State v. Hebenstreit
| Citation | 514 P.3d 26 |
| Decision Date | 12 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-38654 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Davis HEBENSTREIT a/k/a Davis Todd Hebenstreit, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Meryl Francolini, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM for Appellant
Joseph Sullivan, Albuquerque, NM for Appellee
{1} The March 24, 2022, memorandum opinion is withdrawn, and this formal opinion replaces it based on the April 8, 2022, order granting the State's motion to publish. The State appeals the metropolitan court's order dismissing without prejudice the State's criminal complaint against Defendant Davis Hebenstreit. The metropolitan court dismissed the complaint based on the unavailability of a State witness at trial. The State argues the metropolitan court erred in dismissing the complaint because the witness was not necessary to the prosecution of the case. We reverse and remand.
{2} This case arises from a stop at a sobriety checkpoint. Defendant was stopped at the checkpoint and later charged with aggravated DWI based on refusal to submit to chemical testing, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(D)(3) (2016).
{3} Defendant filed a motion to suppress based upon lack of reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant. The motion included the statement, "[D]efendant was detained by law enforcement[ ] unlawfully" and argued that Deputy Gallegos—the officer who made contact with Defendant at the checkpoint—"did not have reasonable suspicion to detain [D]efendant initially [or] ... beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop."
{4} On October 30, 2019, the parties convened for a bench trial. The State indicated it was ready to proceed to trial and that Deputy Gallegos and Sergeant LeCompte—the sobriety checkpoint's supervising officer—would be available to testify. Defendant, however, stated he was not ready to proceed because, while he had interviewed Deputy Gallegos, he had not yet had the opportunity to interview Sergeant LeCompte. The State responded that Defendant's motion to suppress did not challenge the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint itself, and therefore Sergeant LeCompte's testimony was "technically not relevant" because it was Deputy Gallegos who made contact with Defendant at the sobriety checkpoint and conducted the field sobriety test. Defendant answered that his motion was a "place marker" until he could interview Sergeant LeCompte. Defendant also argued that, since a sobriety checkpoint is an exception to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, the State had the burden of showing that the checkpoint was constitutional, and Sergeant LeCompte was therefore a necessary witness. In response, the metropolitan court issued a subpoena for a pretrial statement from Sergeant LeCompte and reset the trial for a later date.
Defendant interviewed Sergeant LeCompte on November 21, 2019.
{5} At the rescheduled bench trial on December 3, 2019, Deputy Gallegos was present but Sergeant LeCompte was unavailable to testify. After considering the requirements governing motions under Rule 7-304 NMRA, the metropolitan court concluded that Defendant's motion "was made as a place marker with enough specificity to trigger ... the [necessity]" of Sergeant LeCompte's testimony at trial. The court therefore dismissed the case without prejudice. The State appeals.
{6} The State argues the metropolitan court erred in concluding that Defendant's motion to suppress attacked the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint with adequate particularity as required by Rule 7-304. Because Defendant's motion did not challenge the checkpoint's constitutionality with sufficient particularity, the State contends Defendant waived this issue for purposes of trial. And because Defendant had waived any challenge to the checkpoint's constitutionality, the State argues, Sergeant LeCompte's testimony—which would have been limited to addressing the checkpoint's constitutionality—was unnecessary and irrelevant to the prosecution of the case. As a result, the State argues the metropolitan court erred in dismissing the complaint due to Sergeant LeCompte's unavailability at trial.
{7} Defendant argues that his motion to suppress, which challenged his detention and invoked the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10, sufficiently raised the constitutionality of the checkpoint to shift the burden to the State to prove Defendant's detention was lawful. Likewise, Defendant contends that his oral arguments before the metropolitan court sufficiently raised the constitutionality of the checkpoint by arguing that a sobriety checkpoint is an exception to the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10, and therefore the State had the burden to show the checkpoint was constitutional. Defendant urges us to review the dismissal of the complaint under an abuse of discretion standard.
{8} Allen v. LeMaster , 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 11, 267 P.3d 806. Rule 7-304(B) provides in relevant part that motions to the metropolitan court "shall state with particularity the grounds therefor." Accord State v. Goss , 1991-NMCA-003, ¶ 13, 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228 (). "efendants have the burden to raise an issue as to their illegal search and seizure claims. State v. Ponce , 2004-NMCA-137, ¶ 7, 136 N.M. 614, 103 P.3d 54 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Because this case turns on whether Defendant sufficiently raised an issue as to the illegality of the sobriety checkpoint, we consider the metropolitan court's application of Rule 7-304 in light of our law governing the legality of these checkpoints. "Although there is no question that a [sobriety checkpoint] is a seizure, a [checkpoint] does not require reasonable suspicion or probable cause with respect to a particular motorist." State v. Bates , 1995-NMCA-080, ¶ 9, 120 N.M. 457, 902 P.2d 1060. "[T]he constitutionality of the [checkpoint] depends on whether it is reasonable." Id. ¶ 6 ; see also State v. Bolton , 1990-NMCA-107, ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 28, 801 P.2d 98 (). A sobriety checkpoint "is constitutionally permissible so long as it is reasonable within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment as measured by its substantial compliance with [eight factors]." City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt , 1987-NMCA-039, ¶ 24, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161. "[A] sobriety checkpoint conducted in substantial compliance with the eight Betancourt factors is [also] constitutional under the New Mexico Constitution."
State v. Madalena, 1995-NMCA-122, ¶ 26, 121 N.M. 63, 908 P.2d 756.
{9} We conclude Defendant's motion was insufficiently particular to alert the metropolitan court or State that the grounds for suppressing evidence related to the checkpoint's illegality. See Goss , 1991-NMCA-003, ¶ 13, 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228 (); see also City of Santa Fe v. Marquez , 2012-NMSC-031, ¶ 27, 285 P.3d 637 . The record reflects that Defendant's motion did not specifically challenge the legality of the checkpoint or argue the State failed to comply with any of the Betancourt guidelines for determining whether a checkpoint is reasonable. Cf. Goss , 1991-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 10, 14, 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228 ().1 Defendant's motion does not cite Betancourt , mention any of Betancourt ’s guidelines or facts implicating these guidelines, or use the term checkpoint or roadblock.
{10} Defendant's motion, rather, was based upon the State lacking reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant. The reasonable suspicion required for a continued investigatory detention related to a sobriety checkpoint, however, is not required to stop a particular motorist at the checkpoint initially; the legality of a checkpoint stop and the legality of an investigative detention arising from that stop are distinct issues such that raising one does not necessarily implicate the other. Compare Bates , 1995-NMCA-080, ¶ 9, 120 N.M. 457, 902 P.2d 1060 (), with State v. Hall , 2016-NMCA-080, ¶ 17, 380 P.3d 884 (), and State v. Anaya , 2009-NMSC-043, ¶ 15, 147 N.M. 100, 217 P.3d 586 ().2
{11} Although Defendant's motion does state, "[D]efendant was detained by law...
To continue reading
Request your trial