State v. Hasfal

Decision Date11 April 2006
Docket NumberNo. 26087.,26087.
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Christopher HASFAL.

Joaquina Borges King, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Elizabeth M. Moseley, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Mirella Giambalvo, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

FLYNN, C.J., and BISHOP and STOUGHTON, Js.

FLYNN, C.J.

The defendant, Christopher Hasfal, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of criminal violation of a protective order under General Statutes § 53a-223. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.1

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant and the victim were involved in a romantic relationship that became abusive. On August 22, 2003, the victim telephoned the police following a violent incident with the defendant. Thereafter, the defendant was arrested. On November 4, 2003, the court issued a protective order that, inter alia, explicitly precluded the defendant from entering the dwelling of the victim, coming within 100 yards of the victim or having any contact with the victim. The order also provided that the defendant could return to the dwelling one time with police to retrieve his belongings. On December 15, 2003, at approximately 10:49 a.m., the defendant arrived at the victim's apartment alone, without police escort. Upon the defendant's arrival, the victim telephoned the police in what was identified as a hang-up call. Officers Robert Stapleton and George Watson of the Hartford police department were dispatched to the victim's residence. Stapleton was the first officer to arrive. He knocked on the victim's door, and she presented him with a copy of the protective order. The defendant told Stapleton that he was at the victim's apartment to retrieve his belongings. The police arrested the defendant for violating the protective order.

On September 2, 2004, the jury found the defendant guilty of violating a protective order. Thereafter, the defendant was sentenced to five years incarceration. This appeal followed.

"The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 542, 881 A.2d 290 (2005).

"We note that the [finder of fact] must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical. . . to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the [fact finder] is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

On appeal, the defendant seeks to have his judgment of conviction reversed, reasoning that the state did not offer sufficient evidence to prove that he had the "requisite general intent to violate the protective order" that previously had been entered against him. Specifically, the defendant argues that because he understood that the protective order required him to have a police escort to recover his belongings and because he was under the impression that the police were notified and would be at the victim's apartment, the jury could not have found that he had the requisite intent to violate the protective order. Moreover, the defendant claims that the jury reasonably could have concluded only that his actions were in accordance with the protective order. We disagree.

Section 53a-223(a) provides: "A person is guilty of criminal violation of a protective order when an order issued pursuant to subsection (e) of section 46b-38c, or section 54-1k or 54-82r has been issued against such person, and such person violates such order." "To prove a charge of criminal violation of a protective order, the state must demonstrate that a protective order was issued against the defendant in accordance with General Statutes §§ 46b-38c(e) or 54-1k, and it must demonstrate the terms of the order and the manner in which it was violated by the defendant." State v. Martino, 61 Conn.App. 118, 128, 762 A.2d 6 (2000). Regarding the mental element of the crime, "we have explained previously [that] a violation of a protective order does not incorporate the specific intent to harass. . . . All that is necessary is a general intent that one intend to perform the activities that constitute the violation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Binnette, 86 Conn.App. 491, 497, 861 A.2d 1197 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 902, 868 A.2d 745 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant intended behaviors proscribed by the protective order. The defendant testified at trial that he understood that the protective order prohibited him from having any contact with the victim and that it permitted him to return to the victim's dwelling one time with police to retrieve his belongings. The defendant and the victim testified that on December 15, 2003, the defendant arrived at the victim's apartment alone, without a police escort....

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11 cases
  • State v. Osimanti, No. 18311.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • November 9, 2010
    ...conduct rather than accident or mistake."), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S.Ct. 1491, 167 L.Ed.2d 236 (2007); State v. Hasfal, 94 Conn.App. 741, 744-45, 894 A.2d 372 (2006) ("To prove a charge of criminal violation of a protective order, the state must demonstrate that a protective order......
  • State v. Fagan
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • September 26, 2006
    ...that one intend to perform the activities that constitute the violation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hasfal, 94 Conn.App. 741, 745, 894 A.2d 372 (2006); State v. Binnette, 86 Conn.App. 491, 497, 861 A.2d 1197 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 902, 868 A.2d 745 (2005); accord......
  • State Of Conn. v. Osimanti
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • November 9, 2010
    ...rather than accident or mistake.''), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S. Ct. 1491, 167 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2007); State v. Hasfal, 94 Conn. App. 741, 744-45, 894 A.2d 372 (2006) (''To prove a charge of criminal violation of a protective order, the state must demonstrate that a protective order w......
  • State v. Winter
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • October 6, 2009
    ...that one intend to perform the activities that constitute the violation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hasfal, 94 Conn.App. 741, 745, 894 A.2d 372 (2006). The state need not prove that the defendant had the specific intent to violate the protective order; rather, state must ......
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