State v. Hartley
| Decision Date | 03 July 1986 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Terrence B. HARTLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
William E. Norris, Designated Counsel, for defendant-appellant (Joseph H. Rodriguez, Public Defender, attorney).
Jay H. Hindman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent (Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen., attorney, Thomas J. Santangelo, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel, and on brief).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Defendant, Terrence Hartley, was convicted on one count of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, and two counts of felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3). For purposes of sentencing the robbery conviction was merged. On the two murders the court imposed a term of life imprisonment with a parole-ineligibility period of twenty years, and a consecutive thirty-year term with a parole-ineligibility period of fifteen years. The convictions were based on a robbery of the Holst Jewelry Store in Atlantic City that resulted in the death of the store's owner and the owner's aunt.
This appeal questions the admissibility, on the State's case in-chief, of defendant's two inculpatory statements given during custodial interrogations by separate branches of law enforcement, who were pursuing a "joint" investigation. Defendant had previously been given Miranda warnings, in response to which he had asserted in clear and unequivocal terms his right to remain silent. 1 Some time later he made the statements in question, the first in response to interrogation by federal authorities, who did not give defendant the Miranda warnings anew, and the second to New Jersey authorities after defendant had been reinformed of his Miranda rights. The specific issues are whether the federal authorities "scrupulously honored" defendant's previously-invoked right to silence, as required by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); and, if not, whether the statement to New Jersey authorities is tainted because of its relationship to the "federal" statement.
We hold that before an accused's previously-asserted right to remain silent may be deemed to have been "scrupulously honored," law-enforcement authorities must, at a minimum, readminister the Miranda warnings. In the absence of those renewed warnings any inculpatory statement given in response to police-initiated custodial interrogation after the right to silence has been invoked is inadmissible. In addition, we determine that a police failure scrupulously to honor an accused's earlier-invoked right to silence amounts to a violation not simply of Miranda 's prophylactic rules but of the accused's privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, any statement that a suspect may make after his right to silence has not been scrupulously honored is unconstitutionally compelled as a matter of law. That circumstance in turn requires a close examination of the relationship between that first statement and any subsequent statement.
We conclude that in this case the federal authorities' failure scrupulously to honor defendant's announced intention not to make a statement requires the exclusion, on the State's case, not only of defendant's confession to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) but also of defendant's second statement, made to state and municipal authorities. This result is compelled either (1) because the second statement was obtained through a process that was in fact part of the same illicit procedure that produced the first statement, or (2) because it was the product of an unconstitutional interrogation--and this despite the readministering of Miranda warnings to defendant before the second statement. Finally, we base the above determinations not only on our understanding of the United States Supreme Court precedents in this area but on independent state grounds of decision as well.
The facts surrounding the commission of the crimes are uncomplicated. Hartley and two companions, James Hooks and a young woman known only as "Snow," traveled from New York to Atlantic City for the purpose of robbing the casino at the Resorts International Hotel. The heavy security at the hotel served to discourage that venture, so defendant and his co-felons searched for a more vulnerable target. The nearby Holst Jewelry Store appeared to promise easier pickings. While defendant remained outside as a "lookout," Hooks and Snow robbed the jewelry store, in the course of which the owner and his aunt were shot and killed. The three culprits then returned to the hotel, took a taxi to the Atlantic City Bus Depot, and boarded a return bus for New York City.
At funeral services for James Hooks, who himself was killed just ten days after the robbery-murders in Atlantic City, an informant identified defendant as a suspect in the Holst Jewelry Store crimes. On the basis of the informant's tip and a corroborating police investigation, a federal magistrate sitting in the Eastern District of New York issued an arrest warrant for Hartley and a search warrant for his residence. The federal authorities' involvement arose because of a charge of interstate transportation of the property taken from the jewelry store.
The warrants were executed at Hartley's apartment in Brooklyn at about 7:30 a.m. on February 5, 1981, by five special agents of the FBI, assisted by members of the Atlantic City Police Department, the Atlantic County Prosecutor's office, and the New York City Police Department. At the time of the arrest FBI agent Richard Robley read Hartley the Miranda rights and informed him that he was being arrested for "the interstate transportation of stolen property in connection with an armed robbery of the Holst Jewelry Store in Atlantic City, New Jersey, [in] which the owner and his aunt were murdered." A police search of defendant's apartment uncovered jewelry that was later identified as merchandise stolen from the Holst Jewelry Store.
After his arrest Hartley was taken to the Brooklyn-Queens office of the FBI. At 9:13 a.m. the authorities placed Hartley in an Interview Room for processing. At 9:16 a.m. he was readvised of his constitutional rights and was handed a federal "Advice of Rights" form, which contained the full panoply of Miranda warnings. Immediately following the statement of those warnings, the form contained the following, under the heading "Waiver of Rights":
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.
This in turn was followed by a line for defendant's signature. Thus, the only place provided for one to sign the form came after the "waiver" section. Put differently, the only purpose of the signature was not to acknowledge receipt of one's rights but rather to indicate a waiver of those rights.
He said, "Yes." He hesitated and I said, "What seems to be the problem?"
He said, "I don't believe I want to make a statement at this time." And to which Special Agent Davis said, Which he did.
The authorities asked no questions at that time, but proceeded to fingerprint and photograph defendant, commencing at 9:26 a.m.
At 10:43 a.m. agent Frieberg again approached Hartley, who had been returned to the Interview Room, and stated:
Terrence, I am Special Agent Frieberg and I am from Atlantic City, New Jersey and I think you know why I am up here. And I would like you to reconsider and now is the time if you are going to make a statement. Now is the time to do it.
Defendant replied, "What do you want to know?" Frieberg thereupon, without readministering the Miranda warnings, proceeded to ask defendant personal background questions, followed by questions probing the details of the jewelry-store robbery. Defendant responded by giving what amounted to a full confession. The agent had his notes typed into a statement, which Hartley refused to sign.
After being questioned by the FBI agents, Hartley was questioned by a group of four New York and New Jersey officials. Criminal Investigator Margaret Barnett of the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office read him his rights. The State asserts that defendant signed a waiver at that time but that the form was misplaced in the Prosecutor's office. The interrogation was conducted primarily by Detective Dennis Mason of the Atlantic City Police Department. Also present were two New York City police officers. All four were members of the group that had arrived at the defendant's apartment that morning and had assisted in the search conducted there. Hartley refused to allow his statement to be recorded on tape, and likewise refused to sign a typed description of this interview, as was the case with the federal statement.
The trial court refused to admit into evidence either of the unsigned typewritten statements, but it allowed both the federal and state authorities' testimony as to the contents of Hartley's oral statements to them. Defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, alleging error in the trial court's failure to have suppressed "statements attributed to the defendant in violation of federal and state constitutions." The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with Judge Gaulkin dissenting. That court determined that defendant's right to remain silent had not been violated and that therefore his confession was properly admitted. This appeal followed as of right. See R. 2:2-1(a)(2). 2
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