in chains, and permanent civil disabilities. Id. at 367, 30 S.Ct. 544. The Supreme Court held the punishment cruel and unusual because it was not graduated and proportioned to offense, and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), the Supreme Court held a 90–day sentence for the crime of “addicted to the use of narcotics,” excessive despite the fact that such a short sentence is not, in the abstract, cruel or unusual. Id. at 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417. However, the Supreme Court looked at the actual nature of the crime in finding, “ Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.” 1Id.

In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the proportionality principle to a felony prison term. In that case, the defendant pled guilty to check fraud. Id. at 281, 103 S.Ct. 3001. At the time of his conviction, South Dakota law provided for a maximum punishment of five years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. Id. However, the defendant was sentenced pursuant to the state's recidivist statute due to his six previous non-felony convictions. Id. (citing S.D. Codified Laws § 32–23–4 (1976)). The recidivist statute mandated that a defendant convicted of three prior felonies, in addition to the principal felony, receive life imprisonment. Id. at 281–82, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (“The maximum penalty for a ‘Class 1 felony’ was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine.”). Following exhaustion of his state appeals, the defendant sought habeas relief. Id. at 283–84, 103 S.Ct. 3001. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the defendant's sentence “grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense,” and ordered the District Court to issue the writ unless the State resentenced the defendant. Id. at 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001. The Supreme Court affirmed, and provided “objective factors” to guide courts in reviewing the proportionality of sentences under the Eighth Amendment.

First, courts should look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. Id. at 290–91, 103 S.Ct. 3001. Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentence to sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. Id. at 291, 103 S.Ct. 3001. If more serious crimes carry the same penalty, or less serious penalties, then that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive. Id. Third, courts may also compare the sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 291–92, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (“In Enmund [ v. florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.ct. 3368, 73 L.ed.2d 1140 (1982) ], the court conducted an extensive review of capital punishment statutes and determined that ‘only about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die.’ (alterations in original)). The Court applied these objective criteria to the defendant's crime and found that he received the “penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct.” Id. at 303, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (He has been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have committed more serious crimes. He has been treated more harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single state. We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.”).

Solem appeared to stand for a continued, if not strengthened, Eighth Amendment prohibition against disproportional sentences. However, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), the Supreme Court narrowed, significantly at points, its proportionality guidance.

In Harmelin, the petitioner was convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 501 U.S. at 961, 111 S.Ct. 2680. The petitioner claimed that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it was “significantly disproportionate” to the crime he committed, and because the sentencing court was statutorily required to impose the term of imprisonment without taking into account the particularized circumstances of the crime and of the criminal. Id. at 961–62, 111 S.Ct. 2680.

Justice Scalia delivered the Court's decision in a four part opinion, and concluded that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality review. Id. at 965, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (We have addressed anew, and in greater...

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