State v. Heath, 01-629.

Decision Date14 May 2004
Docket NumberNo. 01-629.,01-629.
PartiesSTATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DOUGLAS HEATH, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

For Appellant: Gary E. Wilcox, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana.

For Respondent: Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; John Paulson, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana.

Dennis Paxinos, County Attorney; Rod Souza, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana.

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Douglas Heath (Heath) entered guilty pleas to one count of theft, for violation of § 45-6-301(1)(a), MCA (1999), a felony, and one count of possession of burglary tools, a violation of § 45-6-205, MCA, a misdemeanor, and, on April 19, 2001, was sentenced to a term of ten years in the Montana State Prison, with two years suspended upon conditions, including payment of restitution. Heath appealed from the judgment, challenging the District Court's imposition of restitution on several grounds.

¶2 On February 5, 2002, this Court entered an order, sua sponte, indicating that "we have determined that the trial court did not consider and the parties have not addressed an issue that may be dispositive of this appeal." Our order referenced a footnote in this Court's opinion in State v. Horton, 2001 MT 100, 305 Mont. 242, 25 P.3d 886, issued June 12, 2001, which explained that "an apparent codification error" in the 1999 amendments to § 46-18-201, MCA, had raised a question about a sentencing court's continued authority to impose restitution as a condition of a suspended execution of sentence. Horton, ¶ 28, n. 3. We remanded for further consideration "[b]ecause the trial court and the parties did not consider this issue and because the footnote reference in Horton is dicta," and held the case in abeyance pending further proceedings in the District Court.

¶3 The District Court entered an order May 15, 2002, concluding that the 1999 statutory amendments had not eliminated a sentencing court's authority to impose restitution as a condition of a suspended sentence, and affirming Heath's original sentence. Following supplemental briefing, we undertook review of all issues on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

¶4 We address the following issues:

¶5 1. Did the District Court err by requiring payment of restitution as a condition of the suspended portion of a sentence imposed for a crime committed after October 1, 1999?

¶6 2. Did the District Court err in ordering restitution because the Presentence Investigation Report contained insufficient information?

¶7 3. Was the amount of restitution ordered by the District Court supported by substantial credible evidence?

¶8 4. Did the District Court err by failing to establish the amount, method and time of restitution payments?

BACKGROUND

¶9 On June 5, 2000, Donald and Renate Cooper, en route on their move from Colorado to Washington, checked into a hotel in Billings. In the early morning hours of June 6, the Coopers were notified by hotel personnel that their vehicle had been broken into. Two suitcases and a bag containing clothes, books, a camera, miscellaneous items, and, particularly, a large jewelry collection, had been taken. The jewelry collection had been gifted to Renate Cooper (Cooper) by her mother, a resident of Germany who had accumulated the collection over a forty-year period. The collection consisted of over 120 pieces, including rings, bracelets, necklaces, pendants, broaches and earrings which held diamonds, pearls, sapphires, rubies, emeralds, quartz and other precious gems.

¶10 Police later arrested and charged Heath in connection with the crime. Part of the jewelry collection was recovered. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Heath entered guilty pleas to felony theft and misdemeanor possession of burglary tools, and a presentence investigation report (PSI) was thereafter completed, which included Cooper's detailed itemization of the jewelry collection. Cooper estimated the value of the entire collection, which was not separately insured, to be $120,000. The PSI included documentation of a claim which the Coopers filed against their insurer, State Farm, and State Farm's payment to the Coopers of $3,699.90 for various losses arising from the incident. The PSI recommended that Heath be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $123,699.90, reimbursing the Coopers and State Farm for the respective amounts claimed. The PSI also noted that Heath had obtained his GED, that, though presently unemployed, Heath had been employed in construction and in restaurants, and that he had no assets and $1,000 in debts.

¶11 At the sentencing hearing, testimony by Cooper and from a jewelry expert, and other evidence regarding the value of the jewelry was offered. Heath testified that "I have always been employable here in town and made pretty good money" in the construction trade, stating he had made up to $24,000 a year. Heath stated that he accepted full responsibility for his actions, and testified that, upon release, he could make restitution payments of $100 or $200 per month. He indicated he had no debts other than a $1000 fine arising from another matter.

