State v. Hatchie

• Decision Date: 06 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 78889-8.,78889-8.
• Citation: 166 P.3d 698,161 Wn.2d 390
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Raymond K. HATCHIE, Petitioner.

166 P.3d 698

161 Wn.2d 390

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Raymond K. HATCHIE, Petitioner.

No. 78889-8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued June 26, 2007.

Decided September 6, 2007.

Kathryn A. Russell Selk, Russell Selk Law Office, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Michelle Luna-Green, Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.

Douglas B. Klunder, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties.

SANDERS, J.

¶ 1 We are asked to determine if a misdemeanor arrest warrant gives police the "authority of law" to enter someone's home. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.¹

¶ 2 The police entered Raymond Hatchie's house looking for Eric Schinnell. They had a misdemeanor arrest warrant for Schinnell and believed he lived in Hatchie's duplex. But Schinnell was merely a guest, not a resident. Before the police found Schinnell hiding under a truck in the garage, they saw evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing in plain view. Based upon these observations they obtained a search warrant for Hatchie's house and seized the suspected evidence. Hatchie moved to suppress the evidence, arguing first, a misdemeanor arrest warrant does not give police the "authority of law" to enter a private residence, and second, the police had no probable cause to believe Schinnell was a resident at Hatchie's home. Lastly, Hatchie claimed he was not given a chance to allocute until after the judge orally announced his proposed sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed Hatchie's conviction.

¶ 3 We hold an arrest warrant — even for a misdemeanor — constitutes "authority of law" which allows the police the limited power to enter a residence for an arrest, as long as (1) the entry is reasonable, (2) the entry is not a pretext for conducting other unauthorized searches or investigations, (3) the police have probable cause to believe the person named in the arrest warrant is an actual resident of the home, and (4) said named person is actually present at the time of the entry. We also hold Hatchie failed to preserve any violation of his right to allocution through objection.

FACTS

¶ 4 In June 2003 a narcotics unit of the Pierce County Sheriff's Department observed Eric Schinnell buying precursor materials to methamphetamine manufacture-muriatic acid, lithium batteries, and lye. The officers followed Schinnell and discovered his driver license was suspended and there was an outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrant for him.² The officers decided to pull him over but lost sight of his truck. However, they soon found it parked in the driveway of a duplex unit. A second car registered to him was also parked on the lawn in front of the house.

¶ 5 The police interviewed two neighbors. One said he believed Schinnell lived in the house, and he had seen him there earlier that day. The second neighbor was not sure whether Schinnell lived there but said he often saw him there and believed as many as six people lived there. The police also spoke with Tim Petticord, who was standing in the duplex unit's yard. Petticord told the deputies that if Schinnell's truck was there, Schinnell was there too.

¶ 6 The deputies approached the house to make contact with Schinnell and after knocking for about 45 minutes, Donald Robbins answered. Robbins said he believed Schinnell was "home" because his truck was there, but Robbins could not be sure since he had been sleeping. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 28. The deputies announced their presence, but Schinnell did not respond. The deputies entered to serve the misdemeanor arrest warrant and found Schinnell hiding under a truck in the garage. While searching for him, the police saw items commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine. Robbins told the police Raymond Hatchie rented the duplex. Robbins also said he had been living with Hatchie for three months, and Schinnell had been there "off and on" for the last two months. Id. at 38.

¶ 7 Based upon what they had seen while arresting Schinnell, the officers obtained a search warrant for Hatchie's duplex to look for evidence of possession and manufacture of methamphetamine. Hatchie moved to suppress the evidence, claiming a misdemeanor arrest warrant did not authorize the police to enter a private residence and alternatively, the police did not have sufficient facts to reasonably believe Schinnell was living in Hatchie's home. The superior court denied the motion, and a jury found Hatchie guilty of unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. At sentencing, the judge announced he was "ready to rule" and would impose a 55 month sentence unless Hatchie had something else to say. RP at 19 (Sentencing). Neither Hatchie nor his counsel responded. The prosecutor, however, suggested the judge formally ask if Hatchie wished to allocute. Hatchie's counsel claimed any allocution would be pointless because the court had ruled, but the judge said he would consider anything Hatchie had to say. After Hatchie addressed the court, the judge reduced the sentence by two months.

¶ 8 Hatchie appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeals held the evidence was admissible and Hatchie's right to allocution was not violated.³ We granted Hatchie's petition for review, 159 Wash.2d 1014, 157 P.3d 403 (2007), and affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 We review questions of constitutional construction de novo. State v. Norman, 145 Wash.2d 578, 579, 40 P.3d 1161 (2002). Allocution is a statutory right, and we also review questions of statutory construction de novo. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 801, 807, 16 P.3d 583 (2001).

ANALYSIS

1. What authority of law does a misdemeanor arrest warrant provide?

¶ 10 Our state constitution provides, "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. We have long held a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, unless it fits within one of the "`jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.'" State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980)). Plain view is one such exception.

¶ 11 After the Pierce County deputies saw materials used for methamphetamine manufacturing in plain view, they obtained a search warrant for Hatchie's home. Therefore, we must ask whether their plain view observation was a valid one. A plain view search is legal when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity. State v. Myers, 117 Wash.2d 332, 346, 815 P.2d 761 (1991); see generally Charles W. Johnson, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 2005 Update, 28 SEATTLE U.L.REV. 467, 638 (2005).

a. A misdemeanor arrest warrant gives officers the limited ability to enter a residence to execute the warrant

¶ 12 An arrest is unquestionably a seizure of the person arrested. Under both federal and Washington State law a felony arrest warrant gives the police the authority to enter the house of the accused for a brief period of time. In Payton v. New York, the United States Supreme Court said, "an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) ("[A]n arrest warrant authorizes . . . a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home."); State v. Williams, 142 Wash.2d 17, 24, 11 P.3d 714 (2000) (relying on Payton for article I, section 7 analysis); State v. Thang, 145 Wash.2d 630, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002); State v. Hopkins, 113 Wash.App. 954, 958, 55 P.3d 691 (2002) ("[A]n arrest warrant, by itself, provides authority for the police to enter a person's residence to effectuate his or her arrest."). While the Supreme Court limited its holding in Payton to felony arrest warrants — as per the facts before it — it expanded its analysis to misdemeanor warrants in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). There the Court said, "When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, . . . the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests [inside the sanctity of the home] only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate." Id. (footnote omitted). Similarly, all other courts to consider the issue have likewise construed Payton's broad language to apply to misdemeanor warrants as well. See State v. Hatchie, 133 Wash.App. 100, 109 n. 3, 135 P.3d 519 (2006).

¶ 13 Of course police action may pass muster under a federal constitutional analysis but still fail under our state constitution. It is well established that in some areas article I, section 7 provides greater protection than does the Fourth Amendment. State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 29, 60 P.3d 46 (2002); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984) ("[T]he unique language of Const. art. 1, § 7 provides greater protection to persons under the Washington Constitution than U.S. Const. amend. 4 provides to persons generally."). The differences in interpretations are largely because of the differences in the language of the two constitutional protections. The Fourth Amendment provides for "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend IV. Therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis hinges on whether a warrantless seizure is reasonable. But an article I, section 7 analysis hinges on whether a seizure is permitted by "authority of law" — in other words, a warrant. WASH. CONST....