State v. Hawkins
| Decision Date | 07 December 1935 |
| Docket Number | 32626. |
| Citation | 51 P.2d 914,142 Kan. 874 |
| Parties | STATE v. HAWKINS. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Writ of error coram nobis to review judgment of conviction of second-degree murder on ground that plea of guilty was entered under fear of death to be inflicted by mob or by officer in charge, and under threat that accused would not be permitted to see an attorney except one appointed by county attorney held properly denied, where there was no proof of existence in fact of a mob assembled or assembling, or that officer threatened death, and plea of guilty was made six hours after accused confessed commission of crime.
The evidence in support of a motion for a writ of error coram nobis, to review a judgment of conviction of felony, based on plea of guilty entered as the result of duress, considered and held a demurrer to the evidence was properly sustained.
Appeal from District Court, Ford County; Karl Miller, Judge.
W. D Hawkins was convicted of second-degree murder, and from a judgment sustaining demurrer to evidence in support of a proceeding for writ of error coram nobis, to review judgment of conviction, he appeals.
J. S Vernon, of Larned, and Walter L. Bullock, of Dodge City, for appellant.
W. C Gould and Harold Zimmer, both of Dodge City, for the State.
The proceeding was one for a writ of error coram nobis, to review a judgment of conviction of felony, based on a plea of guilty entered as the result of duress. A demurrer to defendant's evidence was sustained, and he appeals.
On February 10, 1932, defendant was arrested on a warrant issued pursuant to a complaint charging him with having murdered his wife, Mary Hawkins, on February 4, 1932. He waived preliminary examination and in default of bail was committed to the county jail. On February 11, an information was filed in district court charging him with murder in the first degree. Later in the same day, the following proceedings were had:
In 1934, defendant filed a motion for a writ of error coram nobis, supported by affidavits attached to the motion. The motion came on for hearing in February, 1935, before the court, and defendant produced oral testimony. After proceedings had occurred which need not be described, defendant submitted his motion to the court on the pleadings and the evidence, for decision on the merits. The state demurred to defendant's evidence and, as indicated, the demurrer was sustained.
The precedent for a writ of error coram nobis is the case of State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 32 P. 38, 18 L.R.A. 838, 34 Am.St.Rep. 141, decided in January, 1893. In the years which have elapsed since that decision was rendered, the remedy has been invoked many times and each time has been denied. See Gibson v. Enright, 140 Kan. 700, 701, 37 P.2d 1017.
The facts in the Calhoun Case were these:
State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 528, 32 P. 38, 18 L.R.A. 838, 34 Am.St.Rep. 141.
Evidence of threats made after the pleas of guilty were entered and before the mob completely dispersed was introduced, showing the temper of the mob and the fact Calhoun's life was in real danger.
The pertinent paragraph of the syllabus of the decision reads:
"Where the accused in a criminal prosecution in the district court is forced, through well-grounded fears of mob violence, to plead guilty to the criminal charge, and to be sentenced to imprisonment and hard labor in the penitentiary for a term of years, he has a right to relief from such sentence and plea by an action or proceeding in the same court in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis." (Syl. 1.)
The significant portion of the foregoing declaration is, "forced, through well-grounded fears of mob violence," which meant fears well-grounded in fact.
The following is the substantive portion of defendant's motion:
"That the plea of guilty was made by the defendant unwillingly and involuntarily and under the influence of duress and fears of death caused by the officer in charge after his arrest, who beat and tortured the defendant; threatened to take his life; threatened to arrest his mother and charge her with the crime of murder; informing that he would not be permitted to see an attorney except one appointed by the county attorney of Ford County, and in addition thereto, if he did not enter a plea of guilty, death would be inflicted upon him by a mob that was being formed for that purpose."
There is no statement here that there was in fact any mob. The affidavits attached to the motion did not state there was any mob, and defendant's brief in this court does not undertake to marshal any facts showing there was a mob.
Defendant's brief says there was a considerable number of people frequenting the immediate vicinity of the sheriff's private office during the latter portion of a period in which defendant was held there, and there was considerable talk among these persons. The testimony was there were persons from South Dodge, where defendant lived and where Mary Hawkins met death, in the hall, outside the sheriff's office, talking in groups part of the day; the undersheriff said from 10 o'clock in the forenoon to 12:30 p. m. When the revolting details of the crime became known, some persons said a man who would do that ought to be mobbed, but there was no testimony of anything resembling threats of mob violence, and the undersheriff testified he heard none of the persons threaten to do anything.
The brief says there was considerable talk among officers, and because of facts to be narrated later, he was susceptible to fear of mob violence, brought to him through the suggestion of the officers and the presence of numbers of people from the vicinity of defendant's place of residence. There is an element of truth in this statement, but there was no mob or indication of a mob, and the testimony was defendant offered to tell the truth about the homicide in the early morning, before any crowd of persons assembled in the courthouse.
Defendant's brief contains the following:
"That there was grave danger of a mob being formed, or that a mob was being formed and that this danger of mob violence was, in fact, brought repeatedly to the attention of Hawkins by one or more of the officers grilling him, as well as by the presence of these numerous persons in the hallway adjoining the sheriff's office."
Defendant's chief witness was Edward Gill, a special agent of the Santa Fe Railway Company, who, on request of a superior, acted as a special investigator in the Hawkins case. He, with a number of peace officers, gave Hawkins "the third degree" in the sheriff's private office in the courthouse. The grilling lasted from about 8 o'clock in the evening of February 10, to about noon, February 11. Gill and the officers believed Hawkins was guilty and felt that any means short of physical violence which would bring about a confession was justifiable. Gill testified:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Frazier v. State
...; Reponte v. State, 57 Haw. 354, 556 P.2d 577 (1976) ; People v. Andrus, 41 Ill.2d 543, 244 N.E.2d 161, 162 (1969) ; State v. Hawkins, 142 Kan. 874, 51 P.2d 914, 914 (1935) ; Dwyer v. State, 151 Me. 382, 120 A.2d 276, 284 (1956) ; Baker v. State, 358 So.2d 401 (Miss.1978) ; Arnold v. State,......
-
Wlodarz v. State
...Reponte v. State, 57 Haw. 354, 556 P.2d 577 (1976); People v. Andrus, 41 Ill.2d 543, 244 N.E.2d 161, 162 (1969); State v. Hawkins, 142 Kan. 874, 51 P.2d 914, 914 (1935); Dwyer v. State, 151 Me. 382, 120 A.2d 276, 284 (1956); Baker v. State, 358 So.2d 401 (Miss.1978); State v. LeMay, 144 Mon......
-
Downs v. Hudspeth
...few grounds for invoking it in view of the broad remedies provided by the codes of civil and criminal procedure. State v. Hawkins, 142 Kan. 874, 51 P.2d 914; State v. Miller, 161 Kan. 210, 166 P.2d 680, certiorari denied 329 U. S. 749, 67 S.Ct. 76, 91 L.Ed. ___. Thus the procedural difficul......
-
State v. Miller
...made and preparations apparently being made to carry out such threats, knowledge of which was communicated to him, while in jail. In the Hawkins case, there was evidence that the accused had been to 'the third degree' in order to secure a confession but this court said that 'despicable as a......