State v. Hatcher

• Decision Date: 16 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2015AP297–CR.,2015AP297–CR.
• Citation: 371 Wis.2d 758,886 N.W.2d 592 (Table)
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Mychael R. HATCHER, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

371 Wis.2d 758
886 N.W.2d 592 (Table)

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent,
v.
Mychael R. HATCHER, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2015AP297–CR.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Aug. 16, 2016.

¶ 1 STARK, P.J.

Mychael Hatcher appeals a judgment convicting him of three offenses, an order denying his motion for postconviction relief, and an order denying his motion for reconsideration.¹ Hatcher argues the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by refusing to accept his guilty pleas to two of the three charges on the morning of the first day of trial and by permitting the State to call a particular witness in rebuttal. Hatcher also argues the trial court erroneously limited his trial testimony and, by doing so, violated his constitutional right to present a defense. In addition, Hatcher contends his trial attorney was ineffective in two respects. Finally, Hatcher argues he was prejudiced by the combined effect of these errors. We reject Hatcher's arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 A criminal complaint charged Hatcher with five counts, each as a repeater: second-degree sexual assault of an intoxicated person;² identity theft; disorderly conduct (domestic abuse); obstructing an officer; and misdemeanor bail jumping. As relevant to this appeal, the complaint alleged that, on July 2, 2010, Hatcher went out drinking with his girlfriend, Smith, and two of Smith's friends, Williams and Johnson.³ Hatcher, Smith, and Williams ended up at Smith's residence. The following morning, Williams called Johnson, and then called the police, reporting that Hatcher had raped her.

¶ 3 On the morning of the first day of trial, the State filed an amended Information omitting the disorderly conduct and identity theft charges. At that point, Hatcher attempted to plead guilty to the obstructing and bail jumping charges in order to “keep the trial confined to the sexual assault.” However, the trial court would not permit Hatcher to do so, and the three remaining charges were tried.

¶ 4 At trial, it was undisputed that Johnson and Williams met up with Smith at the Stadium View bar at approximately 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. on July 2, 2010, and Hatcher joined them sometime before 7:00 p .m. The group was talking and drinking alcohol, and Hatcher and Williams played pool. Williams testified she consumed five or six beers and at least two shots. At some point during the evening, Hatcher and Williams drove to a gas station to buy cigarettes.

¶ 5 Johnson left the bar at around 10:00 p.m. Hatcher, Smith, and Williams left approximately thirty to sixty minutes later and drove together to Smith's residence. When they arrived, Smith helped Williams inside and carried her upstairs to a spare bedroom. Smith then went to sleep in her own bedroom, and Hatcher walked to a nearby bar. He returned to Smith's residence at around 2:30 a.m. He took a glass of water to Smith, who had awoken, and put on a movie. Smith then went back to sleep.

¶ 6 What happened next is disputed. Hatcher testified he brought Williams a glass of water, woke her up, and they had a brief conversation before engaging in consensual sex. Conversely, Williams testified she was asleep and woke to find Hatcher having sex with her. Williams testified she was too intoxicated to move or talk, and she passed out following the assault. When she woke again at around 6:00 or 6:30 a.m., she was wearing her tank top and pants from the night before, but her underwear were gone. Williams used her cell phone to call Johnson, who told her to call the police. Williams then called the police and reported that Hatcher had sexually assaulted her.

¶ 7 Following a two-day trial, the jury found Hatcher guilty of all three charges.⁴ The trial court imposed concurrent sentences totaling fifteen years' initial confinement and fifteen years' extended supervision. Hatcher then moved for postconviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court issued a written decision denying Hatcher's postconviction motion. The court subsequently denied Hatcher's motion to reconsider a portion of that decision, and Hatcher now appeals. Additional facts are included in the discussion section as necessary.

DISCUSSION

I. Constitutional right to a fair trial

¶ 8 Hatcher's first argument on appeal is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a fair trial in two ways. First, Hatcher argues the court should have accepted his guilty pleas to the obstructing and bail jumping charges. Second, Hatcher argues the court erred by allowing the State to present the expert testimony of Samantha McKenzie, a project manager for the Brown County Sexual Assault Response Team, in rebuttal. We address these arguments in turn.

