State v. Hawkins
Decision Date | 06 November 1998 |
Citation | 719 A.2d 689,316 N.J. Super. 74 |
Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mark HAWKINS, a/k/a Marshall Roundtree, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, for defendant-appellant (Jacqueline E. Turner, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Lee A. Solomon, Camden County Prosecutor, for plaintiff-respondent (Deborah Fox, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges STERN and LANDAU and BRAITHWAITE.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by LANDAU, J.A.D.
On October 4, 1993, defendant Mark Hawkins was indicted in Camden County on counts of first degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and third degree hindering prosecution (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(1)). In 1994, he entered a retraxit plea of guilty on the armed robbery count subject to the court's acceptance of a plea bargain in which the State was to recommend a second degree sentence of nine years with three years of parole ineligibility to run concurrently with any sentence imposed under a pending Essex County prosecution.1
An Essex County jury found defendant guilty of first degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; 5-1); second degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)); third degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); and second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a), but his motion for a new trial was granted. Defendant then pled guilty to second degree counts of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, receiving concurrentsentences of ten years with five years of parole ineligibility on each count.
After the Essex County convictions, the Camden County plea proffer was rejected because the conviction in Essex County would require a conviction for the robbery charge subject to "a second Graves [Act]" sentence. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3d; State v. Hawks, 114 N.J. 359, 554 A.2d 1330 (1989). Defendant went to trial on the Camden indictment. The jury returned a guilty verdict on each count. A Graves Act hearing was held. As defendant was found to have used a gun in the robbery, and as defendant had also been sentenced under the Graves Act for the Essex County offense, an extended term was imposed. Defendant was sentenced on the robbery count to a fifty-year custodial term with 16 2/3 years of parole ineligibility, and to a concurrent five year term on the hindering prosecution count. The sentence was run consecutively to the term imposed in Essex County.
On appeal defendant argues:
THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE.
We have considered these arguments in light of the briefs and record and conclude that each is without merit, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), warranting no extended discussion.
We add these comments. The victim gave a description of defendant and his unique attire to authorities immediately after the robbery. She had ample opportunity to observe him in broad daylight, and positively identified him both shortly thereafter and at the trial. Coupled with defendant's taped confession, there was such overwhelming evidence of guilt that even were there some merit in any of the arguments raised in Points I, II and III, the outcome would not have been affected. Defendant was provided with khaki pants, sweatshirt and sneakers rather than prison garb. It was not necessary to outfit him in stylish clothing, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's refusal to further delay the trial. As to denial of the mistrial request, the limiting instructions given promptly during trial and in the later jury charge were fully adequate in this case to forestall any possibility of an unjust result. It was a reasonable exercise of discretion to deny the mistrial motion.
Respecting the judge's method of avoiding prejudice to defendant from his own self-serving courtroom outbursts, our review of the record satisfies us that the curative instructions were sufficient, and an appropriate exercise of discretion. Defendant's statements, some made after court warning, were either designed to evoke sympathy or to confound the judicial process. The judge made appropriate inquiry of a juror who thought his objectivity might be affected, dismissing the juror without compromising the jury. He instructed the jury appropriately. Defendant ought not be rewarded on appeal for engaging in disruptive courtroom conduct. State v. Vasky, 203 N.J.Super. 91, 98, 495 A.2d 1347 (App.Div.1985). See also State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 365-66, 680 A.2d 677 (1996)
( )
Turning to defendant's challenge to the finding that defendant used a gun, thus implicating a Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c) sentence, we note that the judge conducted a separate inquiry as required by State v. Stewart, 96 N.J. 596, 477 A.2d 300 (1984). In so doing, a court must conclude by a preponderance of evidence that defendant possessed a gun during commission of the crime. Stewart, supra, at 606, 477 A.2d 300.
All relevant material, not only that placed before the jury during trial, may be considered. Ibid. Indeed, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6d affords broad latitude to the court in making the Graves Act finding:
[i]n making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
Here, one of the several underlying reasons given for the conclusion that a real gun was employed was defendant's confirmation of that fact during the course of a guilty plea, later withdrawn. Other factors mentioned were defendant's own statement that he "never stuck a gun to anybody before [this incident]," and the victim's description of the silver-grey gun she was confronted with, which didn't look like a toy.
The finding of a requisite element of a Graves Act offense may be based upon proof which would not be admissible in evidence at the defendant's trial. State v. Wooters, 228 N.J.Super. 171, 179, 549 A.2d 441 (App.Div.1988)(citing Stewart, supra, 96 N.J. at 606, 477 A.2d 300).
Thus a judge is not bound by strict rules of evidence when considering a defendant's sentence.
According to the victim, the gun was silver-gray, flat, about the size of a person's hand, and it was not a revolver. It did not look like a toy gun.
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