¶12 The District Court imposed a ten-year sentence to Montana State Prison, suspending two years "for the reason that I want you to have some additional opportunity to become employed and pay restitution." The court imposed restitution in the amount of $22,500, and ordered a portion of Heath's prison wages to be applied to his restitution obligation. The court further ordered that restitution would be made "in monthly payments on a schedule to be supervised and regulated by the Adult Probation and Parole" office. From the judgment, Heath appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 This Court reviews a criminal sentence for legality. State v. Pritchett, 2000 MT 261, ¶ 6, 302 Mont. 1, ¶ 6, 11 P.3d 539, ¶ 6. Our review is confined to whether the sentence is within the parameters provided by statute. Pritchett, ¶ 6. We review a district court's findings of fact to determine whether the findings are clearly erroneous, including those findings regarding the amount of restitution. State v. Hilgers, 1999 MT 284, ¶ 6, 297 Mont. 23, ¶ 6, 989 P.2d 866, ¶ 6.

DISCUSSION

¶14 1. Did the District Court err by requiring payment of restitution as a condition of the suspended portion of a sentence imposed for a crime committed after October 1, 1999?

¶15 Heath contends that the District Court was without authority to impose restitution as a condition of the suspended portion of his sentence under the 1999 amendments to § 46-18-201, MCA. His argument is understood by comparing the 1997 and 1999 versions of this statute.

¶16 Section 46-18-201, MCA (1997), provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

Sentences that may be imposed. (1) Whenever a person has been found guilty of an offense upon a verdict or a plea of guilty, the court may:
(a) defer imposition of sentence . . . . The sentencing judge may impose upon the defendant any reasonable restrictions or conditions during the period of the deferred imposition. Reasonable restrictions or conditions may include:
(i) - (xiv) [list of 14 restrictions and conditions]
(b) suspend execution of sentence. . . . The sentencing judge may impose on the defendant any reasonable restrictions or conditions during the period of suspended sentence. Reasonable restrictions or conditions may include any of those listed in subsection (1)(a).
. . . .
(2) In addition to any penalties imposed pursuant to subsection (1), if the court finds that the victim of the offense has sustained a pecuniary loss, the court shall require payment of full restitution to the victim as provided in XX-XX-XXX through XX-XX-XXX.

The language in subsection (2) requiring payment of restitution "[i]n addition to the penalties imposed pursuant to subsection (1)" was a clear directive for sentencing courts to impose restitution in addition to other penalties or conditions imposed for either deferred or suspended sentences, because "subsection (1)" included the restrictions imposed for deferred sentences, listed under subsection (1)(a), as well as the restrictions imposed upon suspended sentences, listed under subsection (1)(b).

¶17 The 1999 Montana Legislature enacted House Bill 48, "An Act Generally Revising and Clarifying Certain Sentencing-Related Criminal Procedure Statutes," as Chapter 52, Laws of Montana (1999), which revised the structure of § 46-18-201, MCA.1 The new provision stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

Sentences that may be imposed. (1)(a) Whenever a person has been found guilty of an offense upon a verdict or plea of guilty . . . a sentencing judge may defer imposition of sentence. . . .
(b) . . . [I]mposition of sentence in a felony case may not be deferred in the case of an offender who has been convicted of a felony on a prior occasion, whether or not the sentence was imposed, imposition of the sentence was deferred, or execution of the sentence was suspended.
(2) Whenever a person has been found guilty of an offense upon a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty . . . a sentencing judge may suspend execution of sentence. . . .
. . . .
(4) When deferring imposition of sentence or suspending all or a portion of execution of sentence, the sentencing judge may impose upon the offender any reasonable restrictions or conditions during the period of the deferred imposition or suspension of sentence. Reasonable restrictions or conditions imposed under subsection (1)(a) or (2) may include but are not limited to:
(a) - (o) [list of 15 restrictions and conditions]
(5) In addition to any penalties imposed pursuant to subsection (1), if the sentencing judge finds that the victim of the offense has sustained a pecuniary loss, the sentencing judge shall require payment of full restitution to the victim as provided
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