State v. Hebert, 288
| Decision Date | 01 December 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 288,288 |
| Parties | STATE of Vermont v. Arnold M. HEBERT. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Robert D. Rachlin, State's Atty., St. Johnsbury, for the State.
Davis, Martin & Free, Barre, for respondent.
Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.
As a consequence of a speeding conviction, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles ordered the suspension of Arnold M. Hebert's license to operate a motor vehicle for a period of fifteen days. The order was dated January 28, 1963 and directed Hebert, the respondent, to surrender his operator's license immediately upon receipt of the order of suspension. The order was mailed by certified mail to the respondent at St. Johnsbury, Vermont.
Soon after the communication reached the post office, the respondent presented a notice of arrival card to the registry window. The envelope indicated a return receipt was required from the addressee and carried the instruction--'After five days return to Department of Motor Vehicles.'
Before signing for the communication, the respondent stated to the postal clerk: The respondent did not return for the communication within five days. At that time, the letter was returned to he Department of Motor Vehicles at Montpelier, marked 'UNCLAIMED'.
On February 6, 1963, the respondent was halted by a state police officer while operating his automobile on a public highway. A prosecution followed which resulted in the respondent's conviction, after trial by jury, for driving while under suspension in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 674.
This appeal by the respondent challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence. It is his contention that he had no actual notice of the suspension of his license until he was stopped by the police officer. He argues that without evidence that the order of suspension and demand for surrender of his operator's license was actually communicated to him, his conviction cannot stand.
23 V.S.A. § 204 provides:
It is not questioned that the commissioner had statutory authority to suspend the respondent's license for the period specified. The commissioner took each administrative step required by section 204 to accomplish an...
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Aiken v. Malloy
...conviction in a court of law of this State. See 23 V.S.A. § 204; State v. Cattanach, 129 Vt. 57, 271 A.2d 838 (1970); State v. Hebert, 124 Vt. 377, 205 A.2d 816 (1964). In such a case, our Constitution imposes all necessary due process requirements to protect the defendant in our courts of ......
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State v. Teasley
...such compliance constituted constructive notice to the defendant that his license had been suspended. G.S. § 20--48; State v. Hebert, 124 Vt. 377, 205 A.2d 816 (1964); Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Fisher, 117 Ohio App. 59, 189 N.E.2d 744 (1962); State v. Barber, 24 Conn.Sup. 346, 190 A.2d 49......
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State v. Hughes
...Johnson, (Supreme Ct. of N.D.), 139 N.W.2d 157 (opinion does not specify whether ordinary, certified or registered mail); State v. Hebert, 124 Vt. 377, 205 A.2d 816 (certified Even if it be conceded Arguendo that proof of actual knowledge is not required and that constructive notice by ordi......
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State v. Cattanach, 123-69
...vehicle department, will not thwart a prosecution for the offense of driving under the suspension he has imposed. State of Vermont v. Hebert, 124 Vt. 377, 379, 205 A.2d 816. We are mindful that in the Hebert case the State produced evidence that the accused knew that the commissioner's noti......