State v. Hart

• Decision Date: 14 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. DA 07-0527.,DA 07-0527.
• Citation: 352 Mont. 92,214 P.3d 1273,2009 MT 268
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. William Guy HART, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

214 P.3d 1273

2009 MT 268

352 Mont. 92

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. William Guy HART, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 07-0527.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs October 8, 2008.

Decided August 14, 2009.

For Appellant: Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender; Lisa S. Korchinski, Assistant Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana.

For Appellee: Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Sheri K. Sprigg, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana. Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; David Carter, Victoria Callendar, Deputy County Attorneys, Billings, Montana.

Justice JIM RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 On May 17, 2007, a jury assembled in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court convicted the Defendant William Hart of vehicular homicide while under the influence. Hart appeals his conviction, claiming that three errors rendered his trial unfair. We affirm.

¶ 2 We consider the following issues raised by the Defendant:

¶ 3 (1) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Hart's challenge for cause of prospective juror R.F.?

¶ 4 (2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Hart's motion to exclude the video deposition of one of the State's material witnesses?

¶ 5 (3) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Hart's motion for a mistrial after the bailiff delivered video equipment to the jury room without receiving approval from the court?

BACKGROUND

¶ 6 Around 10 p.m. on August 19, 2006, after spending the evening drinking beer with friends, Hart began his drive home. He refused an offer by Terrance McDonnell to pay for a taxi to take him home. On his way, Hart hit and killed a pedestrian, Jose Fraga. Witnesses reported that Hart's pick-up truck bounced up and down as it passed over Fraga's body, and dragged Fraga's body for some distance. There were no skid or scuff marks on the road, nor did Hart's brake lights illuminate to indicate he had braked at any point before or after hitting Fraga. The State charged Hart with vehicular homicide under the influence, or in the alternative, negligent homicide.

¶ 7 The trial began on Monday, May 14, 2007 and lasted four days. Four DVDs were used at trial, including three patrol-car videos and a videotaped deposition of a witness. The court permitted the State to play the video deposition over Hart's objection that the witness was not unavailable for trial. All three patrol-car videos were admitted into evidence at trial. While the video deposition was played for the jury, it was not admitted as a trial exhibit. Prior to the parties' closing arguments, the court instructed the jury that they would be able to take into their deliberations "the instructions, the verdict form and all of the evidence that has been admitted, with the exception of the demonstrative evidence." Approximately twenty minutes after they began deliberating, the jury requested video equipment so they could watch one of the DVDs. The bailiff provided the jury with video equipment and cued up a patrol car video the jurors had selected to watch. A few minutes after cueing up the video, the bailiff informed the court of his actions, whereupon the court told the bailiff to remove the equipment immediately. At most ten minutes passed between the bailiff cuing up the DVD and his subsequent removal of the video equipment. Hart moved for a mistrial, which was denied by the court.

¶ 8 After deliberating for about an hour, the jury convicted Hart of vehicular homicide under the influence. Thereafter, the District Court sentenced Hart to thirty years in the Montana State Prison. Hart appeals. Additional facts will be set forth herein as necessary.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 We review a district court's decision to deny a challenge for cause to a juror, its evidentiary rulings, and its grant or denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. State v. Braunreiter, 2008 MT 197, ¶ 7, 344 Mont. 59, 185 P.3d 1024 (denial of a challenge for cause); State v. Spencer, 2007 MT 245, ¶¶ 14, 41, 339 Mont. 227, 169 P.3d 384 (motion to exclude video testimony); State v. Smith, 2005 MT 18, ¶ 6, 325 Mont. 374, 106 P.3d 553 (grant or denial of a motion for mistrial). A court abuses its discretion if it makes a ruling arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without employing conscientious judgment, which results in substantial injustice. Spencer, ¶ 14.

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 Issue One: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Hart's challenge for cause of prospective juror R.F.?

¶ 11 Hart urges us to reverse his conviction on the ground that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss prospective juror R.F. Hart claims that R.F. exhibited actual bias against anyone who drives after consuming alcohol. The State responds that, while R.F.'s comments may have reflected his concern about drinking and driving, they did not reflect an actual bias that would have precluded R.F. from properly fulfilling the duties of a juror.

