State v. Hatchie
| Decision Date | 23 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 31544-1-II.,31544-1-II. |
| Citation | 135 P.3d 519,133 Wn. App. 100 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Raymond Kamiolani HATCHIE, Appellant. |
Kathryn A. Russell Selk, Russell Selk Law Office, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
Michelle Luna-Green, Pierce Co. Pros. Attorney, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.
PART PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 Officers entered Raymond Hatchie's home to arrest Eric Schinnell on a misdemeanor warrant. At the time of entry, the officers had probable cause to believe that Schinnell lived in Hatchie's home and that Schinnell was present. While inside, the officers discovered evidence of methamphetamine manufacture. The officers then obtained a search warrant for Hatchie's home. That search warrant eventually led to Hatchie's conviction for unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance.
¶ 2 This appeal presents two significant questions: First, does article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution permit law enforcement to enter a suspect's residence to serve a misdemeanor arrest warrant? Second, is a defendant entitled to a new sentencing hearing when he is given an opportunity to allocute after the court has orally pronounced its sentence? We answer the first question yes and the second no and affirm Hatchie's conviction and sentence.1
¶ 3 On June 11, 2003, Pierce County Sheriff's Deputies were watching a Tacoma hardware store for purchases of methamphetamine precursors when they saw Schinnell buy a container of muriatic acid. The deputies followed Schinnell and observed him purchasing lithium batteries in a second store and two bottles of lye in a third store. Muriatic acid, lithium batteries, and lye are all used in methamphetamine manufacturing.
¶ 4 The deputies continued to follow Schinnell at a distance in an unmarked car. A check with the Department of Licensing revealed that Schinnell's driver's license was suspended. It also revealed that he had an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for failing to appear for sentencing on a conviction for third degree driving while license suspended. The warrant provided for a $500 cash-only bail.
¶ 5 The deputies decided to pull Schinnell over at this point, but they lost sight of him once he drove into a residential area. The deputies eventually saw Schinnell's truck parked in the driveway of a duplex unit. Schinnell was standing next to a fifth-wheel trailer in the driveway. Parked in the yard of the unit was a second car registered to Schinnell. Schinnell's vehicles were registered to a different address in Hoodsport, Washington; Schinnell's misdemeanor warrant also listed that same Hoodsport address. The deputies established surveillance and called for a uniformed unit in a marked patrol car to contact Schinnell.
¶ 6 When the uniformed squad arrived, the deputies interviewed two people who were neighbors of the duplex unit. One neighbor stated that Schinnell lived at the unit and that he had been there earlier that day. The other neighbor, John Huntsman, told the deputies that there was a lot of traffic to the unit at all hours of the day. Huntsman said that people would often show up at his home looking for drugs and, when he turned them away, they would head to the unit. Huntsman also stated that as many as six people lived at the unit and that he had seen Schinnell and his truck there before.
¶ 7 After talking with the neighbors, the deputies decided to contact Schinnell, who by that time was no longer standing in front of the duplex unit. As the deputies approached the unit, they spoke with Timothy Petticord, who was standing in the unit's yard. Petticord told the deputies that if Schinnell's truck was there, he was in the unit. Petticord also stated that he (Petticord) "stayed at the residence but generally outside the residence." 1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 179.
¶ 8 The deputies knocked intermittently on the duplex unit door for 45 minutes before Donald Robbins answered. When asked, Robbins first said that Schinnell was inside. He then stated that he had been sleeping and that he assumed Schinnell was "home" because his truck was there. 1 RP at 28. The deputies announced their presence and asked Schinnell to come out. When there was no response, the deputies decided to enter the unit to serve the arrest warrant on Schinnell and to talk to him about his questionable purchases. While looking for Schinnell in the unit, the deputies saw numerous items used to manufacture methamphetamine. The deputies eventually found Schinnell hiding under a truck in the garage. They arrested him on the outstanding arrest warrant.
¶ 9 After Schinnell's arrest, the deputies learned that the duplex unit was being rented by Hatchie. Robbins told the deputies that Hatchie was at work. Robbins indicated that he had been living with Hatchie for three months. Robbins also stated that Schinnell had been staying at the unit off and on for the last two months.
¶ 10 The deputies obtained a warrant to search Hatchie's duplex unit for evidence of possession and manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on the evidence seized from the unit, the State charged Hatchie with unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. See former RCW 69.50.401 (1998).
¶ 11 Hatchie moved to suppress the evidence seized under the search warrant. Hatchie maintained that the deputies could not enter his home to arrest Schinnell on the outstanding misdemeanor warrant, and that, even if they could, the arrest warrant was invalid because it provided for a cash-only bail. Hatchie also maintained that the deputies used Schinnell's warrant as a pretext to enter his home. The trial court denied Hatchie's suppression motion.
¶ 12 A jury found Hatchie guilty as charged. At sentencing, the prosecutor recommended that the court sentence Hatchie to the high end of his 51- to 68-month standard sentencing range. Defense counsel requested an exceptional sentence downward. The court then indicated that it was "ready to rule" and that it would impose a 55-month sentence "unless your client has something else to add or say . . . on his own behalf." RP (Mar. 12, 2004) at 19. Hatchie and defense counsel did not respond.
¶ 13 When the court began explaining the reasons for its sentence, the prosecutor interjected: "Your Honor, I think probably before you make a final ruling on sentence, we should ask formally whether Mr. Hatchie wishes to allocute." RP (Mar. 12, 2004) at 19-20. Defense counsel responded that allocution would be pointless because the court had already ruled. The court then stated: "If he has something to say that you have not said, that I don't know about, I will consider it." RP (Mar. 12, 2004) at 20. Hatchie then addressed the court. After hearing from Hatchie, the court imposed a sentence of 53 months.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 Hatchie contends that under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, law enforcement could not enter his home to serve a misdemeanor arrest warrant on Schinnell. Alternatively, he maintains that even if home entry to serve a misdemeanor arrest warrant is permissible, Schinnell's warrant was invalid because it provided for a cash-only bail. We disagree with both contentions.
¶ 16 Two constitutional interests are implicated when law enforcement enters a home to serve an arrest warrant: the arrestee's interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure, and the resident's interest in the privacy of his home. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173, 185, 867 P.2d 593 (1994). Here, the arrestee and the resident are different people with different interests at stake. The arrestee's liberty interest is protected by the requirement that the arrest warrant be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. State v. Williams, 142 Wash.2d 17, 24 n. 2, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). Schinnell's interest, as the arrestee, is not at issue in this appeal; we are concerned only with Hatchie's interest as a resident of the home which police entered to arrest Schinnell. If the entry to arrest Schinnell was unlawful, then Hatchie's rights were violated by the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant that was based on information obtained during that unlawful entry. See State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 359, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). If the entry was lawful, then Hatchie's rights were not violated by the admission of the evidence because it was seized pursuant to a search warrant that was based on the officer's plain view, observations from inside the home made when they lawfully entered to arrest Schinnell. State v. Kull, 155 Wash.2d 80, 85, 118 P.3d 307 (2005).
¶ 17 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches. Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." Under both constitutional provisions, lawful searches generally require search warrants. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 349, 979 P.2d 833. There are, however, several exceptions that "provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant. . . outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate." Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 348-49, 979 P.2d 833 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980)). The exceptions include consent, exigent circumstances, plain view, inventory searches, investigatory Terry2 stops, and searches incident to a valid arrest. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). In Washington, these search warrant exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn" because article I, section 7 provides greater privacy protections than its federal counterpart. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 349, 979 P.2d 833 (quoting Houser, 95...
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