State v. Hearns

• Decision Date: 26 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. SC05-2122.,SC05-2122.
• Citation: State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2007)
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Bill Monroe HEARNS, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

961 So.2d 211

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v.Bill Monroe HEARNS, Respondent.

No. SC05-2122.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 26, 2007.

Rehearing Denied July 10, 2007.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Richard L. Polin, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals and Douglas J. Glaid, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Godfrey, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Respondent.

CANTERO, J.

In this case, we decide whether battery on a law enforcement officer (BOLEO) is a "forcible felony" for purposes of a statute that increases criminal sentences for violent career criminals.We review Hearns v. State,912 So.2d 377(Fla. 3d DCA2005), based on express and direct conflict on two issues.First, the decision conflicts with our decision in Perkins v. State,576 So.2d 1310(Fla.1991), on the issue of whether, in determining whether a particular crime is a "forcible felony," one considers the evidence in the case or only the statutory elements of the offense.Second, the decision conflicts with cases from other district courts of appeal on the question of whether BOLEO is a forcible felony.We have jurisdiction.Seeart. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.As we explain below, we approve the result in this case, holding that BOLEO is not a forcible felony, but disapprove part of the district court's reasoning.Consistent with our decision in Perkins, we hold that, in determining whether a crime constitutes a forcible felony, courts must consider only the statutory elements of the offense, regardless of the particular circumstances involved.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2000, Respondent, Bill Monroe Hearns, was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a three-time convicted felon.The trial court designated him a violent career criminal (VCC) under section 775.084, Florida Statutes(2000), and pursuant to that statute sentenced him to life in prison.One of the qualifying offenses on which the trial court relied in designating Hearns a violent career criminal was a 1985 conviction for BOLEO.On direct appeal, the district court affirmed the sentence.

Respondent then filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that BOLEO should not be considered a qualifying offense for VCC sentencing.The trial court denied the postconviction motion and Respondent appealed.The district court initially affirmed the trial court's denial, but on rehearing it reversed, holding that "[b]attery on a law enforcement officer . . . is not invariably a qualified offense for VCC sentencing."Hearns,912 So.2d at 379.The district court noted that BOLEO may be committed either through an unwanted touching or by causing bodily harm to a law enforcement officer.Citing our holding in Perkins,576 So.2d at 1310, the court held that BOLEO is a forcible felony only when it involves bodily harm.The court held that for a BOLEO conviction to qualify as a forcible felony under the VCC statute, the State must prove that the defendant caused bodily harm, rather than mere unwanted touching.Hearns,912 So.2d at 377.¹The State sought review in this Court.

II.ANALYSIS

Two issues of conflict arise in this case.The first is the district court's holding that to obtain a VCC designation based on a conviction of BOLEO, the State may (or must) prove that the circumstances of the particular case involved bodily harm.In Perkins,576 So.2d at 1310, however, we held that in determining whether an offense constitutes a forcible felony, a court may only consider the statutory elements.The particular circumstances are irrelevant.The second conflict is the district court's holding that "mere unwanted touching" does not "involve the use or threat of use of physical force or violence."That holding conflicts with cases from other courts of appeal.SeeJenkins v. State,884 So.2d 1014(Fla. 1st DCA2004);State v. Crenshaw,792 So.2d 582(Fla. 2d DCA2001);Brown v. State,789 So.2d 366(Fla. 2d DCA2001);Spann v. State,772 So.2d 38(Fla. 4th DCA2000);Branch v. State,790 So.2d 437(Fla. 1st DCA2000).

We resolve these conflicts by (A) examining the relevant statutes involved in this case; (B) reviewing the test we articulated in Perkins for determining whether an offense is a forcible felony; (C) analyzing the conflict among the district courts; and (D) applying our Perkins test to the BOLEO statute to resolve the conflict between the district courts.

A.The Statutes

Three statutes inform our analysis: those defining battery and criminalizing BOLEO, and the violent career criminal statute.We discuss each in turn.

1.Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer (BOLEO)

Under the Florida Statutes, battery is a crime, but it is not always a felony.Two battery statutes are relevant in this case: simple battery, section 784.03, Florida Statutes(2006), and battery on a law enforcement officer, section 784.07, Florida Statutes(2006).The simple battery statute provides:

(1)(a) The offense of battery occurs when a person:

1.Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or

2.Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who commits battery commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

§ 784.03(1), Fla. Stat.(2006).²As can be seen, subsections (1)(a)(1) and (1)(a)(2) describe two distinct levels of force.This distinction is usually irrelevant because the offense is complete regardless of which subsection applies.The difference acquires meaning, however, in the context of VCC sentencing.

When simple battery is committed on a law enforcement officer, it becomes the separate offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, or BOLEO.The BOLEO statute converts the crime from a first-degree misdemeanor to a third-degree felony:

Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer . . . the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: . . .

(b) in the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree.

§ 784.07(2)(b)(emphasis added).The underlying conduct required for simple battery and BOLEO is identical.The only differences are the status of the victim and the penalty imposed.

2.The VCC and the Forcible Felony Statutes

The violent career criminal statute, section 775.084(1)(d), Florida Statutes(2000), is intended to deter recidivism by imposing longer sentences on repeat offenders."[T]o be sentenced as a violent career criminal, a defendant must have been previously incarcerated in state or federal prison, must have been convicted three times as an adult of certain violent felonies (listed in the statute), and must have committed another such offense within the above time frame."Clines v. State,912 So.2d 550, 553(Fla.2005).The felonies that qualify for designation as a violent career criminal are:

a. Any forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08;

b. Aggravated stalking . . .

c. Aggravated child abuse . . .

d. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person . . .

e. Lewd, lascivious, or indecent conduct . . .

f. Escape . . .

g. A felony violation of chapter 790 involving the use or possession of a firearm.

§ 775.084(1)(d)(1)(emphasis added).

The statute does not specifically list BOLEO, or even battery, as a qualifying offense.Therefore, that crime qualifies only under the catchall provision in subsection (a), and only if it constitutes a "forcible felony, as described in"section 776.08, Florida Statutes(2000).That section defines "forcible felony" as

treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery; carjacking; home-invasion robbery; robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated battery; aggravated stalking; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.

§ 776.08, Fla. Stat.(2000)(emphasis added).Again, although that section does list some types of battery (sexual battery and aggravated battery), it does not mention BOLEO.Therefore, for BOLEO to qualify as a forcible felony it must fall within the meaning of the catchall clause of the statute—"any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual."Id.

As noted above, by definition BOLEO is a simple battery committed on a law enforcement officer.Under section 784.03, a battery is committed by (a) actually and intentionally touching or striking another person against the will of the other, which may, but need not, involve "the use or threat of physical force or violence;" or (b) intentionally causing bodily harm, which definitely would involve "the use or threat of physical force or violence."Therefore, BOLEO may or may not be a forcible felony, depending on the circumstances.

B.Our Decision inPerkins

In reversing the defendant's VCC designation, the district court considered that the State presented no evidence that Hearns's BOLEO conviction involved the use or threat of force.In Perkins, however, we clarified that the particular circumstances of the case do not matter.In that case, the defendant shot and killed a drug dealer who tried to rob him during a drug sale.The defendant claimed self-defense.The State argued that the defense was not available because at the time of the shooting the defendant was engaged in cocaine trafficking, which, the State argued, was a forcible felony under the final clause of section 776.08.We rejected that argument and articulated a "statutory elements" test for determining whether an offense is a forcible felony within the meaning of the final clause of section 776.08:

The statute does not say that a forcible felony is any felony that "may sometimes" involve violence, or even a...