¶ 12 Both the federal and Montana constitutions provide defendants with a fundamental right to be tried before a fair and impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. In order to preserve this right, a defendant may remove biased jurors using challenges for cause during voir dire. Section 46-16-115, MCA. A court abuses its discretion if it fails to remove a prospective juror after actual bias is revealed during voir dire. State v. Marble, 2005 MT 208, ¶ 10, 328 Mont. 223, 119 P.3d 88. We will reverse a district court's decision and grant a defendant a new trial if three elements are met: (1) the court abused its discretion; (2) the defendant removed the prospective juror with a preemptory challenge; and (3) the defendant exhausted all of his preemptory challenges. Braunreiter, ¶ 7.

¶ 13 "Jurors should be disqualified based on their prejudices only where they have `formed fixed opinions on the guilt or innocence of the defendant which they would not be able to lay aside and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court.'" State v. Falls Down, 2003 MT 300, ¶ 23, 318 Mont. 219, 79 P.3d 797 (citation omitted). However, a court need not dismiss a juror, despite the juror's expression of some concern regarding his or her ability to serve, if the juror believes he or she can remain impartial. Braunreiter, ¶ 10. According to § 46-16-115, MCA:

(2) A challenge for cause may be taken for all or any of the following reasons or for any other reason that the court determines: ...

(j) having a state of mind in reference to the case or to either of the parties that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party.

District courts may question jurors in order to clarify a potential bias, but neither the court nor counsel should elicit "coaxed recantations" in order to rehabilitate a potential juror. Braunreiter, ¶ 11. "To determine whether a juror must be excused for cause, courts must examine both the statutory language and the totality of the circumstances in a given situation." State v. Robinson, 2008 MT 34, ¶ 8, 341 Mont. 300, 177 P.3d 488. While we review a prospective juror's entire discourse during voir dire, we place greater emphasis on a juror's spontaneous statements. Braunreiter, ¶ 9. We give deference to district courts who sit in a "peculiarly advantageous position," wherefrom they may observe a juror's demeanor, expression, and manner of answering questions in order to discern the true bias of a potential juror. State v. Bashor, 188 Mont. 397, 408, 614 P.2d 470, 477 (1980) (citing State v. Simpson, 109 Mont. 198, 207, 95 P.2d 761, 764 (1939)).

¶ 14 During voir dire, defense counsel asked R.F. about his opinion on drinking and driving:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: ... So let's talk about sober. How sober do you have to be?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: A hundred percent sober in my opinion.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So even the slightest drop of alcohol in your opinion.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: In my opinion, yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And so if the law instructed you differently, then you'd have difficulty setting that aside, or would you have difficulty setting it aside?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: You know, I probably wouldn't, because that's what the law says, because my opinion is not the law ...

Turning to burden of proof, defense counsel asked R.F. whether the Defendant had to prove anything:

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: It's not your job to prove anything, it's the State's job.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So if the State doesn't prove that there was alcohol to a level of impairment, simply that there was alcohol, that's enough for you?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: They would have to prove it's alcohol to impairment by the law. I don't know.

When asked how hard it would be to follow the law on a scale of one to seven, seven being the hardest, R.F. responded, "four or five." Defense counsel then challenged R.F. for cause.

¶ 15 The court provided the prosecutor with an opportunity to voir dire R.F. The prosecutor questioned R.F. further about his ability to apply the law and decide the case upon the evidence presented:

PROSECUTOR: If we did not prove that beyond a reasonable doubt, in your mind, could you—would you find him not guilty?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: If you couldn't prove that he was drinking and impaired, then I could find him not guilty.

PROSECUTOR: And this is very important, because, I mean, what we're talking about is with the understanding of what impairment is.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Right.

PROSECUTOR: We're not talking the slightest degree or anything.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I'm thinking more along the lines of, I know people that can't even have one glass of wine without tipping over, but yet their blood alcohol level is not—you know, they're still at the legal limit to drive, but they're responsible enough not to, or I would hope so.

PROSECUTOR: And I think this is a very interesting—I mean, it is the concept. I mean, the person that...