A. Refusal to accept Hatcher's guilty pleas

i. Factual background

¶ 9 As noted above, the State initially charged Hatcher with five offenses. See supra, ¶ 2. At the final pretrial hearing on Thursday, May 12, 2011, Hatcher's attorney informed the trial court he had been negotiating with the State in attempt to “get this particular case resolved,” but Hatcher was “not amenable to any of the offers that [had] been put forward.” Counsel therefore requested that Hatcher's trial, which was scheduled to begin the following Tuesday, be “left on the calendar.” The court responded:

All right. Then it's going to trial. Left on the calendar means it's going to trial. I am not available tomorrow or Monday for last minute, please, Judge, we got a deal worked out. I am simply not available. I am done doing that. I am done working through the noon hours and at 5 o'clock at night for that kind of stuff. Done. The calendar is booked solid. And I am simply not available anytime in the normal working hours.

¶ 10 The trial court confirmed that the State had made its final offer with respect to a plea agreement. The court then addressed Hatcher personally, stating:

Mr. Hatcher, then that means, and I think I have explained this to you in the past, this is the D-day deadline for you to decide if you want to take that offer or not. It is not a good idea for anybody—certainly, not for the 60 or some jurors that are putting their business on hold for next Tuesday. They have been summonsed to come in. You are the only jury trial on next Tuesday right now. The rest have been settled. For them, they have a right to know and I need to know today if you want to try to settle this and other cases or if you want a trial. I have no problem presiding over a trial for you. I am ready, willing, able, [and] pleased to do that. What I do not want is tomorrow and Monday phone calls saying, people are changing their mind, we've got this, we've got that, can you get us back on the calendar? The answer is no. No. So, it's today or not at all. So, Mr. Hatcher, are you sure you don't want to resolve this case and/or the other cases without a trial? Are you positive?

After an off-the-record discussion, Hatcher confirmed he was ready to go to trial.

¶ 11 The following Tuesday, just before the start of Hatcher's trial, the State filed an amended Information that omitted the identity theft and disorderly conduct charges. Hatcher's attorney then informed the trial court that Hatcher would be willing to plead guilty to two of the remaining counts—obstructing and bail jumping—in order to “keep the trial confined to the sexual assault .” The court responded it had informed Hatcher during the final pretrial hearing that it would not accept any “last minute deals” and that, if Hatcher did not enter pleas during that hearing, the case would go to trial on all counts. After noting the jury was waiting, the court asked trial counsel for Hatcher's plea questionnaire form. Counsel then had Hatcher sign a blank plea questionnaire.

¶ 12 At that point, the trial court asked the State whether it was prepared to accept Hatcher's pleas to the obstructing and bail jumping charges, noting the State did not “have to” do so. The State responded that, even if Hatcher pled guilty to those counts, the State would “still bring in [at trial] the fact he was lying to the cops. That is part of the incident. So, if this was an intent to get rid of the lies to the cops, it still comes in. It's part and parcel.” Hatcher's attorney responded that was not Hatcher's intent, and Hatcher “just [didn't] want to get sentenced for not taking responsibility.”

¶ 13 The trial court then noted the plea questionnaire was not completed, and there was “no reason to think [Hatcher had] even gone over [the] form.” Hatcher's attorney stated, “Okay, That's fine. At least it's on the record that he was willing to take responsibility for this. I hope the Court takes that into consideration if and when he gets sentenced on these.” The court responded, “I thought I made myself loud and clear last Thursday that if he wanted to take responsibility for anything, that was the day to do it.... I understand that his position changed over the weekend. I don't know why that happened. But it has obviously changed.” The case then proceeded to trial.

¶ 14 In his postconviction motion, Hatcher alleged the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by rejecting his guilty pleas to the obstructing and bail jumping charges. The postconviction court disagreed, noting the trial court had warned Hatcher the final pretrial hearing was his last opportunity to plead. The postconviction court stated Hatcher's decision to plead on the first day...