State v. Hayden, 88,650.

Citation130 P.3d 24
Decision Date17 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 88,650.,88,650.
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Joseph Andrew HAYDEN, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas

Robert G. Kuchar, of Jenab & Kuchar, of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

John K. Bork, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Julie E. Richey, assistant attorney general, and Phill Kline, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BEIER, J.:

Joseph Hayden appeals his convictions on one count of murder in the second degree, one count of attempted murder in the second degree, and one count of aggravated burglary.

Hayden raises six issues for our consideration: (1) Did the district judge's behavior during trial constitute misconduct requiring reversal? (2) Should the defense motion to dismiss for violation of Hayden's right to speedy trial have been granted? (3) Did the denial of the defense motion for individual voir dire of venire members violate his Sixth Amendment rights? (4) Should the State have been allowed to amend its complaint 1 day before trial began? (5) Did the district judge err by failing to instruct the jury on the legal effect of a person's mere presence at the scene of a crime? and (6) Was there sufficient evidence to support the convictions?

Factual Background

This case arose out of the death of Vivian Johnson, age 85, and the serious injury of her husband, Howard, age 86. A man attacked the couple with a shovel in their home very early in the morning on November 1, 2000, and Mrs. Johnson died 18 days later from her injuries. Before her death, neither Vivian nor Howard could pick Hayden out of a photo lineup, and each described the attacker as 5'5" tall.

Suspicion eventually focused on Raymond Fuller, then 25 years old and 5'8" tall, and on Hayden, then 17 years old and 6'2" tall. Each pointed his finger at the other.

Fuller was tried first; he was convicted of attempted second-degree murder of each of the Johnsons and of aggravated burglary. The State agreed to recommend concurrent sentences for his convictions in exchange for his testimony in Hayden's later trial.

Fuller ultimately testified that he drove himself and Hayden around "the hollows," looking for parties. He claimed that he pulled into the Johnsons' driveway because he had to go to the bathroom and was familiar with the couple and their land. While there, Hayden entered the house. Fuller testified that he entered the home to peek at Hayden. He could see Mr. Johnson bleeding, and he heard a clink sound from the back of the house. He then ran out. Hayden followed, dropped something he was holding into the back of the truck the men had borrowed, and then jumped into the passenger seat. Fuller also testified that Hayden said: "I think I killed them."

This version of events departed in several respects from earlier Fuller stories. At his police interview, Fuller initially claimed that he stayed in the truck after Hayden entered the house. When confronted with evidence of his shoeprint inside the house, Fuller said he only stepped into its entryway. From that location, he then said, he could see Hayden's shadow on the wall and was able to observe him raise the shovel and strike something. Fuller also said before trial that Hayden had nothing in his hands when he followed him out of the house.

For his part, Hayden contended that Fuller tried to talk him into robbing the Johnsons and, when he refused, that Fuller stormed out of the truck and into the house. Hayden asserted that he had stayed in the truck while Fuller was inside and that he did not know what happened until a few days later, when he saw news of the crimes on television.

After the attack on the Johnsons, Fuller and Hayden wrecked the truck. Each claimed that the other stashed the shovel used to beat the Johnsons. After the accident, Fuller and Hayden walked to a house occupied by Fuller's drug dealer.

Hayden eventually left Fuller behind at the dealer's house. Fuller and the dealer used methamphetamine that afternoon, and the dealer eventually testified that Fuller came to her room, crying. When she asked if he and Hayden had been "out robbing somebody," Fuller nodded his head "yes" and told her that "the last thing he heard was: `Please don't hurt us. We're old.'"

Before their arrest, Hayden and Fuller stayed a couple of days at a friend's house, where they were introduced to John Vincent Cly. Hayden and Fuller asked Cly if he could procure false identification for them. At Hayden's trial, Cly testified that Hayden had been upset and had told him that he did not mean "to get his boy caught up like this" and did not mean "to hurt the old lady." Cly understood Hayden's reference to "his boy" to mean Fuller. Hayden's counsel suggested at trial that an unrelated charge against Cly had been reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor and that his $2,500 bond had been changed to a personal recognizance bond in exchange for his testimony.

