State v. Hasty

Citation184 Ala. 121,63 So. 559
PartiesSTATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. HASTY, Judge of Probate.
Decision Date04 November 1913
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

Original impeachment proceeding by the State, on relation of the Attorney General, against A.L. Hasty, as Judge of Probate and ex officio Judge of the County Court of Marengo County. Judgment exonerating respondent.

The specifications were: (1) Willful neglect of duty. (2) Incompetency. (3) Corruption in office, and covered a period extending back of and beyond and the present term of office of the incumbent. Respondent moved the court to quash the proceedings, and to dismiss same in so far as they related to any of his acts and doings as such officer prior to the beginning of his present term, and desired the court to ascertain if evidence as to such prior acts would be received on the trial. They also by demurrer raised the question as to the duty of the respondent as judge of the county court to issue execution in cases disposed of on the county court docket. There was voluminous testimony given ore tenus before the court, the substance of which is set out in the opinion.

R.C Brickell, Atty. Gen., W.L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Rushton, Williams & Crenshaw, of Montgomery, for appellant.

William Cunninghame, of Linden, Robert B. Evins, of Greensboro Elmore & Herbert, of Demopolis, George Pegram, of Faunsdale and I.I. Canterbury, of Linden, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

While ours is a popular form of government, under which nearly all officials are elected by the people, yet public office has been ever regarded as a public trust, and our lawmakers while not contemplating or requiring infallibility, have expected a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who are selected to fill positions of trust and responsibility. This expectation has been emphasized, not only by statutes covering nearly all derelictions and providing a punishment for same, but by our organic law, which provides for the impeachment and removal from office of nearly all public officials for any of the causes therein enumerated, but which said impeachment does not exclude the right of the state to indict and is in its nature cumulative and is intended to relieve the public of an unfit official until the people have another chance to pass upon his qualification. While this extraordinary remedy by impeachment does not prevent an indictment and conviction thereunder, and does not extend beyond a removal from office and a disqualification to hold office under the state, during the term for which the officer was elected or appointed, it is, in its nature, highly penal and is governed by rules of law applicable to criminal prosecutions.

Section 173 of the Constitution provides for the method of impeaching certain officials therein enumerated and prescribes the causes for removal, and which are as follows: "Willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or intemperance in the use of intoxicating liquors or narcotics to such an extent, in view of the dignity of the office and importance of its duties, as unfits the officer for the discharge of such duties, or for any offense involving moral turpitude while in office or committed under color thereof." Section 174 makes section 173 apply to probate judges and other officers therein named but who are omitted from said section 173, and section 176 provides that the penalty shall not extend beyond the removal from office and disqualification from holding office, under the authority of this state, for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed; but the accused shall be liable to indictment and punishment as prescribed by law.

It must be observed that, while the law affords ample means for the indictment and punishment of unfaithful officers and for the removal of same for certain causes, the maximum penalty, under an impeachment proceeding, is the removal and disqualification to hold office under the state for the term only for which he was elected. If an officer is impeached and removed, there is nothing to prevent his being elected to the identical office from which he was removed for a subsequent term, and, this being true, a re-election to the office would operate as a condonation under the Constitution of the officer's conduct during the previous term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him from the subsequent term for said conduct during the previous term. It seems to be the policy of our Constitution to make each term independent of the other and to disassociate the conduct under one term from the qualification or right to fill another term, at least so far as the same may apply to impeachment proceedings, and as distinguished from the right to indict and convict an offending official. In other words, if this respondent had been impeached and removed from his first term, that fact could not affect his right to hold the subsequent term to which he was elected in 1910, and, as he was re-elected in 1910, this fact alone forecloses the state from impeaching and removing him from the second term for acts done during the previous term. We therefore sustain the motion of respondent to strike from the information all grounds of impeachment based upon his conduct during the previous term of office.

We are not unmindful of the fact that there have been rulings by other tribunals, federal and state, wherein the conduct of the officer during the previous term of office, and in a few instances before taking office, has been the basis of impeachment and removal; but the Constitutions there, as to the extent of the punishment and the period of removal, are not like ours, and these holdings can probably be differentiated from ours, and we need not therefore commit ourselves to the soundness or unsoundness of these adjudications.

While we have eliminated the acts of the previous term, as grounds of impeachment, we have considered some of them as evidential facts, in so far as they are connected with or bear upon the respondent's general course of conduct during the second term, for the limited purpose of inquiring into the motive and intent of the respondent as to the acts and omissions charged to him during the second term. Reeves v. State, 95 Ala. 31, 11 So. 158; Jones on Evidence, §§ 143-145.

The respondent questions, by demurrer, the charge that he neglected to issue executions from the county court upon the ground that, under the statute, it was not his duty to do so and we are cited to subdivision 11 of section 3272 of the Code of 1907, which, among other things, requires the clerks of the circuit court to issue executions...

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26 cases
  • State v. Scott
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • June 22, 1926
    ...202 N.W. 94. An official cannot be removed for alleged misconduct or malfeasance committed in a prior term; 29 Cyc. 1410; State v. Hasty, (Ala.) 63 So. 559; Thurston v. Clark, (Cal.) 40 P. 435; Re Opinion, (Fla.) 60 So. 334; State v. Henschel, (Kan.) 175 P. 393; State v. City, 25 N. J. L. 5......
  • State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 44339
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • February 27, 1974
    ...107 Cal. 285, 40 P. 435 (1895); State ex rel. Schulez v. Patton, 131 Mo.App. 628, 110 S.W. 636 (1908); State ex rel. Attorney General v. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559 (1913); State ex rel. Thompson v. Crump, 134 Tenn. 121, 183 S.W. 505 (1916); State v. Scott, 35 Wyo. 108, 247 P. 699 (1926......
  • State on Inf. of McKittrick v. Graves
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 9, 1940
    ...... present term for failure to prosecute violations of the. criminal laws during prior terms, but not barred by the. Statute of Limitations. Breckenridge v. State, 4 L. R. A. 360, 11 S.W. 630, 27 Tex.App. 513; Comant v. Grogan, 6 N.Y.S. 322; State ex rel. v. Hasty, . 184 Ala. 121, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 553, 63 So. 559; State. ex rel. Gill v. Watertown, 9 Wis. 254. (c) The office of. respondent was forfeited during his prior terms for. misconduct during such terms. Sec. 11202, R. S. 1929;. State ex rel. Evans v. Gordon, 149 S.W. 638, 245 Mo. 12; ......
  • State, on Inf. McKittrick v. Wymore
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • October 17, 1939
    ......Blake, 280 P. 833;. In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State v. Council, . 25 N. J. L. 536; Montgomery v. Nowell, 183 Ark. 1116; Conant v. Grogan, 6 N.Y.S. 322; Thurston. v. Clark, 40 P. 435; State v. Henschel, 175 P. 393; Jacobs v. Parham, 298 S.W. 483; State ex. rel. v. Hasty, 63 So. 559; In re Advisory. Opinion, 60 So. 337; Attorney General v. Tufts, . 131 N.E. 573; Tibbs v. Atlanta, 53 S.E. 811; State. v. Welsh, 79 N.W. 369. . .          Gantt,. J. Tipton, C. J., Hays and Douglas, JJ., concur; Ellison,. Leedy and Clark, JJ., concur in result ......
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