State v. Hayward

Decision Date20 November 1895
Citation65 N.W. 63,62 Minn. 474
PartiesSTATE v. HAYWARD.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. On the trial of an indictment for one crime, the prosecution may prove the admission by the defendant of the commission by him of other, independent crimes, when relevant and material to the issue.

2. Conversations of the defendant four or five months before the commission of the murder held competent, under the circumstances, as tending to prove that he then contemplated the commission of the crime.

3. The statement of the deceased a few hours before the homicide, not in the presence of the defendant, that she had a business engagement with him that evening, held competent evidence against him, in connection with the other evidence in the case.

4. Certain expert evidence held to be irrelevant.

5. Certain evidence offered to corroborate the defendant's evidence held of no weight, and that it was not error to rule it out.

6. Two witnesses for the defense testified that in the company of each other they were going along the road, when they observed certain facts. Held, it was not error to permit them to be cross–examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any concert or agreement between them as to their testimony, and for this purpose the court might permit one witness to be asked what the other witness had subsequently told him as to what he saw.

7. Certain evidence offered to corroborate one of the state's witnesses held properly admitted.

8. After a witness had been fully cross–examined on a certain point, held not error to refuse to permit him to be further cross–examined on the same point later in the trial.

9. Held not error to refuse to receive certain evidence at the close of a protracted trial, after the regular time to introduce it had passed. Held, also, that the rulings of the trial judge do not show that he exercised his discretion in favor of so receiving the evidence out of order, but rejected it on some other ground.

10. After a witness for the state had testified at considerable length, and was to all appearances perfectly sane and rational, the defense objected to his competency on the ground that he was insane, but made no offer to prove that he was. Held, under the circumstances, it was not error for the judge to assert that he did not see that the witness was at that time any more insane than the attorney was.

11. When insanity of a permanent type is once shown, it is presumed to continue until it appears that the person has again become sane. But this presumption only applies to habitual insanity, which has continued so long as to raise a presumption that it is permanent. Temporary insanity, or temporary delusions or aberrations, are not presumed to continue, and evidence of the same, standing alone, is no evidence that the person is insane at a later period.

12. Evidence of the insanity of a person's ancestors and relatives is not alone competent or sufficient to prove that he is insane, and such evidence can only be used to corroborate other evidence of his insanity.

13. Whether, when insanity is a direct issue in the case, evidence of prior temporary delusions or mental aberrations, and evidence of insanity of ancestors and relatives, are together sufficient, without more, to go to the jury as evidence of the person's insanity at a later period, quære. But held, such evidence, without more, is not sufficient to go to the jury when insanity is merely a collateral issue, as where an attempt is made to impeach the competency or credibility of a witness by proving that he is insane. Distinction between insanity as a direct issue and as a collateral issue noted. When an attempt is thus made to impeach the credibility of a witness, the court may in its discretion refuse to receive evidence of insanity of his ancestors and relatives, and evidence of his prior temporary delusions and aberrations, until some other evidence is first given of his insanity at the time of the transactions testified to, or at the time of trial.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; Seagrave Smith, Judge.

Harry T. Hayward was convicted of murder in the first degree, and from an order denying a new trial he appeals. Affirmed.

W. W. Erwin, Walter A. Shumaker, and John Day Smith, for appellant.

H. W. Childs, Atty. Gen., Geo. B. Edgerton, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Frank M. Nye, for the State.