Hayden's trial was originally set to begin on July 9, 2001, but the State filed a motion to dismiss. The case was dismissed, and Hayden was released. After the State learned of Cly's likely testimony, the case was refiled. Hayden was arrested again and went to trial on December 11, 2001.

Five days before trial began, the State filed a motion to amend the complaint and information. The district court granted the motion on December 10, 2001, changing an aggravated battery charge to aggravated burglary.

Hayden unsuccessfully requested individual voir dire of the jury venire because of extensive media coverage of the crimes. His counsel argued that "prospective jurors w[ould] have to be interrogated as to the nature of the publicity [to which they had been exposed] .... Forthright answers would very likely contaminate the entire venire, and based on the nature of the pretrial publicity, that contamination could not be corrected by mere admonishment." The district judge denied the motion.

On this appeal, Hayden also accuses the district judge of engaging in prejudicial misconduct, arguing the judge "demonstrated a careless, angry, and unprofessional attitude toward most persons involved in the above-captioned case." He cites examples of what he characterizes as interruptions, rudeness, inattentiveness, and hostility in the trial judge's examination of prospective jurors; the judge's continual interruption of both of the lawyers; the judge's distraction from trial by a computer at the bench; the judge's visible and audible anger toward both counsel, including during bench conferences at the bench; and the judge's disrespect toward both parties, witnesses, prospective jury members, and those ultimately selected to serve on the jury. The State does not contest the accuracy of defense counsel's description of the district judge's demeanor and behavior. It does challenge the legal effect, arguing that the judge's equal opportunity misconduct did not prejudice the defense.

Judicial Misconduct

An appellate court's standard of review is unlimited in cases alleging judicial misconduct. State v. Patton, 280 Kan. 146, 181, 120 P.3d 760 (2005); see State v. Miller, 274 Kan. 113, 118, 49 P.3d 458 (2002). The merit of allegations of judicial misconduct during trial must be decided on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct. In order to warrant a new trial, it must affirmatively appear that the conduct prejudiced the substantial rights of the complaining party. State v. Patton, 280 Kan. at 181, 120 P.3d 760; see also Miller, 274 Kan. at 118, 49 P.3d 458 (burden of showing prejudice on party asserting existence of judicial misconduct).

Although we are limited to review of a "cold record," we agree with Hayden and the State that the district judge engaged in misconduct in this case. The record reflects numerous unnecessary interruptions, as well as impatient and rude remarks, made by the district judge. It also documents, as much as a written record can, the district judge raising his voice and failing to pay attention. We also note that, when the judge's conduct was challenged on Hayden's motion for a mistrial, he did little to defend himself, asserting his behavior had been no "better or worse to [Hayden] than it ha[d been] to the State."

The district judge's pattern of hostility was set early. During a pretrial hearing, he succeeded in cowing both counsel.

"The Court: I am going to deny your motion in limine. I don't believe he can properly cross-examine if there's in fact an agreement and the agreement does provide for some improvement of Mr. Fuller's position.

"[Prosecutor]: I understand he will do that. I am not seeking to prevent that.

"The Court: Well, you don't want him to talk about sentence. You don't want him to talk about what he's been convicted of. How can you discuss that and not discuss how you improved his position on sentencing?

"[Prosecutor]: I am here as I said for guidance from the Court.

"The Court: The guidance is I deny your motion in limine. He may cross-examine him about what he's been convicted of and—

"[Prosecutor]: I can hear you. You do not need to raise your voice.

"The Court: I'm not raising my voice. I'm telling you what my ruling is. Do you have any other preliminary matters, [Prosecutor]?

"[Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor.

"The Court: [Defense Attorney]?

"[Defense Attorney]: No, Judge."

During voir dire, the judge constantly interrupted counsel's questioning of prospective jurors. The judge interrupted the prosecutor 14 times, at least once, cutting him off in mid-sentence.

"[Prosecutor]: And sometimes in order to have a co-defendant testify against the other defendant it is necessary to deal with that co-defendant. And you will hear in this case that there has been a bargain struck. Is there anybody that because of that fact would simply not listen to what the co-defendant had to say?

...

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