State v. Haynes

Citation364 P.2d 935,58 Wn.2d 716
Decision Date14 September 1961
Docket NumberNo. 34735,34735
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Raymond L. HAYNES, Appellant.

Keogan & Kinnie, Spokane, for appellant.

John J. Lally, Pros. Atty., John P. Tracy, Jr., Carroll D. Gray, Deputies, Spokane, for respondent.

FINLEY, Chief Justice.

In the trial court Raymond L. Haynes, the appellant herein, and his brother, Keith E. Haynes, were found guilty by a jury on a charge of robbery of a filling station in Spokane, Washington, at approximately 9:00 p. m., on the evening of December 19, 1957.

Shortly after the occurrence of the robbery, the two brothers were apprehended, arrested, and taken to the police station in Spokane. There, they were positively identified by the owned of the filing station and his wife as the men who had committed the robbery. Bot men were booked for investigation on an open charge on the socalled 'small book' of the Spokane police department. Around noon on the following day, both appellant and his brother, in the presence of a deputy prosecuting attorney, signed statements in which they admitted having committed the robbery. They were then formally charged with the crime, and after an appearance before a police judge they were taken to the county jail.

At the trial the state offered in evidence the signed statements of appellant and his brother. Appellant objected on two grounds: (a) That the statements offered were not confessions in that they did not contain a clear and unequivocal expression of guilt; and (b) that admission of the statements would violate the constitutional rights of the appellant with respect to self incrimination by forcing him, against his will, to offer evidence against himself. The trial court overruled the objections and admitted the statements. Appellant's principal assignment of error concerns this ruling of the trial court.

Appellant does not now contend that the statements were not confessions. He urges that, as confessions, the statements were erroneously admitted, because the circumstances surrounding their making rendered them involuntary and thus inadmissible under the due-process provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 3, of the Washington state constitution. The record discloses that the trial court instructed the jury not to consider any out-of-court admissions or statements of one defendant as evidence against the other defendant, and appellant has made no assertion that this instruction was violated. Consequently, we shall confine our attention to the contention of appellant with respect to his own confession.

Before discussing this contention, we must dispose of the state's argument that the objections (made to prevent the confession from being considered by the jury) did not specifically raise the question of whether the confession was made voluntarily. It seems to us that appellant's objection--that admission of the confession would force him to offer evidence against himself and against his will--was sufficient to place the question before the trial court as to whether the confession was voluntary. The record discloses that, after admitting the confession, the trial judge submitted it to the jury under instructions to disregard it if they found it had been made involuntarily. We think thus in itself indicates that the trial court had been properly informed by the objection and was well aware of the fact that voluntariness of the confession was in issue.

We now turn to appellant's argument that admission of the confession into evidence violated his rights to due process under the Federal and state constitutions.

It is clear that decisions of the Supreme Court construing the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit the use of an involuntary confession against a defendant in a criminal action. See, for example, Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 1944, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192, and cases cited therein. However, the above-noted instruction given by the trial judge not only indicates he was aware that voluntariness of appellant's confession was in issue, but it also indicates that the confession was only conditionally admitted as evidence against the appellant. The final determination as to whether it was a voluntary confession, which might be considered as evidence against the appellant, was made by the jury and not by the trial judge. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution does not forbid jury determination of the issue of voluntariness of a confession. Stein v. People of State of New York, 1953, 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522. This, plus the fact that appropriate instructions were given to the jury on the question of voluntariness of the confession, should, we think, end this matter.

We say this despite the fact that recently the procedure in our state for determining the voluntariness of a confession has been altered and, we think, improved in terms of fairness and protection to the criminally accused by the adoption of Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 101.20 W, RCW Vol. O, as amended, effective January 2, 1961. Thereunder, provision is made for a special hearing before the trial court out of the presence of the jury on the question of voluntariness of a confession. However, the procedure which was in effect and actually followed at the time the instant case was tried was not necessarily an unfair one. Essentially, it delegated to the jury rather than to the trial judge the responsibility for determining the credibility and evidentiary significance to be attributed to a confession. In this connection perhaps the parallel should be noted that in our system of law we still entrust to the jury rather than the judge the responsibility for determining the perhaps even more crucial ultimate question of guilt or innocence. Furthermore, it may be noteworthy that there seems to be no serious movement afoot in the Federal or other appellate courts, among the law reviews or text writers to reverse this latter facet of our criminal procedure. As described in State v. Van Brunt, 1944, 22 Wash.2d 103, 154 P.2d 606, 608, the procedure extant re confessions and applied in the instant case was as follows:

'* * * where an issue of fact arises as to the question of the influence of fear produced by threats and confessions made under inducement, it is not a question of law for the court to decide but is a question of fact for the jury under proper instructions. Where threats or inducements are conceded by the state or where facts are admitted which as a matter of law constituted threats or inducements, it is a question of law for the court.'

