State v. Hayden

Decision Date28 August 2002
Docket NumberNo. 2000-1997.,2000-1997.
Citation96 Ohio St.3d 211,773 N.E.2d 502,2002 Ohio 4169
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HAYDEN, Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Page 502

773 N.E.2d 502
96 Ohio St.3d 211
2002 Ohio 4169
The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,
v.
HAYDEN, Appellee.
No. 2000-1997.
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Submitted March 26, 2002.
Decided August 28, 2002.

Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carley

Page 503

J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

J. Dean Carro, Akron, for appellee.

FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.


{¶ 1} In 1984, defendant-appellee, Robert O. Hayden, pled guilty to attempted rape and was sentenced to prison for a term of 5 to 15 years. In 1999, based solely on his conviction, the trial court determined that Hayden was a "sexually oriented offender" and notified him of his duty to register under R.C. 2950.03(A)(1). Appellee appealed from this order, arguing that his constitutional rights of confrontation and due process had been violated because he had not been afforded a hearing. In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed, holding that appellee's constitutional right to due process, including the right to confront his accusers, had been violated by the trial court's failure to conduct a hearing. The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

{¶ 2} This case involves yet another challenge to R.C. Chapter 2950, which contains Ohio's sex offender classification, registration, and notification laws.

{¶ 3} Initially, the state takes issue with the appellate court's application of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to R.C. Chapter 2950. That Revised Code chapter imposes registration requirements on those convicted of sexually oriented offenses. In particular, the state argues that the trial court's failure to provide a hearing did not violate this clause. However, at oral argument, appellee conceded that prior decisions from this court, notably State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, and State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 728 N.E.2d 342, precludes this argument. We agree.

{¶ 4} Cook holds that the scheme provided for in R.C. Chapter 2950 is civil, not punitive, in nature. Id., 83 Ohio St.3d at 422, 700 N.E.2d 570. Williams reaffirms that principle. Id., 88 Ohio St.3d at 528, 728 N.E.2d 342. Thus, the federal Confrontation Clause, which provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him" (emphasis added), clearly has no application. See, also, Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which contains a similar guarantee.

{¶ 5} Therefore, we hold that the Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution do not apply to R.C. Chapter 2950.

{¶ 6} However, the issue remains as to whether appellee's due process rights were violated. The right to procedural due process is found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. To trigger protections under these clauses, a sexual offender must show that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest as a result of the registration requirement. See Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community Mental Health Bd. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 176, 181, 736 N.E.2d 10. Although due process is "`flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,'" Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, the basic requirements under this clause are notice and an opportunity to be heard. State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 459, 668 N.E.2d 457. In particular, appellee finds fault with the trial court's failure to afford him a hearing

Page 504

on whether he is a "sexually oriented offender" who must comply with the registration requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950.

{¶ 7} At the outset we note that a statute is presumed constitutional and before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible. State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 8} Although Ohio has had sex offender registration statutes since 1963, see, e.g., former R.C. Chapter 2950, 130 Ohio Laws 669, the law became more complex in 1996 due in large part to New Jersey's 1994 passage of "Megan's Law," N.J.Stat.Ann. 2C:7-1 et seq., and the 1994 enactment of the federal Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Section 14071, Title 42, U.S.Code.1 Against this backdrop, R.C. Chapter 2950 was repealed and reenacted to provide protections to the public against sex offenders. 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560. Specifically, the law divides sex offenders into one of three categories and imposes registration and sometimes notification requirements upon each class once the offender is released from incarceration. See, e.g., R.C. 2950.01.

{¶ 9} R.C. 2950.01(B) defines a "habitual sex offender" as a person who "is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense" and who "previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more sexually oriented offenses." R.C. 2950.01(B)(1) and (2). In the case of an adult, R.C. 2950.01(E) defines a "sexual predator" as a person who "has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses." Finally, the least restrictive designation, that of a "sexually oriented offender," is not specifically defined in R.C. Chapter 2950. However, we have explained that a "sexually oriented offender" is a person "who has committed a `sexually oriented offense' as that term is defined in R.C. 2950.01(D) but who does not fit the description of either habitual sex offender or sexual predator." Cook, supra, 83 Ohio St.3d at 407, 700 N.E.2d 570; Williams, supra, 88 Ohio St.3d at 519, 728 N.E.2d 342. This is the classification in which the trial court placed appellee. The question is whether due process requires a hearing before a court may impose that label on a defendant.

{¶ 10} Recognizing that sexual predators and habitual sex offenders have a high risk of recidivism, R.C. 2950.02(A)(2), the law allows in certain cases for the public dissemination of information regarding the whereabouts of these offenders. See R.C. 2950.11. However, before the community notification requirement is imposed, the law requires that a hearing be held either before sentencing or before an incarcerated sex offender is released to determine whether that person should be labeled a sexual predator or habitual sex offender who is likely to offend again. R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) and (C). A hearing is necessary because a factual determination...

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