CANTY, J.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on an indictment charging that he procured and induced one Claus Blixt to kill and murder one Catherine Ging, and aided and abetted him in so doing. From an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, he appeals to this court, and the case comes up on a bill of exceptions. From the evidence returned it appears that Catherine Ging was a young, unmarried woman, who carried on a dressmaking business in Minneapolis, and resided with her niece in the Ozark Flats, an apartment building in that city, owned by the father of the defendant. Defendant is a young, unmarried man. He, his father and mother, and his brother Adry Hayward, also occupied rooms or flats in that building; and Claus Blixt was the engineer who attended to the furnace and ran the heating plant in the building. On the evening of December 3, 1894, Miss Ging was found lying dead on a main–traveled road at the outskirts of the city, with a bullet hole in her head, the bullet having entered just back of the right ear. About a week prior to this the deceased made and delivered to defendant her promissory notes for $7,000, and assigned to him life insurance policies which she had, with his assistance, just procured on her own life, for the aggregate sum of $10,000. The defendant, his brother Adry, and Claus Blixt were all arrested by the authorities, on suspicion. Blixt confessed to committing the murder, and implicated the defendant.

1. On the trial Adry testified, on behalf of the state, that defendant had told him repeatedly that he was going to do away with the dressmaker, and tried on a number of occasions to induce the witness to murder her after he (defendant) had procured insurance on her life; that the witness refused to have anything to do with the scheme, tried to dissuade his brother from attempting to carry it out, and told him, “You will be haunted all your life if you do anything of the kind”; that to this the witness answered, “It is not generally known, but I have been the cause of the death of three people already.” This the court, on defendant's motion, struck out, and then the witness continued: “Two in the East, and one— Of that one I don't care to speak.” The court refused to strike out the last statement, and defendant excepted. Against defendant's objection and exception, the witness further testified: He stated that he had caused a fire in the East, at a loss of half a million dollars, or rather he said about four hundred and fifty thousand. I said, ‘Harry, how much did you get for it?’ He said, ‘Two dollars,’ as if he was disgusted with it, and then said, ‘There is nothing in haunting, Adry.’ I referred just before that to what a terrible thing it would be,—the girl might haunt him,—and he said: ‘There is nothing in haunting. People might dream certain things occasionally.’ And he said, ‘Besides, if you have any nerve.’ I said, ‘Harry, I have nerve, if you drive me to show it. I will show it in the right time, but not in killing them.” We are of the opinion that these exceptions are not well taken. It is true that it is error to admit evidence of other, independent crimes, unless the evidence is in some way relevant to the issue. But we are of the opinion that this evidence was relevant. The evidence tends to show that defendant was still trying to induce the witness to take part in the commission of the crime; that the witness was considerably alarmed at the risks the defendant was about to incur, and was also agitated with superstitious fear. It is fairly to be inferred that the object of defendant in making these admissions was to allay these fears, and nerve the witness up so that he would take part in the commission of the murder. These admissions are connected and material parts of the conversation between the parties.

2. One Vallely was called as a witness for the state, and permitted to testify that he was a hackman, and had been for years; that he was well acquainted with defendant, who had frequently employed him; that in July, prior to the murder, defendant, while sitting in his hack about 4 o'clock one morning, asked him some questions. Said the witness: “A. Well, he was questioning me in regard to my conscience; if I done any deeds, or anything like that, would my conscience bother me afterwards? I told him it would. He did not mention what the deed was.” “A. He asked me about driving into the lake with a party in a hack (he did not say what; he did not say who it was,—man or woman, or what), and turn off and let the team go and come out. I told him I was no swimmer.” “A. He wanted to know if the team was fractious. I told him they were. Supposing they would start them and turn them loose, pull them off to the bluff,—something like that,—would it be apt to do the whole rig up? I told him it would. He asked me what I would take for the rig. I told him. He asked me if I cared what was done with the rig after he had it. I told him no, it was immaterial to me.” “A. Well, he asked me some questions that I cannot just remember, in regard to having somebody in the rig and letting the team run away, or some way in that shape, if everything was fixed so nobody could find it out afterward.” Defendant's objections to this testimony were overruled, and he assigns this as error. We are of the opinion that the evidence was competent. It is true that the conversation testified to occurred some four or five months before the murder. But it appears by the evidence that intimate business and social relations existed between defendant...

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  • State v. Ames
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
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