The confession in the instant case was admitted into evidence by the trial judge. It was submitted to the jury under instructions, which were appropriate to the factual issue of voluntariness. The question before us on this appeal under the Van Brunt decision, as excerpted above, is whether the state had conceded or admitted that the confession was made under the influence of threats or inducements. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the trial judge erred as a matter of law in admitting the confession into evidence and allowing the jury to consider it in determining the question of guilt.

We have noted that the confession in issue was made at the close of an approximately fourteen-hour period, during which the appellant was in the Spokane police station on the so-called 'small book,' and that he was not formally charged with the robbery until after the confession was made. Appellant makes no charge that he was physically mistreated during this period, or that he was deprived of sleep or food. Specifically, he claims (a) that he was not allowed to telephone his wife during this period, and (b) that he was told he could call her only after he had made a statement and was formally charged. This, as a condition relative to the making of a statement, is not conceded by the state.

Appellant's theory emphasizes that the confession was involuntary because it was procured in violation of RCW 9.33.020(5), which provides:

'(5) No officer or person having the custody and control of the body or liberty of any person under arrest, shall refuse permission to such arrested person to communicate with his friends or with an attorney, nor subject any person under arrest to any form of personal violence, intimidation, indignity or threats for the purpose of extorting from such person incriminating statements or a confession. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

In State v. Miller, 1912, 68 Wash. 239, 122 P. 1066, in which the prosecution admitted that the defendant had been kept in a dark cell for eight days and was threatened with additional prosecutions if he did not confess, this court held that a confession induced by a violation of RCW 9.33.020(5) was inadmissible under RCW 10.58.030. As we view it, the standard or rule established by the statute breaks down into three facets: (1) a refusal by the police to allow the arrested person to communicate with his friends (obviously including family) or an attorney, or subjection of the suspect to personal violence or threats, etc; (2) done for the purpose of inducing the arrested person to make incriminating statements; and (3) actually inducing the particular confession under attack. The record in the instant case discloses that the trial judge was aware of this statutory rule for, in addition to giving the jury a general instruction to disregard any confessions they found to be involuntary, he instructed them that if they found that any officer having custody of the appellant denied him communication with his friends or an attorney they could consider such denial in relation to the question of the voluntariness of any statement made. Therefore, w...

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8 cases
  • Haynes v. State of Washington
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • May 27, 1963
    ...'for a term of not more than 20 years.' The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, with four of nine judges dissenting. 58 Wash.2d 716, 364 P.2d 935. Certiorari was granted, 370 U.S. 902, 82 S.Ct. 1252, 8 L.Ed.2d 399, to consider whether the admission of the petitioner's written ......
  • Davis v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • April 7, 1964
    ...528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (21 Ill.2d 63, 171 N.E.2d 17). Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (58 Wash.2d 716, 364 P.2d 935). It is apparent that no precise codifiable formula has arisen from these cases or from instances of affirmances such as Lisenba v.......
  • City of Tacoma v. Heater, 36384
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • January 13, 1966
    ...and application of RCW 9.33.020(5) is supported by the analysis of the statute found in decisions of this court in State v. Haynes, 58 Wash.2d 716, 364 P.2d 935 (1961), and in State v. Miller, 68 Wash. 239, 122 P. 1066 In conclusion, I must again emphasize that society has some important ri......
  • State v. Self
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • November 9, 1961
    ...That is not only the constitutional test, but it is the test which has been consistently applied in this state. See State v. Haynes, Wash., 364 P.2d 935 (1961); State v. Johnson, 53 Wash.2d 666, 335 P.2d 809 (1959); and State v. Winters, 39 Wash.2d 545, 236 P.2d 1038 Considering the absence......
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