State v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 25 June 1979
• Docket Number: No. 63436,63436
• Citation: 376 So.2d 943
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Julian P. HAWKINS.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 943

376 So.2d 943

STATE of Louisiana v. Julian P. HAWKINS.

No. 63436.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 25, 1979.

On Rehearing Nov. 1, 1979.

Woodrow W. Wyatt, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Kay Kirkpatrick, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

SUMMERS, Chief Justice.

In a two-count bill of information the District Attorney of East Baton Rouge Parish charged that Julian P. Hawkins attempted to murder Brigida Hall on May 11, 1977 and that he attempted to murder Wilbert Jones on May 13, 1977. When arraigned defendant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to each count. A jury of twelve found defendant guilty on both counts. He was sentenced to serve forty years at hard labor on each, the sentences to run concurrently. On this appeal five assignments of error are relied upon to set aside defendant's conviction and sentence. Only four are argued and briefed.

On May 11, 1977 defendant Hawkins was sitting in a chair in the lobby of Bolen Hall on the Southern University Campus in Baton Rouge with a gun hidden in his lap. While Brigida Hall, a student who was unknown to defendant, waited at the elevator in the lobby, defendant shot her in the back. Defendant then fired four more shots at her as she lay wounded on the floor, walked out of the dormitory and drove away in his car. Brigida Hall was thereafter taken to the hospital where, as a result of her wounds, surgery was required to remove a kidney. Witnesses at the scene furnished authorities with a description of the assailant and a search ensued.

Two days later, on May 13, 1977, a track meet was held at Southern University. On that occasion defendant walked up to Wilbert Jones, a ticket taker who knew him, and when Jones advised Hawkins that, to gain admittance to the meet, he would need a school identification card or three dollars, he was fired upon three times by defendant. Defendant then ran to his car in the parking lot and drove away. He was pursued by campus police. Shots were exchanged between police and the defendant who was finally apprehended and arrested at his residence. He was taken to campus police headquarters at the University where he admitted the shootings of May 11 and May 13. Thereafter, he was brought to the Sheriff's substation in Scotlandville where, on May 14, he was again questioned. He gave a confession there which was taped.

Assignment 1: Voir dire examination of the prospective jurors was conducted in groups. The prospective jurors in the first group were questioned by the judge on basic factual data: their names, residence and marital status; whether they had children; their occupations; and whether they knew the victims, counsel, or the law enforcement authorities. He then instructed them on the basic law concerning presumption of innocence, burden of proof, reasonable doubt, attempted murder and insanity. He also asked each juror if he would accept the law as given by the judge at the end of the trial and if they could give the accused a fair and impartial trial. Each juror answered affirmatively. The jurors were then tendered to counsel. After the State's attorney questioned them, the prospective jurors were examined by defense counsel.

After examining others, defense counsel asked the prospective juror Patricia Browning if she understood the judge's instructions, particularly regarding the burden imposed upon the State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. She answered that she understood. Counsel then said:

"If I told you that in the insanity defense, the defendant is presumed sane but the burden of proof necessary for him to convince you or for him to show you that he has a legal insanity defense, it is not beyond a reasonable doubt but is in fact the civil burden, which is a preponderance of the evidence, i. e., that it is more likely that or more probable that. Do you understand the difference?"

At this time the trial judge injected:

"Miss Browning, that is the correct statement of the law. However, you've already agreed to accept the law as I instruct it to you. That will be one of the additional instructions. We can be here all day going into the law, and I try to cover all the questions, and lawyers feel an obligation to cover questions although I would like to cover the whole field myself in order that we do not waste a lot of time, but that is a correct statement of law, and you have agreed to accept the law as I have told you. Will you accept that and other principles of the law as I instruct you?"

The prospective juror answered that she would accept the judge's instructions on the law; whereupon, defense counsel objected and the State's attorney concurred. When they did, the trial judge said, "Well, I stated that was a correct statement of the law. You wish me to say that it is not?"

Apparently construing the remarks of the trial judge to be an undue restriction of his right to voir dire examination, defense counsel then argued that the prospective jurors should be made aware of what the law was before they were selected and sworn. In some cases, he said, they may not agree with the law and may refuse to accept it, which would present a ground to challenge for cause. The trial judge overruled the objection, and the ruling is assigned as error.

Considering the issue in the posture presented by this assignment, there is no basis to complain of the judge's ruling because he agreed with defense counsel's statement of the law, and the prospective juror recognized that statement and agreed to accept it as a correct statement of the law.

In general terms defense counsel attacks this dialogue and the judge's statement that he would not permit counsel to interrogate prospective jurors on questions of law. He asserts this to be an undue restriction of defendant's right to "full voir dire examination of prospective jurors" guaranteed by Section 17 of Article I of the Constitution.

With respect to the question propounded to this prospective juror, which was allowed, there was no deprivation of full voir dire examination. No other incident is called to this Court's attention in which voir dire was unduly restricted. Each claim of error is to be taken upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case and, upon the record, here the scope of voir dire was not unduly restricted. State v. Vinet, 352 So.2d 684 (La.1977).

We do believe, however, that the statement of the trial judge was broad and if it had been generally enforced could be interpreted as an undue restriction of voir dire. But the fact remains that we are not made aware that he actually refused to allow counsel to examine prospective jurors on the law.

Aside from the general assertion that the defendant's right to voir dire examination was unduly restricted, defense counsel does not allege particular prejudice to the defendant and none is apparent from this record. This trial should not be aborted because of an improper statement of the trial judge when its prejudicial effect on the defendant is not shown.

Assignment 2: Defendant contends that it was error for the trial judge to deny his motion to suppress an oral confession, asserting the confession was obtained without a knowing and intelligent waiver.

Before the trial began defense counsel orally moved to suppress defendant's confession, contending that because of his mental condition defendant's confession was not voluntary.

The State first presented witnesses to establish the free and voluntary character of the confession given to the officers on May 14, 1977. Captain Dalton Honore of the Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office testified the Southern University police brought defendant to the Sheriff's Scotlandville substation for interrogation at which time Captain Honore advised him of his rights and recorded defendant's statements on tape. Defendant, according to this witness, understood his rights, talked normally, and was not coerced or threatened in any way. Four other Sheriff's officers were present and heard the confession.

Captain Honore had known defendant since he was a youngster. At times during this acquaintance defendant seemed "strange" to the officer and "unstable", conditions which may have been drug related. When the confession was given defendant appeared to be tired and rundown physically and at times his mind seemed to "drift".

Several days prior to the shooting at Southern University defendant came to the substation to talk to Honore. He talked about a theft of a large sum of money at a bank in Baton Rouge and "didn't sound like a person of sound mind." However, at the time of the confession defendant was "different", and appeared to understand his rights, and the confession he gave was purely voluntary. Nevertheless, during the interview defendant's mind seemed to drift, and at one time he asked Honore for a "joint" of marijuana to calm himself. In summary, he said, defendant's answers were responsive to the questions asked, and he was cooperative. He knew the implications of his confession.

After this Officer's testimony the hearing on the motion to suppress was recessed.

Major William Pass, Assistant Chief of Police at Southern University testified later. He was called to the university station after the episode at the track meet. He arrived while defendant was being questioned. He had known defendant all of defendant's life. Defendant had attended Southern and Grambling University on basketball scholarships. Pass confirmed that the officers conducting the interrogation had exercised every means of informing defendant of his constitutional rights, such as informing him of his Miranda rights. He noted that defendant was "more than cooperative in his response to questions that were asked by the investigating officers," a different attitude than that assumed by most persons under interrogation. Defendant's...