State v. Hassett

Citation155 Conn. 225,230 A.2d 553
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Decision Date13 June 1967
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Ronald J. HASSETT.

James D. Cosgrove, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

John D. LaBelle, State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was George D. Stoughton, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, RYAN and FITZGERALD, JJ.

ALCORN, Associate Justice.

The defendant was indicted on two counts of murder in the first degree. He was charged in the first count with the murder of Mary E. Nugent and in the second count with the murder of George Hassett. He pleaded not guilty and chosee a trial to the court. Pursuant to § 54-82 of the General Statutes the court was composed of three judges. The defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree on the first count and guilty of murder in the first degree on the second count. A sentence of life imprisonment was imposed on each count, the sentence to run concurrently, and the defendant has appealed from the judgment rendered.

The claims which are pursued in the defendant's brief are that the court erred in admitting into evidence testimony concerning statements made by the defendant to the police after he was taken into custody, in admitting his shoes into evidence, and in concluding on all the evidence that he was guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. No issue is made of the court's conclusion as to the degrees of murder.

Two elements of the case need to be emphasized at the outset. The first is that the trial took place early in 1964, and the judgment appealed from was rendered on February 11, 1964. Consequently, under the decision in Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, decided on June 20, 1966, the principles established in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, are not controlling. The second is that we are not, in the present case, concerned with the admissibility in evidence of a confession because the defendant, in his statements to the police, did not purport to implicate himself in any crime.

Prior to the decision in the Miranda case, the United States Supreme Court had recognized a distinction between the requirements of the admissibility of an admission and a confession, indicating, in effect, that the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States did not required the same reliability tests for an admission as for a confession. Stein v. People of State of New York, 346 U.S. 156, 162 n. 5, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522. In Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 91, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101, 45 A.L.R.2d 1308, however, the court pointed to the same need for corroboration, under federal procedure, in the case of statements showing essential elements of a crime necessary to supplement an otherwise inadequate basis for conviction as was already required in the case of confessions. Statements immaterial to guilt or innocence were, however, exempted from the rule. It was not until the Miranda decision that the rule enunciated in that case was held to be equally applicable to confessions and admissions and, as to the latter, regardless of whether they were inculpatory or exculpatory. Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 476, 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

Our own rule has long recognized a distinction between a full confession and an admission; State v. Coffee, 56 Conn. 399, 414, 16 A. 151; but nevertheless our rule has required that statements which did not amount to a confession of guilt must still be shown to be voluntary in order to be admissible in evidence. State v. Wakefield, 88 Conn. 164, 168, 90 A. 230.

In considering the claim that the court erred in admitting testimony concerning the statements made by the defendant to the police while he was in custody, we accept the finding made by the trial court except for the conclusion that the statements were voluntary. This conclusion we review in the light of the appendix to the defendant's brief. State v. Traub, 150 Conn. 169, 176, 187 A.2d 230, remanded for reconsideration on another ground, 374 U.S. 493, 83 S.Ct. 1899, 10 L.Ed.2d 1048; see State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 196 A.2d 755, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 960, 84 S.Ct. 1637, 12 L.Ed.2d 503. This appendix discloses only that, at his trial, the defendant, after being carefully cautioned and advised by his counsel in open court, chose to take the witness stand in his own defense. Thereupon he testified unhesitatingly concerning the same subject matter and to the same effect as in his earlier statements to the policy. There is no claim, either in his testimony at the trial or on this appeal, the he was subjected to any mistreatment, either physical or mental, that any promises or inducements were held out to him, or that he sought or was denied the advice of counsel before talking, apparently freely and unrestrainedly, with the police. The effort to have the testimony concerning the statements excluded was grounded on the claim that the statements were involuntary solely because the defendant was under arrest when they were made. The trial court determined, as a question properly within its province, that the statements were voluntary. State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 16 n. 1, 202 A.2d 494; see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205. The conclusion is not to be disturbed if it was reasonable under the evidence and not violative of some rule of law. Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 34, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726. All of the surrounding circumstances, including the duration and conditions of the detention, the attitude of the police, and all factors affecting the defendant's powers of self-control are pertinent to whether his statements were the result of a free and unconstrained choice, in other words, were truly voluntary. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037.

It appears that the police arrived at the home of the victims of the crimes shortly after 10 p.m. on August 5, 1963, and found their bodies under circumstances clearly indicating that they had met foul play; that the defendant had been seen at the home between 4:30 and 5 o'clock that afternoon; and that an order to apprehend him was issued shortly after 11 p.m. The defendant was taken into custody by Hartford police officers less than two hours later and was at once taken to police headquarters. The officer who apprehended him was his next door neighbor and had known him for fifteen years. On arriving at police headquarters, the defendant was met by another officer who knew him, introduced him to other officers present and said: 'You don't have to talk to us. You don't even have to tell us the light is lit, but we're conducting an investigation and the purpose of the investigation is to find out anything that you might know about this particular case.' He was then asked to give an account of his activities on August 5. During the next hour, the statements complained of were made by the defendant to the four or five officers present, after which he was told by the police that he was being charged with murder. His statements included the fact that he had been at the home of the victims, which the police already knew; his assertion that he had left the house about 1:30 p.m. on August 5; and a description of his subsequent wanderings about the streets of Hartford and West Hartford until he was apprehended. He specifically denied any knowledge of the deaths. The nature of the interrogation, the total absence of any duress or beguilement, the short period of time involved, and the substance of what was said, all indicate that the court was fully justified in concluding that the statements were voluntary and in admitting the testimony concerning them.

We turn now to the claim that the court erred in admitting the defendant's shoes in evidence as an exhibit. During the hour in which the defendant made the statements referred to above, the police asked him to remove his clothing, including his shoes. When the shoes were removed, one of the officers noticed spots or stains on the soles. The defendant claims that the shoes were not legally admissible in evidence because the seizure of the shoes was not incident to the admittedly lawful arrest. Other objections voiced during the long discussion concerning the admissibility of the shoes in evidence are not pursued in the appeal.

As already stated, an order to apprehend the defendant had been issued about 11 o'clock on the evening of the discovery of the crime. He was taken into custody less than two hours later, and it was during the period of approximately one hour between the time when he was actually taken into custody and the time when he was told that he would be charged with murder that the police took possession of his shoes. No claim is made that the defendant's apprehension was illegal. It is clear that, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, as incident to that arrest, to make a contemporaneous search of the person arrested. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. --, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777; United States v. Rabinowitz, ...

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  • State v. Asherman
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 17, 1984
    ...156 Conn. 378, 383, 242 A.2d 763 (1968); the introduction in evidence of the defendant's blood stained shoes; State v. Hassett, 155 Conn. 225, 232, 230 A.2d 553 (1967); and the use of fingerprints. State v. Chin Lung, 106 Conn. 701, 723, 139 A. 91...
  • State v. Morales
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    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
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    ...does not violate fourth and fifth amendments), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 324, 42 L.Ed.2d 280 (1974) ; State v. Hassett, 155 Conn. 225, 231–32, 230 A.2d 553 (1967) (introduction into evidence of defendant's bloodstained shoes, which police ordered him to remove after he was arres......
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    ...its province, that the defendant's statement was voluntary. See State v. Rosa, supra, 170 Conn. 424, 365 A.2d 1135; State v. Hassett, 155 Conn. 225, 230, 230 A.2d 553 (1967). That conclusion is not to be disturbed if it was reasonable under the evidence and not violative of some rule of law......
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