State v. Haskell

• Decision Date: 05 November 2001
• Citation: 784 A.2d 4,2001 ME 154
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Brian S. HASKELL Sr.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

784 A.2d 4

2001 ME 154

STATE of Maine v. Brian S. HASKELL Sr.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: September 11, 2001.

Decided: November 5, 2001.

Norman R. Croteau, District Attorney, Richard R. Beauchesne, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), South Paris, for State.

Douglas D. Hendrick, Esq. (orally), Cornish, for defendant.

Panel: WATHEN, C.J.,¹ and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

RUDMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Brian S. Haskell Sr. appeals from the application of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 ("SORNA")² in his case after a judgment of conviction was entered in the Superior Court (Oxford County, Pierson, J.) on a jury verdict finding him guilty of unlawful sexual contact in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C) (Supp.2000) (Class C).³ Haskell contends that: (1) SORNA, as it applies to him, is an ex post facto law that is prohibited by the Constitutions of the State of Maine and of the United States and (2) the Sentencing Court's alleged specification of him as a "sex offender," rather than as a "sexually violent predator," makes void its determination that he is subject to SORNA provisions. We disagree and affirm.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶ 2] On September 13, 2000, the jury found that Haskell was guilty of the charge of unlawful sexual contact with a child pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C). Accordingly, on September 22, 2000, the trial court sentenced Haskell to an imprisonment term of three years, with all but fourteen months suspended. The court also imposed a probationary term of four years. In addition, pursuant to 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11221 et seq., the court notified and ordered Haskell to satisfy, upon his release, the registration provisions of SORNA. The sole basis of Haskell's appeal stems from the court's application of SORNA provisions to his case.⁴

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

[¶ 3] We review a ruling on the validity of a statute, a matter of law, de novo. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 14, 761 A.2d 291, 297

(citing Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, ¶ 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524). Further, our review is guided by the familiar principle that "[a] statute is presumed to be constitutional and the person challenging the constitutionality has the burden of establishing its infirmity." Id. (quoting Kenny v. Dep't of Human Servs., 1999 ME 158, ¶ 7, 740 A.2d 560, 563).

[¶ 4] We must assume that the Legislature acted in accord with constitutional requirements if the statute can reasonably be read in such a way, notwithstanding other possible unconstitutional interpretations of the same statute. Id. ¶ 14, 761 A.2d at 297-98 (citing Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1, 15-16 (Me.1973)). "Our role in reviewing the constitutionality of a statute must necessarily be limited by the facts in the case before us." Id. ¶ 15, 761 A.2d at 298. "We may not reach beyond those facts to decide the constitutionality of matters not yet presented." Id. (citations omitted). We, therefore, address the constitutionality of the statute before us in the context of the facts found by the trial court.

B. SORNA is Not Penal in Nature — Ex Post Facto Doctrine does not apply.

1. Introduction.

[¶ 5] The Maine sex offender registration and notification laws comprise three Acts.⁵ The original 1991 Act, entitled the Sex Offender Registration Act, limited the class of registrants to only those persons who had a gross sexual assault conviction that involved a victim who was under 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11002(2) (Supp.2000); P.L. 1991, ch. 809, § 1 (effective June 30, 1992); see also 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (1983) (Gross sexual misconduct). In 1995, the Legislature enacted provisions expanding the registration requirements to include "individual[s] found not criminally responsible for committing gross sexual assault by reason of mental disease or defect if the victim had not, in fact, attained 16 years of age at the time of the crime." 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11103(5) (Supp.2000); P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 13 (effective July 4, 1996). Finally, in 1999, the Legislature enacted SORNA to further expand the registration requirements to encompass individuals who have been convicted of a number of other offenses, including unlawful sexual contact under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C), the crime for which Haskell was convicted. See 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11203(7)(A) (Supp.2000); P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 2 (effective September 18, 1999). [¶ 6] Because he committed the crime on August 8, 1999, and SORNA did not become effective until September 18, 1999, Haskell argues that applying SORNA in his case constitutes an ex post facto application of a penal statute. Indeed, the enactment by our state Legislature of any ex post facto law is constitutionally prohibited.⁶ A criminal statute will violate these constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto legislation if: "(i) the new statute punishes as a crime an act that was innocent when done, or (ii) makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commission, or (iii) if it deprives one charged with a crime of a defense available according to law at the time the act was committed." State v. Chapman, 685 A.2d 423, 424 (Me.1996) (citing State v. Joubert, 603 A.2d 861, 869 (Me.1992)).

[¶ 7] If SORNA measures are deemed civil rather than criminal in nature, however, they do not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Baker v. Town of Woolwich, 517 A.2d 64, 69 (Me.1987)

. The threshold question for us to consider, therefore, is whether SORNA is civil or penal in nature.

2. Civil-Criminal Analysis.

[¶ 8] In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), the Supreme Court promulgated the so-called "intent-effects" test for distinguishing between civil and criminal penalties, stating:

Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. A court must first ask whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Even in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.

In making this latter determination, the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), provide useful guideposts, including: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it"; and (7) "whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." It is important to note, however, that "these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face," id. at 169, 83 S.Ct. at 568, and only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.

Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (additional citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361,

117 S.Ct. 2072, 138

L.Ed.2d 501, (1997) (applying similar principles to determine whether sex offender commitment statute violated Ex Post Facto Clause).⁷

[¶ 9] The Mendoza-Martinez list of considerations, however, is neither exhaustive nor dispositive. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)

. In fact, the Supreme Court has intimated, in other cases, that the most significant question under the effects stage of the analysis is whether the law, "while perhaps having certain punitive aspects, serve[s] important nonpunitive goals." United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996).⁸

See also Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1091 (9th Cir.1997) (stating, Mendoza-Martinez's list of considerations is helpful but is not exhaustive or dispositive), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007, 118 S.Ct. 1191, 140 L.Ed.2d 321 (1998); Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr., 253 F.3d 870, 873 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that "`[t]he most significant question under [the effects] stage of the [`intent-effects'] analysis' is whether the law `while perhaps having certain punitive aspects, serve[s] important nonpunitive goals.'").

[¶ 10] Thus, our first task is to discern whether the intent of the Legislature in enacting the sex-offender notification program was to create a civil or criminal penalty. If we determine that the legislature intended to establish a civil penalty, we must then inquire whether there exists the "clearest proof" that the measure is so punitive in purpose or effect as to override the Legislature's intent.

a. Legislative Intent.

[¶ 11] An analysis of the legislative history of SORNA and its sister Acts reveals that the Maine legislature intended SORNA to be a civil remedy. First, the legislative intent to establish a nonpunitive measure is ascertainable from the simple fact that the Legislature placed the statute in the civil code as opposed to the criminal code. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361,

117 S.Ct. 2072 (stating that the Kansas Legislature's objective to create a civil proceeding is evidenced by its placement of the Sexually Violent Predator Act within the Kansas probate code, instead of the criminal code). Second, the civil nature of the Acts is evident in the Legislature's description of the 1991 Act as "An Act to Ensure...