State v. Haught
| Decision Date | 16 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 32583.,32583. |
| Citation | 624 S.E.2d 899 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Chesdon James HAUGHT, Defendant Below, Appellant. |
Syllabus by the Court
2. Our kidnaping statute, W.Va.Code § 61-2-14a (1999), does not provide for the enhancement of a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on additional facts found by the trial judge in violation of the constitutional right to a trial by jury as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).
Edward L. Harman, Jr., Esq., Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, Morgantown, for the Appellant.
K. Kathleen Kern, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Morgantown, for the Appellee.
Appellant, Chesdon James Haught, appeals his March 12, 2004, conviction for domestic battery and kidnapping in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County. Appellant Haught argues that his sentencing under W.Va.Code § 61-2-14a (1999) violated his right to due process and trial by jury under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), because the trial judge made a finding of fact that enhanced his punishment beyond the maximum amount allowed by the kidnaping statute. After careful consideration of this matter, we affirm Appellant's convictions.
Appellant, Chesdon James Haught, was convicted of the domestic battery and kidnapping of his girlfriend, Stephanie Hilton. Evidence introduced at trial indicated that after enjoying a late night out with a female friend, Ms. Hilton's car tire went flat. The two women drove a short distance to a nearby friend's house to have Ms. Hilton's tire repaired and spend the evening. After arriving at the friend's home, Ms. Hilton called the American Automobile Association and requested that a tow truck be dispatched to repair her tire.
While Ms. Hilton was waiting for the driver to arrive, Appellant called her cell phone several times to ascertain her location. Although Ms. Hilton refused to divulge her whereabouts, Appellant determined her location from background noises and drove to see her. After Appellant arrived, he repeatedly asked Ms. Hilton to leave with him. She refused and threatened to call the police when he became more insistent. Appellant left only to return a short time later. He parked his car close to Ms. Hilton's car and left the engine running. At that point, Appellant demanded that Ms. Hilton leave with him, and she refused. While Ms. Hilton was sitting in her car, Appellant took Ms. Hilton's money from inside her vehicle, grabbed her by the arms, picked her up out of the car, and carried her over his shoulder to his car. Ms. Hilton resisted to no avail. Appellant assured Ms. Hilton that he would return her to her friend's house and return her money if she would only ride around the block with him. Ms. Hilton stated at trial that she did not ask for help because she was afraid that Appellant would harm her or anyone who tried to help her.
Shortly after Ms. Hilton left with Appellant, she jumped from the moving vehicle in an attempt to escape. Appellant got out of his car and chased her. When he caught Ms. Hilton, he forced her back into the vehicle with verbal threats and his physical strength. While trying to compel him to stop the car and release her, Ms. Hilton once again tried to escape by kicking, punching, and biting Appellant. At that point, Appellant stopped the car and attempted to strangle Ms. Hilton. In her struggle to escape, Ms. Hilton kicked out the Appellant's windshield.
In a final attempt to flee from Appellant, Ms. Hilton grabbed his steering wheel causing him to drive into a ditch. When Appellant and Ms. Hilton exited the vehicle to push it out of the ditch, she stopped a passing vehicle to get help. As she was explaining her situation to the passing motorist, Appellant took more money from her, and obscenely gestured to her. The driver of the vehicle took her to a local convenient store where she called the police.
Appellant was subsequently indicted on charges of kidnapping, first-degree robbery, and domestic battery. On March 12, 2004, a jury found Appellant guilty of kidnapping and domestic battery. Pursuant to W.Va.Code § 61-2-14a(a),1 our kidnaping statute, a person found guilty shall receive a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. However, the statute also provides that the jury may, in its discretion, recommend mercy. In the instant case, the jury recommended mercy. Further, according to W.Va.Code § 61-2-14a(a)(3),
in all cases where the person against whom the offense is committed is returned, or is permitted to return, alive, without bodily harm having been inflicted upon him, but after ransom, money or other thing, or any concession or advantage of any sort has been paid or yielded, the punishment shall be confinement by the division of corrections for a definite terms of years of not less than twenty nor more than fifty.
Finally, W.Va.Code § 61-2-14a(a)(4) provides that,
in all cases where the person against whom the offense is committed is returned, or is permitted to return, alive, without bodily harm having been inflicted upon him or her, but without ransom, money or other thing, or any concession or advantage of any sort having been paid or yielded, the punishment shall be confinement by the division of corrections for a definite term of years not less than ten nor more than thirty.
The trial judge found that Appellant did not return Ms. Hilton unharmed and thus did not qualify for the sentences provided for in W.Va.Code § 61-2-14a(3) and (4). Therefore, the circuit sentenced Appellant to life with mercy as recommended by the jury. Appellant now appeals.
We are asked in this case to determine the constitutionality of a statute. Such an issue is a question of law. Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Paynter, 206 W.Va. 521, 526 S.E.2d 43 (1999). Accordingly, we will review the question before us de novo.
As noted above, Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the kidnaping statute, W.Va.Code § 61-2-14a, under the Supreme Court's holding in Blakely v. Washington, supra. Specifically, Appellant contends that the statute improperly permits the circuit court, rather than the jury, to make findings of fact that enhance a defendant's sentence.
In Blakely, the Supreme Court applied its previous ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Apprendi involved a defendant who was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carried a prison term of 5 to 10 years. After the defendant pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence pursuant to a separate state hate crime statute. The statute allowed the defendant's sentence to be extended if the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "`[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.'" Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69, 120 S.Ct. at 2351, quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.1999-2000). The trial court found that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced the defendant to a 12 year term, which was two years more than the maximum sentence provided in the statute under which the defendant was convicted.
The defendant appealed his conviction arguing that the federal due process clause requires the jury, not the trial judge, to find beyond a reasonable doubt the bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based. A New Jersey appellate court upheld the increased sentence reasoning that the hate crime enhancement was a sentencing factor and not an essential element of the underlying offense. The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court reasoned that the statute was constitutional because it did not allow "impermissible burden shifting and did not `create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty.'" Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 473, 120 S.Ct. at 2353. The court further explained that the statute was a result of the legislature giving weight to a factor that sentencing courts have used to affect punishment.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision. The Supreme Court explained:
Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . ....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Slater
...by the trial court operates to reduce the defendant's sentence from the maximum sentence as found by the jury. See State v. Haught, 218 W.Va. 462, 624 S.E.2d 899 (2005). We have also The provisions of the statute relating to the various punishments to be imposed upon a person convicted of t......
-
Slater v. Ballard
...Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). This simply is not true. As this Court explained in State v. Haught, 218 W.Va. 462, 624 S.E.2d 899 (2005), Apprendi and Blakely stand for the principle that any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the penalty fo......
-
State v. Scruggs
...v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) has impacted the holding of Syllabus point 2 of State v. Haught, 218 W.Va. 462, 624 S.E.2d 899 (2005) so that a jury would now need to make additional determinations when considering a kidnapping charge. Another pretrial ......
-
Slater v. Martin, CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-12075
...Slater, 665 S.E.2d at 685-86. Justice Starcher argues the majority in Slater has perpetuated the same error it made in State v. Haught, 624 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2005) because it has again failed to clarify that the jury, not the judge, must find the facts necessary for determining the sentenc......